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AUDITING DATABASE SYSTEMS THROUGH FORENSIC ANALYSIS 
ABSTRACT 
The majority of sensitive and personal data is stored in a number of 
different Database Management Systems (DBMS). For example, Oracle is 
frequently used to store corporate data, MySQL serves as the back-end storage for 
many webstores, and SQLite stores personal data such as SMS messages or 
browser bookmarks. Consequently, the pervasive use of DBMSes has led to an 
increase in the rate at which they are exploited in cybercrimes. After a cybercrime 
occurs, investigators need forensic tools and methods to recreate a timeline of 
events and determine the extent of the security breach. When a breach involves a 
compromised system, these tools must make few assumptions about the system 
(e.g., corrupt storage, poorly configured logging, data tampering). Since DBMSes 
manage storage independent of the operating system, they require their own set of 
forensic tools. 
This dissertation presents 1) our database-agnostic forensic methods to 
examine. DBMS contents from any evidence source (e.g., disk images or RAM 
snapshots) without using a live system and 2) applications of our forensic analysis 
methods to secure data. The foundation of this analysis is page carving, our novel 
database forensic method that we implemented as the tool DBCarver. We 
demonstrate that DBCarver is capable of reconstructing DBMS contents, 
iv 
 
including metadata and deleted data, from various types of digital evidence. Since 
DBMS storage is managed independently of the operating system, DBCarver can 
be used for new methods to securely delete data (i.e., data sanitization). In the 
event of suspected log tampering or direct modification to DBMS storage, 
DBCarver can be used to verify log integrity and discover storage inconsistencies. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cyber-crime (e.g., data exfiltration or computer fraud) is a significant concern in today’s
society. A well-known fact from security research and practice is that unbreakable security
measures are virtually impossible to create. For example, 1) incomplete access control re-
strictions allows users to execute commands beyond their intended roles, and 2) users may
illegally obtain privileges by exploiting security holes in a Database Management System
(DBMS) or OS code or through other means (e.g., social engineering). Thus, in addition
to deploying preventive measures (e.g., access control), it is necessary to 1) detect secu-
rity breaches in a timely fashion, and 2) collect evidence about attacks to devise counter-
measures and assess the extent of the damage (e.g., what data was leaked or perturbed).
This evidence provides preparation for legal action or can be leveraged to improve security
and prevent future attacks.
DBMSes are targeted by criminals because they serve as repositories of data. Therefore,
investigators must have the capacity to examine and forensically interpret contents of a
DBMS. Currently, an audit log with SQL query history is a critical (and perhaps only)
source of evidence for investigators [51] when a malicious operation is suspected. However,
in field conditions, a DBMS may not provide the necessary logging granularity (unavailable
or disabled). Moreover, the storage itself might be corrupt or contain multiple DBMSes.
Digital forensics provides approaches for an independent analysis with minimal as-
sumptions about the environment. A particularly important and well-recognized technique
is file carving [25, 73], which extracts files (but not DBMS files) from a disk image, includ-
ing deleted or corrupted files. Traditional file carving techniques interpret files (e.g., JPEG,
PDF) individually and rely on file headers. DBMS files, on the other hand, do not maintain
a file header and are never independent (e.g., table contents are stored separate from table
name and logical structure information). Even if DBMS files could be carved, they can-
not be meaningfully imported into a different DBMS and must be parsed to retrieve their
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content. To accomplish that task, DBMSes need their own set of digital forensics rules and
tools.
Even in an environment with ideal log settings, DBMSes can not necessarily guarantee
log accuracy or their immunity from tampering. For example, log tampering is a concern
when a data breach originated from a privileged user such as an administrator (DBA or
an attacker who obtained DBA privileges). Tamper-proof logging mechanisms were pre-
viously proposed [64, 80], but these only prevent logs from illegitimate modifications and
do not account for attacks that skirt logging (e.g., logging was disabled). Knowing that
even privileged users have almost no control of the lowest level DBMS storage, an analysis
of forensic artifacts provides a unique approach to identify data tampering in an untrusted
environment.
The primary goal of this work is to 1) develop forensic methods for DBMSes, and
2) use these methods to detect and describe security breaches in untrusted environments.
A secondary goal of this work is to use our forensic methods to understand and optimize
database storage beyond what DBMSes typically expose and support.
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Figure 1.1: Dissertation overview. Publications include [86, 87, 85, 91, 93, 89, 88, 92, 90].
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1.1 Overview
Figure 1.1 displays a diagram to visualize for the reader how the chapters of this dissertation
are interrelated and serves as a guideline to read the material. Chapter 2 introduces database
systems terminology and concepts used throughout this dissertation. Database storage at
the page level, auxiliary object behavior, and additional database operations are covered.
1.1.1 Part 1: Database Forensic Carving
The first part of this dissertation focuses on collecting forensic artifacts from carving
database storage. Chapter 3 presents our novel database forensic method, page carving,
and introduces our page carving implementation, DBCarver. Page carving was developed
as the database compliment to file carving to reconstruct database contents independent of
the DBMS and OS. We previously presented page carving and DBCarver in [86, 87, 91].
Chapter 4 builds upon Chapter 3 by presenting the algorithms used by DBCarver in de-
tail. The difference between these two chapters is that the material presented in Chapter 3 is
based on the research published in [86, 87, 91], whereas Chapter 4 discusses algorithms in
more detail than would typically be included in a research paper and are more appropriate
for a patent.
1.1.2 Part 2: Standardized Storage & Abstraction
The second part of this dissertation extends the work in Part 1 by presenting a standard
storage format for database forensics and an API to access this data. Chapter 5 describes our
standard storage format, the Database Forensic File Format (DB3F), to store page carving
results. DB3F abstracts DBMS storage engine specifics that can be used by all database
carving tools, not just DBCarver, simplifying application development in Part 3 of this
dissertation. Chapter 5 is based on the research published in [88]. Chapter 6 extends the
work in Chapter 5 by presenting an API called Open Database Storage Access (ODSA),
which the applications described in Part 3 can use to access DB3F files. Chapter 6 is based
on the work published in [92, 90].
1.1.3 Part 3: Applications
The third part of this dissertation presents applications that require the database forensics
data extracted by approaches in Part 1. Chapter 7 addresses an attack vector where logging
was disabled by a database administrator (or an attacker with similar privileges). Chapter 7
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is based on the worked published in [85]. Chapter 8 addresses direct DBMS file tamper-
ing without SQL commands by a system administrator. Chapter 8 is based on the work
published in [89]. Finally, Chapter 9 presents a method for approximate data clustering.
Rather than strictly ordering data (to improve data access speed), sections of approximately
ordered data can be scanned at with competitive query runtimes. Chapter 9 is based on the
worked published in [93]. While this is not an exhaustive list of applications that require
database forensic data, other applications remain as future work.
1.1.4 Future Work and Conclusion
The final part of this dissertation consists of an overview of future work in Chapter 10 and
a conclusion in Chapter 11. Future work describes our plans for a more thorough testing
of approaches presented in this dissertation and of database forensics in general; it also
discusses building on our novel methods in database forensics to expand this research to all
of digital forensics.
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Chapter 2
Background
The material in this dissertation requires access and modifications to database storage at
the page level. Internal database storage at the page level is, by design, hidden from users –
and thus our approach requires an understanding of database storage. In this chapter, we
provide a generalized description of database storage at the page level for all (relational)
DBMSes and define the terminology used throughout this dissertation. The terminology
and concepts in this chapter apply (but are not limited) to IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server,
Oracle, PostgreSQL, MySQL, Apache Derby, MariaDB, SQLite, and Firebird.
2.1 Pages
The storage layer in relational DBMSes partitions all physical structures (e.g., tables, in-
dexes, and system catalogs) into fixed size pages (typically 4, 8, or 16 KB). A fixed page
size across an entire database instance significantly simplifies storage and cache manage-
ment.
When data is inserted or modified, the DBMS controls data placement within pages
and internally maintains additional metadata. Despite the wide variety of DBMSes from
different vendors on the market, many commonalities exist between DBMSes in how data
is stored and maintained at the page level. Every row-store (storing records values on
the same page) DBMS uses pages with three main structures: header, row directory, and
row data. Figure 2.1.A displays a high-level breakdown of a page with all three of these
structures.
The page header contains metadata describing the user records stored in the page. Fig-
ure 2.1.B demonstrates how some of this metadata could be positioned in a page header.
The checksum is used by the DBMS to detect page corruption – whenever a page is modi-
fied, the checksum is updated. The object identifier represents the object to which the page
belongs. The name of an object (e.g., table name) is not stored in a page, but the object
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Figure 2.1: Page Example: A) high-level, B) header, C) row directory, and D) row data.
identifier can be mapped to the system catalog data to retrieve plaintext name. Depending
on a DBMS, the page identifier is unique to each page for either each object, within a file,
or across all database files. The record count refers to the number of active records within
a page. If a record is deleted in a page the record count is decremented by one; if a record
is added to a page, it is incremented by one.
The row directory stores pointers to each record – when a record is added to a page, a
corresponding pointer is added to the row directory. Figure 2.1.C shows an example of how
the row directory could be positioned. The row data segment stores user data along with
metadata that describes record layout. Figure 2.1.D shows an example of how the row data
may be structured (within minor DBMS-specific variations). In this example, each record
stores a row delimiter, row identifier, column count, value sizes, and the user data values.
The row delimiter marks the start of a record and is typically where row directory entries
point to. The row identifier is a subset of an internal database pseudo-column. The column
count represents the number of columns in that record. The sizes of values are typically
stored for strings, but not other data types (e.g., integers).
2.2 Auxiliary Objects
System Catalog The system catalog refers to the data and metadata maintained by the
DBMS. The system catalog is stored in tables and pages just like user data (with a few
variations in the row data). Sometimes the system catalog tables use domain datatypes that
are not available to the user (e.g., the Object Name datatype in PostgreSQL). Examples
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of data and metadata stored in the system catalog are object types (e.g., table or index),
object plaintext name (e.g., customer or employee), and object identifier, which is a unique
identifier for each object stored in the user data page headers.
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Figure 2.2: An example of how an index references a record.
Users interact with DBMS tables; however, multiple copies of user data are stored in
many other internal objects. Copies are stored in auxiliary objects (e.g., indexes, mate-
rialized views) that are used for improving query performance or for constraint enforce-
ment. Note that indexes are created both by explicit user commands or automatically by
the DBMS itself (e.g., primary key or unique constraint).
Indexes An index stores value-pointer pairs (typically a B-Tree structure) to locate rows
within a table, providing performance benefits. A DBMS sometimes creates indexes au-
tomatically – for example, constraints (e.g., primary key or UNIQUE) cause force an index
build. Index value-pointer pairs are stored in pages as the one in Figure 2.1 – an index is
structurally similar to a table that stores (value, pointer) records. It is important for this
dissertation to note that NULL values are not stored in indexes.
Figure 2.2 displays an example index page, and how a value references a record. A
pointer to a table record is stored with each city value. Here, the pointer stores the page
identifier, 8, and the respective row identifier, 25.
Index Organized Tables While MySQL is the only of the known DBMS that creates
index organized tables (IOTs) by default, IOTs are often used in other DBMSes under
different names (e.g., IOT table in Oracle or index included columns in Microsoft SQL
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Server). An IOT is structured as a traditional B-Tree index on the primary key, and all
remaining columns are included columns (or not used for ordering).
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Figure 2.3: An example of how an index references an IOT record.
Figure 2.3 illustrates how a secondary index on the City column points to the record
stored in an IOT. Just as in Figure 2.2, the City index stores value-pointer pairs. However,
in this case the secondary index points to an intermediate page of the IOT B-Tree. The
intermediate page is then used to retrieve the table record from the IOT leaf page.
Materialized views (MVs) MVs are pre-computed queries – unlike views that are “mem-
orized” but not physically stored. For example, if SQL query
SELECT *
FROM Customer
WHERE City = ‘Boston’
is executed often, DBA may choose to construct a BostonCustomers MV that pre-
computes the answer in order to speed up that query. MVs are not created automatically,
but some indirect actions can cause MV to become materialized – e.g., indexing a view in
SQL Server makes it a materialized view.
2.3 Other Database Operation Topics
Constraints A fundamental rule that exists in all relational databases is that a relation
(table) is a set of tuples (rows). Each row must be unique, enforced through a primary key.
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Keys are always unique and by definition can never be NULL (“unknown” or “undefined”);
the DBMS automatically blocks any operation that attempts to violate that rule.
Uniqueness of the primary key is further used to enforce integrity through foreign keys.
A foreign key is a cross-table reference: for example, a loan payment record holds the
loan ID (primary key) to which it belongs. Referential integrity requires such foreign key
references to always be valid – either reference an existing record (e.g., an existing loan
ID) or contain NULL as a placeholder.
Relational database rules furthermore impose a constraint on every table column. Each
column must have a well-defined data type such as INTEGER or VARCHAR(15). As with
other constraints, the DBMS actively enforces these rules by checking every operation that
attempts to modify stored values. Any step found to be in violation of these rules (e.g.,
inserting a sixteen character string into VARCHAR(15)) is blocked.
Query Execution A DBMS engine has two strategies to fetch data from tables: 1) an
index access performs a targeted data retrieval (i.e., use an index to fetch relevant rows), or
2) a full table scan searches the entire table reading both relevant and irrelevant rows. An
index access is only used when an index is available and deemed to be cheaper than a full
table scan.
An SQL query that accesses multiple tables combines them through a join operation.
The default join type is an INNER JOIN, which combines only the matching rows. Using
our loan example, a report about loans and loan payments includes only loans with exist-
ing payments – a loan without any associated payments is on included in the join result.
Several other operations such as NATURAL JOIN or subqueries are also executed as an
INNER JOIN. An SQL query may explicitly request that unmatched values be included
in the result – this operation is known as an OUTER JOIN. An OUTER JOIN in our loan
example returns both loans with and without associated payments, substituting NULLs for
missing loan payment data.
Database Caching In order to explain why the buffer cache contents can be used to
determine how the data was possibly accessed, we will briefly discuss database memory
management concepts. DBMSes manage their own cache separate from the operating sys-
tem. Unallocated space in the buffer cache is commonly referred to as a free buffer. A
free buffer is available to store a page accessed from persistent storage. When a query is
issued, the buffer cache is first searched for the relevant pages. If a page needed to satisfy
a query is found in the buffer cache, the page can be read directly from memory. This is
referred to as a cache hit. A cache miss refers to when the page is not in memory and
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must be read from persistent storage. When a cache miss occurs a free buffer is required.
The least-recently used (LRU) replacement policy is one of the most commonly used ways
to create free buffers. Fundamentally, the LRU replacement policy evicts pages with the
oldest cache hit time. However, some DBMSes may implement a slight variation where
eviction may not occur strictly on pages with the oldest cache hit time.
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Chapter 3
Database Forensics
3.1 Introduction
Because most personal and company data is stored in digital form, forensic analysts are of-
ten tasked with restoring digital data contents or even reconstructing user actions based on
system storage snapshots. The digital data recovery process is composed of both hardware
and software phases. Hardware techniques extract data from physically damaged disks,
while software techniques make sense of the recovered data fragments. Our work pre-
sented here focuses on software-based restoration techniques in the context of DBMSes.
A well-recognized forensic technique is the process of file carving that reconstructs file
contents directly without the use of any file system metadata. If a sufficient portion of the
file can be recovered and recognized, then the content of the file (e.g., images or document
text) can then be restored.
It is our contention that a significant amount of data, particularly what is referred to
as Big Data, is not stored in flat files, but rather resides in a variety of databases within
the organization or personal devices. Standard file carving techniques are insufficient to
meaningfully recover the contents of a database; indeed, without the metadata of the DBMS
(catalog), the contents of database tables could not be presented to the forensic analyst in
a coherent form. The work presented here thus bridges this gap by introducing a novel
database carving approach, page carving, that allows us to reconstruct database contents
and reason about actions performed by the database users.
Our motivating philosophy is that a comprehensive analytic method should reconstruct
everything from all databases. Beyond simple recovery, forensic analysts will benefit from
seeing the “hidden” content, including artifacts in unallocated storage.
In this chapter and the next chapter, we deconstruct database storage and present gener-
alized techniques for reconstructing any database content. We use our page carving method
to restore deleted and unallocated data across a variety of different DBMSes. This chapter
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provides a high-level overview of page carving, and Chapter 4 presents a more detailed
description of the page carving parameters and operation.
3.1.1 Our Contributions
The next two chapters present a comprehensive collection of techniques for forensic anal-
ysis of persistent, volatile, and unallocated database content. The research contributions in
these chapters include:
• A defined set of generalized storage layout parameters used to parse the raw stor-
age of commonly used relational DBMSes.
• A comparison of different storage design decisions made by these DBMSes and
discussion of the resulting implications for forensic analysis.
• A method to reverse-engineer new DBMS storage parameters by iteratively load-
ing synthetic data, executing test SQL commands, and observing resulting storage
changes.
• We also present a tool, DBCarver, that, given a disk image or a RAM snapshot
does the following:
– Identifies intact DBMS pages, even for multiple DBMSes on the same disk, for
all known storage configuration parameters.
– Recovers the logical schema (SQL tables and constraints) and all database
table rows for known parameters (a parameter set will support several different
versions of the DBMS, depending on storage changes version-to-version).
– Extracts a variety of volatile data artifacts (e.g., deleted rows or pre-update
values).
– Detects evidence of user actions such as row insertion order or recently ac-
cessed tables.
• We define similarities and differences in how different databases handle deletion,
explaining why deleted values often remain recoverable for a long duration of
time.
• We also show how non-delete user actions create deleted values in a database.
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• We explain why databases create and keep many additional copies of the data.
Copies that are often created without user’s knowledge and sometimes without
any human action at all.
• We demonstrate how to recover a surprising amount of content from auxiliary
structures used in databases.
• We prove the value of our tool, recovering nonexistent data (de-allocated and/or
surviving past expectations) by testing page carving and DBCarver against many
DBMSes.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 File Carving
Forensic data analysis is generally concerned with recovering partially damaged remnants
of a file, typically from a hard drive. Seminal work by Garfinkel [25] discusses efficient file
carving strategies that rely on file content rather than metadata, in order to restore the con-
tent of a hard drive. [6] presents a mechanism for recovering a compressed file that includes
a corrupted region. Similarly, research that concentrates on the analysis of volatile mem-
ory (RAM flash memory) tends to look for particular patterns of interest. [31] describes a
framework for identifying and capturing data from an Android device in order to protect
that device from malware or investigate and/or audit its owner. Approaching volatile data
analysis also benefits from stochastic forensics defined in [29], which derives probabilis-
tic conclusions about user actions based on side effects of these actions. Our approach
relies a similar idea, with page layout and database caching acting as side effects. [34]
describes collecting data from a running Android device to identify patterns of malicious
software. The goal is to identify malicious applications without an apriori known signature
by observing system events in real-time. Work by [57] presents a generalized process of
performing a version-agnostic Windows memory dump analysis. Similarly, it is our goals
is to generalize the process of database carving (disk or RAM) across all DBMSes and
operating systems.
3.2.2 Database Forensics
Drinkwater had studied carving data out of SQLite storage [17]. SQLite had been the
focus of forensic analysis particularly because it is used in Firefox [66] and in a num-
ber of mobile device applications [70]. [11] investigated recovery of deleted records from
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the Windows Search database. OfficeRecovery provides a number of commercially sold
emergency recovery tools for corrupted DBMSes [54, 56, 55] that support several ver-
sions of each DBMS. OfficeRecovery products recover most of database objects (except
for constraints) – for Oracle that also includes backup file recovery which is not something
we currently support because our primary focus is on a universal multi-DBMS tool. Per-
cona Projects supplies a tool that recovers corrupted or deleted tables in MySQL [65], but
does not recover the schema (and in fact requires that the user to provide the descriptive
data structure for the schema). Stellar Phoenix sells DB2 recovery software for IBM DB2
(UDB) v8 [68] as well as MS SQL Server for multiple versions [69].
Oliver [58] characterized the differences between File System Forensics and Database
Forensics, but did not implement a database reconstruction tool. Adedayo [4] described
techniques for restoring database to an earlier version using the database schema and log
file records. This requires a still-functional database, availability of the log files and a valid
schema. Our work reconstructs data at the page level in database files without relying on
any of these assumptions. We capture the full state of the database, including deleted data
that has survived, rather than restoring the accessible (visible) parts of the database to an
earlier version in time.
3.3 Deconstructing Database Storage
In this section, we delve into how parameter usage varies between different DBMSes and
discuss the implications of the storage design choices. Our tool currently supports eight
distinct DBMSes: Oracle, PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite, Apache Derby, DB2, SQLServer
and FireBird (Section 3.8 lists DBMS versions and parameter settings).
Parameter Orac
le
Pos
tgre
SQL
SQL
ite
Fire
bird
DB2 SQL
Serv
er
MyS
QL
Apa
cheD
erby
Structure Identifier Yes No Yes No
Unique Page Identifier Yes No
Row Directory Sequence Top-to-bottom insertion Bottom-to-top insertion
Row Identifier No Yes No Yes
Column Count Yes No Yes No Yes
Column Sizes Yes No Yes
Column Directory No Yes No
Numbers Stored with Strings Yes No Yes
Table 3.1: A summary of significant page layout trade-offs made by DBMSes.
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3.3.1 Database Storage Parameter Trade-offs
As illustrated in Table 3.1, the majority (six out of eight) of the DBMSes use the structure
identifier which makes it easier to detect the presence of pages in the data image snapshot
and simplifies reassembling DB structures from individual pages. For the remaining two
databases, our tool has to rely on the column count to reconstruct the schema of each
structure (both of these databases do use column count). Therefore in those two databases,
two tables with identical schemas (same number of columns and all column types are the
same) may be erroneously merged into one table when rebuilt. A unique page identifier
is available in all but one of the databases, letting us match the identity of the same page
(e.g., between on-disk and in-memory). In some cases, the unique page identifier is a
composition of different IDs (e.g., file ID plus the page ID) providing some additional
information. The choice of row directory sequence is split (five versus three) between
the different DBMSes. The ordering of the row directory is helpful when recovering data
because it determines the sequence in which rows were initially inserted/added to the page.
The presence or absence of the row identifier is evenly split between the different databases
– in Section 3.3.3 we will also show that the presence of the row identifier is particularly
significant when recovering data in presence of updates and deletes.
Most databases use column count (six versus two), which simplifies the process of
parsing the page. Without the explicit column count, additional effort is required for re-
constructing table contents – in essence our tool would need to discover the schema (see
Section 3.3.2). Once the table schema has been determined, we use structure identifier to
identify its other pages – in all of the databases we have seen so far, at least one of the struc-
ture identifier or column count was always present. Similarly to column count, column sizes
are commonly present in a database page (in six out of eight databases). The use of column
sizes is directly connected with presence of a column directory structure within the raw
data. Intuitively, explicitly storing column sizes simplifies parsing the individual values;
without sizes, databases use a directory that specifies how to find columns within the row.
This parameter choice also coincides with the raw numbers stored with strings decision, as
having a column directory means that the columns do not have to be stored sequentially and
can be interleaved. However, even if strings and numbers are stored separately the relative
ordering (among strings and among numbers) is still preserved.
3.3.2 Parameter Discovery
With the exception of modest user intervention, the collection of storage parameters de-
scribed in Chapter 4 is automated in our tool. We use a combination of our own syntheti-
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cally generated data and the SSBM benchmark data to iteratively populate a database and
use the resulting storage snapshots to auto-detect the parameter values.
Automated parameter discovery User intervention primarily involves creating a config-
uration file for our tool to define the following database characteristics: page size setting,
directory where the database file(s) are stored, database name, and the login credentials
that have sufficient privileges to create tables/load data. If this is a new DBMS, a wrapper
class for that database needs to be created, which will expose a function that can take a user
name, user password, database name and SQL file as arguments, and run the SQL com-
mands against the database. During parameter discovery, we perform inserts individually
(without a bulk loader) because such tools do not preserve the insert order of the rows.
The SQL schema file (e.g., CREATE TABLE commands) may require changes depend-
ing on the particular database because, unfortunately, different data types are defined in-
consistently. For example, owing to legacy issues, Oracle uses the VARCHAR2 type instead
of VARCHAR type. Also, in most databases implement DATE type differently (it may include
the time or a separate TIMESTAMP may be present). Some global settings may also need
to be adjusted: MySQL needs to have the storage engine set to InnoDB because the old
storage engine (which is no longer used in recent versions) does not use pages.
Recovering database schema If the table schema is not available and no column count
is present in the pages, discovering the original schema requires additional work. Our
tool approaches that problem by approximating the schema and parsing the data under that
assumption. If the schema is incorrect, the parser eventually encounters an error while
deconstructing the data and a new schema is attempted instead. Only three out of the eight
databases may require this approach and, since they all include a structure identifier, once
the schema of the page has been discovered, all other pages from the same structure are
easy to identify.
By looking at the recovered data, we can also discover other components of the schema.
We automatically identify columns that contain unique values throughout the entire table,
which tells us that the column is likely to have a UNIQUE or a PRIMARY KEY constraint.
By comparing these columns we can identify primary keys (because foreign keys refer to
primary keys).
3.3.3 Reconstructing Volatile Artifacts
When database contents are updated, that action creates a number of opportunities. First,
we recover the newly introduced data from inserts and updates. Second, we can recover
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recently performed user actions (i.e., reconstructing the fact that data was inserted, deleted
or updated). Third, we can discover information about the changes that were canceled and
undone (i.e., aborted transactions). The latter category is the most interesting, because this
information would normally be unavailable to users even if the database were operating
normally.
INSERT Insert operations supply relatively little information (beyond data itself) be-
cause a brand new row is created. We can use the storage order to reconstruct the order
of insertion. For performance reasons, new rows would typically be appended to existing
(partially free) database pages as they are inserted into tables. We can also sometime de-
termine if the entire page has been bulk loaded based on the insert pattern; if the rows were
inserted individually, we can determine that insert order.
DELETE The deletion of rows provides more information. Just as file systems marks
a file “deleted”, databases would mark rows “deleted” as well. When a row is deleted in
Oracle and ApacheDerby, the page header and row delimiter are marked. When a row is
deleted in PostgreSQL, the page header and raw data delimiter are marked. When a row
is deleted in MySQL, page header and row metadata is marked. When a row is deleted in
SQLite, the page header is marked and the row identifier is deleted. When a row is deleted
in DB2, SQLServer and Firebird, the page header is marked, and the row directory address
is deleted.
UPDATE Although from database user perspective an update is a combination of a delete
followed by an insert, the underlying storage changes are handled very differently. As with
deletes, we summarize how updates are handled by the different DBMSes. When a row
value is updated with a new value of a size equal to or less than the previous entry for
Oracle, SQLite, DB2, and SQLServer, the page header is marked and the old row data is
overwritten in-place. When a row is updated to a size equal to or less than the previous
row for PostgreSQL, the page header and raw data delimiter are marked and the old raw
data is written over. When a row is updated to a size equal to or less than the previous
row for MySQL and ApacheDerby, the page header and the row metadata are marked and
the old raw data is written over. When a row is updated to a size equal to or less than the
previous row for Firebird, the page header is marked and the rows are reinserted. The only
behavior consistent among all databases is when a column is updated to a size larger than
the previous row value, in which case the old row deleted and the new row is inserted.
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Figure 3.1: Overview of parameter detection and data analysis.
Figure 3.1 shows the high-level architecture overview of DBCarver. Algorithm 1
describes the overall page carving process. A file and a database parameter file are passed
as an input. For every general page identifier found in the image file, DBCarver records
the the page header and the row directory parameters. Next, a list of addresses from the
row directory are recorded. For each row directory address, the row data parameters are
recorded, and the row is parsed. Page parameters and a list of rows is recorded for each
general page identifier. Finally, the DBCarver parser returns the list of all pages.
The remainder of this chapter discuses the reconstruction of deleted data followed by
a thorough experimental evaluation of page carving in Section 3.8. Section 3.5 deals with
deleted record reconstruction, Section 3.6 addresses unallocated pages, and Section 3.7
considers additional copies of data that are left behind following a deleted. Chapter 4
provides more detailed description of the DBCarver algorithms.
3.5 The Life Cycle of a Row
Relational database store tables (relations) and therefore the smallest entity that can be
deleted or inserted is a row (tuple). An update changes specific columns, but in practice
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Algorithm 1 DBCarver Parsing Algorithm
Require: (Any image file, database parameter file)
1: for each GeneralPageIdentifier in imagefile do
2: set PageHeader and RowDirectory parameters
3: for each V alidAddress in RowDirectory do
4: append V alidAddress to Addresses
5: for each Address in Addresses do
6: set RowParameters
7: Row ← ParseRowData()
8: append Row to RowList
9: append (PageParameters, RowList) to PageList
10: return PageList
updates will sometimes manipulate an entire row ( DELETE+INSERT) at the storage layer.
In the rest of this section we explain why data-altering operations leave recoverable copies
behind and how such data can be restored.
3.5.1 Page Structure
Deleted rows can both be recovered and explicitly identified as “deleted” by DBCarver.
In contrast, a discarded page (see Section 3.6) looks like any other page and requires ad-
ditional steps to identify as “unused”. There are three types of deleted row alterations that
may be used by a database: 1) the row header is updated, 2) the address in row directory is
deleted, 3) the metadata within the row is modified.
Row header Every database we investigated updates the row header in the affected page.
This helps us determine when a page was last altered but not what specific data was updated.
For example, if the page header changes compared to previous version, we know that the
page was altered at some point in-between – page checksum update is one of the alteration
causes.
Row directory Only two databases, DB2 and SQL Server, change the page row directory
when a row is deleted. When a row is deleted in SQL Server and DB2 the row directory
address is overwritten with a NULL value. SQL Server overwrites each byte of an address
with decimal value 0, and DB2 overwrites each byte of an address with decimal value
255. Deleted rows can be identified and restored by searching for and parsing the row
pattern between the preceding and following valid row entries for each NULL address in
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row directory. SQL Server and DB2 only use the row directory to reflect the specific row
that has been deleted, and do not alter row metadata at all.
Row metadata Oracle, PostgreSQL, SQLite, and MySQL update row metadata to mark
deleted rows. We found that some of the same parameters for the row data in a page can also
be used to distinguish an active row from a deleted row. We summarize our findings and
parameter decimal values in Table 3.2. MySQL and Oracle mark the row delimiter at the
position stored in the row directory address – a deleted row can be identified using Table 3.2
values. PostgreSQL marks the raw data delimiter, identifying the start of individual values
within the row. When a row is deleted in PostgreSQL, the second byte of raw data delimiter
is updated to a new value. SQLite marks the row identifier, a unique ID created by the
database for each row. In SQLite deleted rows all share a common row identifier value
allowing us to detect a deleted row.
DBMS Parameter Active Deleted
MySQL Row Delimiter 0 32
Oracle Row Delimiter 44 60
PostgreSQL Data Delimiter 2, 9, 24 2, x, 24
SQLite Row Identifier 4 unique bytes 0,226,0,57
*This table excludes DB2 and SQL Server because these DBMSes mark deletion in row directory
but not in metadata.
Table 3.2: Row data parsing parameters used to identify deleted rows.
Figure 3.2 contains examples of what a deleted row looks like in different DBMSes.
In each example, the Row2 containing (Customer2, Jane) has been deleted while Row1
and Row2 containing (Customer1, Joe) and (Customer3, Jim) are active. The first example
page shows how the row delimiter is marked in a database such as MySQL or Oracle, the
second example page shows how the raw data delimiter is marked in PostgreSQL, and the
third example show how the row identifier is marked in SQLite. Figure 3.2 omits DB2 and
SQL Server as they only alter the row directory on deletion.
3.5.2 Updated Rows
When a row is updated, it can be updated in-place (see Section 3.7) or by a sequence of
DELETE and INSERT. For all of the databases we studied, when a row is updated to a
new row of equal or lesser size, old row storage is overwritten with new content (old value
remainder can still be recovered). When a row is updated to size greater than the size of
the old row, the old row is marked as deleted (same as regular delete) and the new row
is either appended to the end of the table, or overwrites other deleted rows if an empty
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Figure 3.2: Deleted row examples for different DBMSes: 1) MySQL or Oracle 2) Post-
greSQL 3) SQLite
slot is available (subject to exact DBMS policy). Since the row is marked exactly like a
regular delete, a deleted row caused by an UPDATE operation and a deleted row caused by
a DELETE operation can’t be distinguished.
3.5.3 Transactional Effects
A transaction can fail because it conflicted with another running transaction or because it
was canceled. Failed transactions are undone from user perspective but the page storage
is still altered in the database: 1) inserted row can still be recovered from page storage
(marked as deleted), 2) an old copy of the updated can be recovered from page storage
(looking similar to a deleted row) and 3) a deleted row is reinserted to cancel out deletion.
Thus, every possible canceled operation will leave recoverable rows in storage – database
logs could determine whether the “deleted” row is actually a side-effect of INSERT or
UPDATE.
3.6 The Life Cycle of a Page
3.6.1 Data Pages
In this section we discuss causes for de-allocation of multiple pages. When a user drops
a table, all pages become unallocated – such pages are fully recoverable until overwritten.
Table deletion is only one of the operations that de-allocate data pages. A more interesting
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example is structure reorganization that compacts table storage (fragmented by deletion
and other operations from Section 3.5).
Few databases (DB2 and PostgreSQL) permit explicit reorganization of table storage.
Oracle and SQLite require that a new table be built to compact an existing table. Both
DB2 and SQL Server reclaim deleted tuple space with new row inserts.However, SQL
Server may require a cleantable command to reclaim space wasted from a dropped column.
MySQL uses OPTIMIZE TABLE command, which is very similar to the rebuild operation
expected by Oracle and SQLite.
A DBMS may choose to perform a compacting operation automatically – DB2 even
provides control over automatic reorganization [14]. Rebuild operation (with or without
user’s knowledge) will typically leave behind recoverable table pages just as the DROP TABLE
command. Recovering a discarded page is trivial for DBCarver (discarded and active
pages are usually identical), but to identify whether a page is discarded we need to look at
system tables.
3.6.2 System Tables
A deleted table page is not usually identified as deleted in storage, unlike deleted rows
which are explicitly marked. In order to identify de-allocated (i.e., old) recovered pages,
we reconstruct the system table that stores table name and structure (or object) identifier.
Structure identifier is one of the page parameters stored in the page header. System tables
are typically stored in regular pages on disk, but require additional parsing parameters and
use different existing parameter values for parsing. System tables may also contain unique
data types that are not accessible to the user. Since determining the structure of system
tables and new datatypes with synthetic data may not be feasible, manual analysis was
typically performed to create new parameters or parameter values.
In Oracle, system table page is similar to regular data page and uses standard data types.
When a table is dropped, data pages are not altered, but the corresponding system table row
is marked as a regular deleted row. SQLite system tables contain extra metadata within the
row, but still use standard data types. When a table is dropped, metadata in the row data is
marked and the row header of the first page that belongs to the table is marked.
PostgreSQL system table pages use regular structures, but raw data delimiter (used to
locate raw data, see Section 3.5.1) uses a different value. PostgreSQL system tables also
use several data types not available to the user. Some of these data types are listed in
Table 3.3. Object Identifier (OID) is an object (or structure) identifier, and stored like any
other 4-byte number in PostgreSQL. The Name data type stores object name string in a
special reserved 64 byte slot. Aclitem is an array that stores user access privileges. XID is
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a transaction identifier, also stored like a 4-byte number in PostgreSQL. When a table is
dropped, the corresponding row in the system table is overwritten. The single, dedicated
data file for the table still exists, but all references to database pages are removed and file
size is reduced to 0. Discarded pages from the dropped table can still be recovered from
unallocated file system storage.
Datatype Size Description
OID 4 bytes Identifier to represent objects.
Name 64 bytes Name of objects.
Aclitem Variable An array of access privileges.
XID 4 bytes Transaction identifier.
Table 3.3: MV refresh options for each database.
MySQL stores database catalog tables in RAM, and no system table pages were found
on disk. This is a direct consequence of MySQL implementation – in addition to the newer
InnoDB, MySQL still uses an older MyISAM storage layer, which does not use pages
(to our knowledge MySQL is the only row-store database to do so and MyISAM is being
retired). DBCarver was built to parse pages across different databases, and thus special-
case parsing is required for parts of MySQL stored in MyISAM. When a MySQL table is
dropped, the files containing table data and metadata are deleted in file system. In DB2
there were no notable differences between system table pages and data pages, nor did we
observe special data types in DB2 system tables. When a DB2 table is deleted, data pages
are not changed but the corresponding system table row is deleted (using same deletion
mark as rows).
SQL Server was the only database to successfully hide its system tables (so far). Ac-
cording to SQL Server documentation, system tables are not accessible to users but only
to developers. We were not able to find where system tables are stored, but we have ascer-
tained that they are not in the default instance storage. Table data pages in SQL Server are
not altered in any way when a table is dropped (and thus can be recovered by DBCarver).
Figure 3.3 shows an example of how pages belonging to a deleted table can be detected
for databases such as Oracle, PostgreSQL or SQLite that update system tables when a
table is dropped. In this figure, the row for the deleted table is marked in the system
table as previously described for each database in Section 3.5. Table supplier has been
dropped while table customer remains active. The pages for customer and supplier table
use structure identifiers 125 and 126. In order to determine if these pages are deleted or
active, we check the relevant page of the catalog system table. This system page shows the
row meta data contains a deleted mark for the row with structure identifier 126. The table
catalog page also stores the table name (supplier) for this deleted structure. This allows us
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to identify all parsed pages with the structure identifier 126 as discarded pages belonging
to the supplier table.
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Figure 3.3: Example of how a deleted page is marked.
3.7 The Life Cycle of a Value
Database tables are stored and processed as a collection of individual rows that comprise
them. In Section 3.6 we described scenarios where an entire table (or at least a collection
of pages) can be discarded by a single operation. We now discuss scenarios that create
individual de-allocated values (i.e., columns) in database storage.
3.7.1 Auxiliary Structure: Indexes
Chapter 2 defines a variety of common non-table structures that contain copies of data.
When a row is deleted, DBMS does not delete the corresponding index values – nor are
such index values marked deleted. Although indexes were designed to be dynamically
maintained [12], it is easier to leave the index entry for a deleted row. For example, if an
employee is erased from a table, IndexEmployeeID would keep this ID value, relying on row
deletion mark to ensure query correctness (i.e., queries should not access deleted employee
records). This holds true for all table indexes; such not-really-deleted values will exist in
indexes for a long time, either until the index is rebuilt or until massive storage changes
occur (Experiment 3.8.7).
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While deletion does not remove values from the index, inserting a new row does create
a value even if that insert is canceled (i.e., transaction ABORT). The nature of database
transactions (see Chapter 2) means that it is easier to include every possible value in the
index and rely on other metadata to determine if the row is relevant to query lookup. There-
fore every indexed value, including never-inserted values will find its way into the index.
Figure 3.4 contains one example: student records Carl and Greg have been deleted (and
marked as such), but the ID values for these students (035 and 143) still persist in the
index.
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Figure 3.4: Example of how a deleted value can still live in an index.
Row from an aborted insert is treated as if it were inserted and then deleted (transaction
logs can differentiate between the two options). An update that has been canceled would
also be treated as a combination of an insert and a delete. The pre-update value would
be marked as deleted (if the new value is larger and cannot change in-place) and the post-
update value of the canceled update will be marked as deleted too.
3.7.2 Auxiliary Structure: Materialized Views
The amount of extraneous values in an MV depends on update options configured for this
MV (which, in turn, depends by update settings available in a DBMS). There are three types
of MV refresh options that databases can offer: 1) use a custom refresh function, 2) refresh
on each transaction commit, 3) refresh on demand. Table 3.4 summarizes which refresh
options are available for each database. A custom refresh function can be created using
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trigger mechanism to refresh an MV based on certain events (e.g., UPDATE). Refresh on
commit will refresh the MV when a COMMIT is issued, reducing the maintenance overhead
somewhat. Refresh on demand refreshes the MV only when manually requested (that is
the cheapest option).
DBMS Function Commit On Demand
DB2 3 3 3
MySQL 3 — 3
Oracle 3 3 3
PostgreSQL 3 — 3
SQLite 3 — 3
SQL Server* — — —
*Indexed views are immediately refreshed. The user cannot change this setting.
Table 3.4: MV refresh options available in each database.
We discuss MVs in this section (dedicated to recoverable values) because MVs have
fewer columns compared to source tables and can include new pre-computed columns.
Even when an entire MV row is affected by data changes, this row is still a subset of
columns from the original table. MV maintenance works similarly to table maintenance,
both support a rebuild directive.
When a row is deleted from a table, but the MV is not refreshed, all table values stored
in MV can still be recovered from disk. Such old MV values may or may not be accessible
to the user (depending on database policies). When an MV is refreshed, deleted data may
either be overwritten by active data or marked as deleted (similar to table rows). Note
that SQLite, MySQL, and PostgreSQL (prior to PostgreSQL 9.3) do not offer materialized
views – but since MV-like functionality is desirable, database documentation recommends
building a “derived” table instead (CREATE NewTable AS SELECT...). In that case,
MV rows follow the same rules discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6 because this MV is really
a table.
3.8 Experiments
Page carving was found to be applicable for at least ten different row-store DBMSes under
both Windows and Linux operating systems. The experiments in this section present results
using six representative databases (Oracle, SQL Server, PostgreSQL, DB2, MySQL and
SQLite). Other supported DBMSes are less widely used (e.g., Firebird and ApacheDerby);
yet others are supported by the virtue of sharing the same storage layer: e.g., MariaDB
(same as MySQL) and Greenplum (same as PostgreSQL). Experiment were performed on
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# Description
1 Purpose: Verify that page carving supports many row-store DBMSes. Results:
Table 3.6 lists eight different DBMSes (along with multiple versions) for which
page carving was tested.
2 Purpose: Demonstrate that page carving works for non-DBMS files, specifically
a buffer cache snapshot. Results: Figure 3.5 presents the carved results from a
series of RAM snapshots.
3 Purpose: Use page carving to determine the lifetime of deleted data. Results:
Table 3.7 presents the data reconstructed using page carving following random
writes to a disk image.
4 Purpose: Use page carving to determine the lifetime of deleted data. Results:
Table 3.8 summarizes the lifetime of a record and its data copies.
5 Purpose: Determine operations that damage a record to a point where it can no
longer be carved. Results: Page carving reconstructed 40-100% of the deleted
rows following simulated database activity.
6 Purpose: Show that an old record version from an UPDATE can be reconstructed.
Results: For up to 14% of updated rows, the full pre-update version of the row
can be recovered.
7 Purpose: Show the data that can be carved from indexes. Results: Values were
reconstrcuted from active and deallocated index pages.
8 Purpose: Show that aborted transactions leave behind storage artifacts. Results:
Canceled transactions leave just as many recoverable values in storage as regular
transactions.
9 DBCarver can recover 0.5% deleted rows and duplicate active rows after MV
rebuild.
10 Table rebuild leaves behind 1) 85% deleted rows or 2) a large number of duplicate
active rows.
Table 3.5: Summary of experimental results in this section.
servers with Intel X3470 2.93 GHz processor and 8GB of RAM; Windows servers run
Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise SP1 and Linux exeriments used CentOS 6.5. Either
the database files or the raw hard drive images were directly read since page carving does
not rely on file system structure.
3.8.1 Experiment 1: DBMS Support Testing
The purpose of this experiment was to verify that page carving supports many row-store
relational DBMSes, various versions of each DBMS, and DBMSes that run on both Linux
and Windows operating systems. Table 3.6 summarizes the DBMS versions, operating
systems, and parameter settings that were used. Acquiring older versions of some databases
proved to be challenging, and we also had difficulty installing some older software, such as
PostgreSQL 6.3.2 (circa 1999) on our servers.
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For the DBMSes listed in Table 3.6, we confirmed that our parameter discovery mech-
anism (described in Section 3.3.2) was able to auto-detect necessary parameters and suc-
cessfully reconstruct data from pages. Not surprisingly, we found that for most alternate
versions, the storage layout had not changed from version to version. However, we did find
a number of changes in PostgreSQL 7.3: the values for the general page identifier and its
address, the structure identifier position, row directory address, the conversion constants
for both row directory and string size computation and the delimiter used to separate row
data have all changed to a different value between PostgreSQL 7.3 and PostgreSQL 8.4.
Thus a variety of DBMS versions can be handled by the same set of known parameters but
if the underlying storage changes, we need to detect the new parameters.
DBMS Version Testing OS Buffer Cache Size(MB) Page Size(KB)
Apache Derby 10.10 Linux 400 4
Apache Derby 10.5 Linux 400 4
DB2 Express-C 10.5 Linux 400 4
Firebird2.5.1 Linux 400 8
Firebird2.1.7 Windows 400 8
MySQLServer5.1.73 Linux 800 16
MySQLServer5.6.1 Windows 800 16
Oracle11gR2 Windows 800 8
Oracle12cR1 Windows 1200 8
PostgreSQL7.3 Linux 400 8
PostgreSQL8.4 Linux 400 8
PostgreSQL9.3 Windows 800 8
SQLite3.8.6 Linux 2 1
SQLite3.8.7 Windows 2 1
SQLServer 2008 Enterprise
Windows
(Linux)
800 8
Table 3.6: The comprehensive list of all databases used in this chapter.
3.8.2 Experiment 2: Rebuilding row data
The purpose of this experiment was to evaluate page carving’s ability to reconstruct data
from a non-DBMS file. The process of rebuilding page contents is the same for disk or
memory (the only difference being that an in-memory copy of the page may temporarily
differ from its on-disk version due to updates). Furthermore, the contents of the database
cache buffer provide some insight into the rows that were recently accessed by user queries,
so we chose to visualize the database cache buffer as different queries are being executed.
Figure 3.5 shows the contents of the Oracle (50K pages) cache buffer, with each dot repre-
senting a single page and a bar chart summarizing the page counts. Initially buffer cache
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Figure 3.5: Transformation of buffer cache contents as queries are executed.
is prepopulated with synthetic data from several tables (aggregated into one bar in the bar
chart), which is shown in the first snapshot and the corresponding bar chart below.
The second image in Figure 3.5 displays pages cached after CUSTOMER and PART
tables were queried for a total of about 7000 pages (using 50 different queries) with the
corresponding bar chart below; the following two images show what happens after the
LINEORDER table was repeatedly queried. The third snapshot displays caching effects
after executing 100 (120-page) LINEORDER queries (summarized in the third bar chart)
and the fourth image shows the results of executing 200 more similar queries which effec-
tively overwrite the entire cache buffer, replacing all of the previously cached data. While
LINEORDER queries add up to approximately (300 × 120) 36K pages, recall that indexes
are commonly used to facilitate table access. Thus, there is a number of index pages, not
shown on the bar chart, that are present in the last snapshot visualization.
The contents of the current buffer cache snapshot reflect the recently accessed data.
However, note that all of the queries in this experiment were chosen to ensure that their
pages are fully cached. A detailed discussion about database caching policies is beyond the
scope of this chapter, but note that when a query accesses a large number of pages (e.g.,
more than one third of the total buffer cache size), only a particular portion of the read data
is be cached. This is done to avoid evicting too many other table’s pages from buffer cache
and is used to reason about what table data was recently accessed.
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3.8.3 Experiment 3: Reconstructing corrupted data
We next evaluate our forensic tool when the raw data has been damaged as well. Using one
of the popular cloud service providers, we rented an instance and created a new database
using PostgreSQL – here we use a cloud service to illustrate that data can be scavenged
from neighboring or decommissioned instances if they are not properly sanitized (actually
trawling the instances for private data would be against the ToS). After loading PostgreSQL
with the SSBM benchmark (Scale4, 24M rows in the lineorder table), we have shutdown
the database and deleted (using rm) the files that contained database storage.
Damage Dmg=0% Dmg=10% Dmg=25%
Dwdate 35(100%) 31(88.6%) 20(57.1%)
Supplier 565(100%) 455(80.5%) 326(57.7%)
Customer 1915(100%) 1559(81.4%) 1075(56.1%)
Part 8659(100%) 6969(80.5%) 4864(56.2%)
Lineorder 115K(100%) 104K(89.9%) 87K(75.2%)
TOTAL 416K(100%) 374K(89.9%) 312K(74.9%)
Table 3.7: Data reconstructed from a damaged disk image.
Deleted disk space is marked “available” and will eventually be overwritten by new
files. We simulate this overwrite process by performing random 1 KB writes throughout the
disk image at random. We use small writes in order to test our tool’s ability to rebuild pages
when pages are partially damaged (if the entire page is overwritten, then it is simply gone).
Once a certain percentage of 1 KB chunks was written to disk at random, we measured
the amount of data that our tool could reconstitute. Table 3.7 summarizes the the results in
terms of the recovered table pages. The second column has the initial number of blocks,
before any page damage had taken place, and then we show the distribution for 10% and
25% worth of damage. While the exact losses vary depending on each particular table’s
luck, the average number of restored pages closely matches the amount of inflicted damage.
Finally, running a query in PostgreSQL after overwriting page metadata caused the
following error:
The connection to the server was lost.
Attempting reset: Failed.
Changing the size of the table storage file (e.g., adding or removing a few bytes) caused the
following error:
ERROR: invalid memory alloc request size 2037542769.
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3.8.4 Experiment 4: The lifetime of deleted data
In this experiment, we test a DBMS to see when a deleted value is overwritten, rather
than just marked as deleted. Using Oracle, we created an index on the Phone column in
the CUSTOMER table as well as a materialized view that contains a few of the customer
columns, including Phone. At T0, the phone value is present on disk in three different
pages (in the table, the index and the MV). Table 3.8 shows the timeline of all three struc-
tures on-disk (HDD) and in-memory (RAM) – a  symbol means that the phone number
can also still be returned by a SQL query. Both 3 and 7 symbols mean that the value is
inaccessible with SQL but can be reconstructed with page carving. The 3 symbol means
the value was marked as active, and the 7 symbol means the value was marked as deleted.
Event Table Index MVHDD RAM HDD RAM HDD RAM
T0  3 
T1 3 7 3 3 
T2 3 7 3 3  3
T3 3 7 3 3
T4 7 7 3
T5 7 3
T6 7
T7
Table 3.8: A timeline for the true deletion of a deleted phone value.
T1 A phone row is deleted (including a COMMIT) by a user – this causes an index page
with the phone (index values are not be marked deleted) and a table page with the phone
marked as deleted to be cached in RAM.
T2 User queries the MV causing the phone page to be cached in RAM.
T3 The MV is refreshed, the RAM page is removed and new MV no longer contains the
phone (fragments of the old MV page may still be available in RAM).
T4 A series of queries (enough to overwrite the buffer) are executed, evicting the index page
from RAM. Because customer table is accessed by a user, the table page containing the
deleted phone remains in RAM.
T5 A long series of queries is executed during which customer table is not accessed, evicting
the table page with phone entry from RAM.
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T6 The index is rebuilt and flushed from RAM.
T7 The table is rebuilt and flushed from RAM.
Thus the deleted value is overwritten by time T7 which, depending on database activity,
may be a very long time away from time T0. In some databases (including Oracle) MV
behavior can be configured to automatically refresh; the value may also be overwritten by
new inserts, but only after a certain number of rows on the page has been deleted.
3.8.5 Experiment 5: Recovering Deleted Rows
In this experiment we demonstrate several properties of deleted row storage behavior: 1)
for any database, 100% of deleted rows can be recovered immediately after deletion, 2)
over time, we can recover a significant chunk (40%) of deleted rows from most databases
and 100% of deleted rows from Oracle, 3) given an atypical workload of deletes specif-
ically designed to be “easy to overwrite”, we can still recover 1% of deleted rows. Our
experiments highlight the difference between deletes that result in high and low amount of
deleted row fragmentation. A sequential range of deleted contiguously-stored rows is more
likely to be replaced by new data. Deleted rows that are scattered across pages are less
likely to be overwritten.
We use two databases with different row replacement approach. SQL Server overwrites
deleted rows once a row of equal or lesser size is inserted into the table, possibly doing some
in-page defragmentation – Oracle will instead wait until page utilization falls below a user-
configurable threshold (Oracle default threshold is 39%). For both Oracle and SQL Server,
we started with two different tables, each with 20K random sized rows. Both databases
used a page size of 8KB, and each page contained approximately 85 rows resulting in table
sizes of 236 pages. We deleted 1000 rows (more than one per page), inserted 1000 new
rows of random size, and inserted another 1000 random rows. At each step we evaluated
how many deleted rows are recovered from disk. In table T1rand, 1000 deleted rows were
randomly distributed across the page storage, while in table T2cont 1000 deleted rows were
contiguous (i.e., delete all rows from just a few pages).
Oracle SQL Server
Action T1rand T2cont T1rand T2cont
Delete 1K Rows 1000 1000 1000 1000
Insert 1K Rows 1000 8 416 354
Insert 1K Rows 1000 8 394 12
Table 3.9: Number of deleted rows recovered by DBCarver.
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As Table 3.9 demonstrates, before new inserts come in, all of the deleted rows can be
recovered by DBCarver. None of the deleted rows for T1rand in Oracle were overwritten
by inserts executed in hte next step. The default threshold in Oracle is 39%, and we only
deleted about 5% of the rows in each page, leaving 95% intact. For T2cont in Oracle all
but 8 of the deleted rows were overwritten by the first 1000 new inserts (these 8 rows were
still recoverable after 1000 more inserts). In T2cont deleted rows correspond to wiping out
19 pages (0% utilization each) – the remaining 8 rows spilled into the 20th page with other
active rows with sufficiently high utilization (85%). In SQL Server we saw that in both
T1rand and T2cont first 1000 new inserts overwrote 60% to 65% of de-allocated rows (due
to compaction applied by SQL Server). For the second 1000 inserts, T2cont replaced most
of the deleted rows because thye are contiguous and easy to overwrite. For T1rand, only
20 additional rows were displaced by the second batch of 1000 inserts because remaining
T1rand are the smallest surviving rows that are difficult to overwrite.
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Figure 3.6: An example for row insertion behavior in SQL Server.
Figure 3.6 shows how an inserted row may overwrite a deleted row in SQL Server.
(Supplier1, Bob) was initially marked as deleted. On the left side we demonstrate inserting
a new record (Supplier3, Ed). Since (Supplier3, Ed) requires fewer bytes than (Supplier1,
Bob), the inserted row can overwrite the deleted row. Note that since the inserted row is
smaller than the original deleted row, fragment of the old row, i.e., b, can be recovered from
page storage. On the right of Figure 3.6 we inserted the record (Supplier3, Gregory). Since
(Supplier3, Gregory) requires more storage than (Supplier1, Bob), there is not enough space
to overwrite the deleted row. This forces the inserted row to be appended to table page,
leaving (Supplier1, Bob) intact with a deletion mark
T1rand is far more representative of day to day database use because it is hard to delete
contiguously stored rows, even on purpose. Row storage shifts over time and particular
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rows are unlikely to be co-located. Only a DBA would know which rows are stored on the
same page.
3.8.6 Experiment 6: Recovering Pre-Update Rows
In this experiment we demonstrate that for a typical workload of UPDATEs we can recover
many old rows, although fewer (5%-10%) compared to DELETEed row recovery in Ex-
periment 1. Fewer old rows can be recovered because while updating values to a larger
value results in DELETE+INSERT, updating row to a smaller value overwrites the old value
in-place. We perform this experiment using DB2 (DB2 behaves similarly to SQL Server
in that context) and PostgreSQL. For each database, we started with two tables of 20K
randomly sized rows and updated 1000 of the rows to a new random row, followed by an-
other 1000 random updates for a total of 2000. 1000 updates in T1rand were distributed
across the table storage at random, while 1000 updates in T2cont updated a contiguously
stored sequence of rows. Both DB2 and PostgreSQL compact page contents to keep larger
updated value on the same page. However, if there is not enough free space available, the
new row is stored in a different page and the old value is marked as deleted in the original
page. New updates will overwrite old deleted-by-update rows over time.
As Table 3.10 shows, for T1rand in DB2, we recovered 121 pre-update records after
1000 updates and 125 records after a total of 2000 updates were executed. Approximately
6% to 12% of old records remained recoverable due to the way DB2 manages page storage.
For T2cont in DB2, we were only able to recover 6 old records after 1000 updates and 10 old
records after all 2000 updates were performed. For T1rand in PostgreSQL, we recovered
137 values after the first 1000 updates and 92 records after the second 1000 updates. For
T2cont in PostgreSQL, we recovered a single row, which was the last update in the sequence
of 1000 updates. We have observed (as expected) that continuous patch of deleted-by-
update rows is overwritten by new data quickly. The numbers in Table 3.10 only include
fully recoverable rows, ignoring some partial old values that can be recovered as well (e.g.,
b example in Figure 3.6).
DB2 PostgreSQL
Upd. Rows T1rand T2cont T1rand T2cont
1000 121 6 137 1
2000 125 10 92 1
Table 3.10: Number of updated rows recovered.
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Action Index(Pg)
Unallocated
(Pg) America Asia Europe Camelot Atlantis
T0 115 0 5992 6051 5937 0 0
T1 113 2 5992 6051 5937 0 0
T2 116 5 5992 6051 5937 1000 0
T3 96 25 5992 6051 5937 1000 0
T4 101 43 4692 5993 5937 1000 6167
T5 135 71 4687 1080 1419 1000 6167
Table 3.11: Life cycle of deleted and updated values in a SQL Server index.
3.8.7 Experiment 7: Recovering Indexed Values
This experiment demonstrates that DBCarver can recover thousands of old deleted or
pre-update values (both from active and discarded index pages) from an index structure in
a database. We used SQL Server and an index on region column for SSBM Scale1 (=30K
rows) customer table – in general, indexes behave similarly across all DBMSes.
Region column has 5 distinct values, including ‘AMERICA’, ‘ASIA’, and ‘EUROPE’,
with roughly 6K records for each (6K×5 = 30K). Table 3.11 summarizes recovered value
counts – each time a count changes, the cell in Table 3.11 is highlighted with gray. We note
that additional duplicate values were recovered based on the behavior described in Section
3.7.1, but we do not include those to avoid double-counting results. We first deleted 1000
rows from customer table with region value of ‘AMERICA’. This resulted in deallocation
of two index pages containing ‘AMERICA’ that we recovered. Next, we updated 1000 rows
in customer table with the value ‘AMERICA’ to the value ‘CAMELOT’ (not a real value
for this benchmark). This action created new ‘CAMELOT’ values and displaced more of
the ‘AMERICA’ index pages.
We next deleted all of the rows with value ‘ASIA’, forcing the index to deallocate 20
pages. All of the ‘ASIA’ remained recoverable. We then updated all ‘EUROPE’ rows to
‘ATLANTIS’ in the table. The index only grew by 5 pages, but the number of deallocated
pages increased by 18 pages. The number of recoverable ‘AMERICA’ and ‘ASIA’ values
decreased after some deallocated pages were overwritten. Finally, we updated all of the
remaining 16K original values in customer to a new value not in this benchmark. And yet a
significant fraction of ‘AMERICA’, ‘ASIA’, and ‘EUROPE’ values were recovered – either
from active or from deallocated pages of the index.
Experiment 7 steps:
T0 Initial
T1 Delete 1K America Rows
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T2 Update 1K America→ Camelot
T3 Delete all Asia Rows
T4 Update all Europe→ Atlantis
T5 Update remaining 16K Rows
3.8.8 Experiment 8: Aborted Transaction Effect
This experiment proves that data inserted by aborted transactions is fully recoverable by our
tool, both from memory and disk, just like regular deleted rows. We were also able to inde-
pendently recover these never-inserted values from indexes that were attached to the table.
We begun the experiment by loading the supplier table from SSBM benchmark into Oracle.
We then inserted 1000 rows and issued an ABORT command resulting in ROLLBACK. The
data from canceled inserts was cached, then marked as deleted and subsequently recovered
from pages in memory. Once cache contents were flushed, pages containing rows from the
aborted transaction were recovered from disk storage as well. One might intuitively expect
that in-memory cache of modified pages would be simply discarded on ABORT – but all
1000 rows were appended at the end of the table on disk. We have also found that the
values from canceled inserts were added to the supplier’s index.
3.8.9 Experiment 9: Materialized View Refresh
In this experiment we show that: 1) we can recover all of the deleted rows from an MV
(in addition to recovering these deleted rows from table storage, 2) after MV is refreshed
we can still recover 5% of the deleted rows from the MV, 3) the refresh operation also
generates extra copies of other, non-deleted rows.We initialized this experiment with two
MVs containing 20K random sized rows and then deleted 1000 rows from the underlying
tables. As in previous experiments, for M1rand, 1000 deletes are applied to random storage
locations in the table and for M2cont table deletes are applies in a contiguous fashion. Table
3.12 summarizes the number of deleted rows and extra copies of active rows (1100+ is not
a typo – and duplicated rows do not intersect with 1000 deleted rows) recovered from both
MVs.
Before the refresh, we can recover every single one of the 1000 deleted rows from the
MV. This is independent of rows recovered from table storage, such as in Experiment 1.
After refresh, we found 51 “deleted” rows and 1107 duplicates of the active rows in M1rand.
The duplicated rows came in two flavors: 1) rows marked as deleted in active pages (but
not from the 1000 of user-deleted rows) and 2) rows from de-allocated MV pages but not
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Before Refresh After Refresh
Row Type M1rand M2cont M1rand M2cont
Deleted 1000 1000 51 60
Duplicated 0 0 1107 1111
Table 3.12: The number of deleted rows and duplicate active rows recovered from disk
storage after MV refresh in Oracle.
marked as deleted and also not from any of the 1000 user-deleted rows. Some rows were
available from both sources, but our results only count one recovered copy per row. Less
than 10% of the duplicates were discovered in both sources and these were eliminated
from our counts. For M2cont, we found 60 deleted values and recovered 1111 distinct
active rows from de-allocated storage. Similar recovery rates for M1rand and M2cont were
as expected, because rows are being deleted from the original table, not from the MV that
is reconstructed by DBCarver.
3.8.10 Experiment 10: Table Rebuild
This last experiment demonstrates in PostgreSQL that: 1) a table refresh following typical
workloads will leave only 1%+ of recoverable deleted rows but more unrelated duplicate
row copies, 2) a table refresh that follows a continuous sequence of deletes from that table
will generate 85% of recoverable deleted rows and few unrelated duplicate row copies.
One way or another table refresh leaves behind recoverable duplicate rows, similar to MV
refresh. PostgreSQL is the only database where users have easy access to a manual de-
fragmenting command – in other DBMSes, one typically has to recreate the structure to
compact storage. When building a brand new structure, old pages are even more likely to
be left behind, so PostgreSQL is chosen as the database likely to leave the fewest discarded
pages.
We created two tables with 20K random sized rows and then deleted 1000 rows. 1000
rows deleted in T1rand were distributed across the page storage and 1000 rows deleted in
T2cont were stored contiguously. Table 3.13 shows the number of recovered deleted rows
and duplicated active rows. After a refresh of T1rand, we recovered 16 deleted rows and
1134 discarded copies of active rows. Similarly to the previous experiment, 16 deleted
recovered rows were marked deleted, and 1134 duplicate values were de-allocated with-
out any markings – 16 deleted values were from 1000 deleted rows, but 1134 duplicates
are from the other 19,000 rows. For T2cont, we instead found 854 deleted rows and 182
duplicates of active rows on disk.
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Before After
Row Type T1rand T2cont T1rand T2cont
Deleted 1000 1000 16 854
Duplicated 0 0 1134 182
Table 3.13: The number of deleted rows and duplicate active rows recovered after a table
rebuild in PostgreSQL.
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Figure 3.7: An example of how PostgreSQL reorganizes pages with sparse or dense deletes
during table rebuild.
Figure 3.7 illustrates why we recover so many duplicates for T1rand but instead re-
cover many more deleted values for T2cont. PostgreSQL defragments rows within the
page when rebuilding tables, which results in different storage allocation depending on
whether deletes were randomly scattered or contiguous before the rebuild. In Figure 3.7,
for sparsely deleted rows before rebuild, Row2 has been marked as deleted in the row meta-
data. As the first page in Figure 3.7 indicates, PostgreSQL does not alter the row directory
for deletion. After the table is rebuilt, Row3 is moved to overwrite the deleted Row2 row,
the old record for Row3 is then marked “deleted” on the page, the row directory address for
Row3 is updated to reflect the new location, and finally the row directory address for Row2
is set to NULL (this NULL has nothing to do with deletion). The result is a contiguous free
space on the page between the row directory and the row data – which also happens to du-
plicate Row3 in storage, without user’s knowledge. For the densely (contiguously) deleted
rows in Figure 3.7 (3rd page in figure), all rows on the page are marked as deleted. When
the table is rebuilt, the row directory addresses for all deleted rows are set to NULL. Because
there are no live rows in this page, live rows are not duplicated as in the sparse case, but
marked-as-deleted rows are preserved on the page (row directory NULLs are unrelated to
deletion).
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3.9 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a forensic tool, DBCarver that can auto-detect internal DBMS storage me-
chanics for new databases and reconstruct the data structure and contents of known DBM-
Ses. Due to the particular storage techniques employed by relational databases, our tool
is able to restore any remaining fraction of a DBMS as well as already-deleted and oth-
erwise inaccessible data. This generalized forensic tool can thus eventually supplant the
DBMS-specific recovery tools currently available to forensic analysts. We intend to re-
lease our code to the wider community and think that it can also serve as an independent
open-source auditing tool for all (including closed-source) DBMSes.
We also demonstrated why simple recovery of phantom data is insufficient – to ana-
lyze the results, forensic analyst must understand how database storage works. There are
changes that appear similar at a glance – e.g., both DELETE and UPDATE create a “deleted”
row in storage. Normal DBMS operation creates strange storage artifacts – deleted or
de-allocated page may be created through simple internal maintenance (with no human
action).
This work only begins to explore the possibilities opened up by looking into the raw
database storage directly. In addition to the self-evident benefit of reconstructing database
contents, we can learn a great deal of other subtler facts. DBMS data caching behavior can
be directly observed to monitor user database activity based on internal caching heuristic
rules; databases also cache a number of other elements of interest (e.g., SQL queries, raw
user output) that can be captured.
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Chapter 4
DBCarver
This chapter gives a detailed description of the tool, DBCarver, and algorithms to perform
page carving, which was introduced in the previous chapter.
4.1 Initial Setup
When support for a new DBMS or functionality for a new DBMS is necessary, the DBMS
version in question should be installed on a trusted system. Typically, the default settings
should be used. However, if something is known about the sample, such as page size,
these parameters should be set to match the sample. The exact DBMS version may not be
necessary. For here on, when we refer to the DBMS, we mean the DBMS on the trusted
system.
4.2 Parameter Collection
This chapter will discuss how to deconstruct the internal database page format for any
RDBMS. A page stores both the user data and metadata, which describes the user data and
page. By deconstructing the page format, the parts within the page can be described with
a set of parameters that generalize across all DBMSes. We have divided deconstruction
into four main categories based on the high-level page format used by all RDBMSes: page
header (Section 4.2.1), row directory (Section 4.2.2), and row data (Section 4.2.3), and
datatype decoding (Section 4.2.4).
4.2.1 Page Header
The page header stores general information about the page and its data. User data is not
stored in the page header. This section discusses how to deconstruct page header meta-
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data that is commonly used by RDBMSes, which includes general page identifier (Sec-
tion 4.2.1.1), structure identifier (Section 4.2.1.2), unique page identifier (Section 4.2.1.3),
and record count (Section 4.2.1.4). Other metadata may exist in a page header, such as
free space pointer, checksum, or logical timestamp, but we believe this metadata has little
forensic significance or is not commonly used by RDBMSes. Experience has demonstrated
that all page header metadata is located within the first 2% of a page. Therefore, when a
page is evaluated in this section, we only consider the first 2% of bytes for the page.
Page header metadata is generally deconstructed by:
1. Locate the metadata typically using similarities or differences between pages.
2. Record the address of the metadata as a parameter.
4.2.1.1 General Page Identifier
The general page identifier is a sequence of non-NULL bytes shared by all pages in a partic-
ular DBMS version. The general page identifier is used by our parser to initially search for
pages within a file. We make two assumptions about the general page identifier: 1) it must
be between two and three bytes in length and 2) at least one byte must be non-NULL, mean-
ing a decimal value not equal to zero. In addition to extracting the general page identifier
as a parameter, the address of the general page identifier is also determined for use as a
parameter. These parameters must not be non-NULL for parsing to be performed.
The following steps summarize how we determine the general page identifier and
general page identifier address parameters:
1. Byte commonalities are found for all data pages containing synthetic data. Byte
commonalities are found as follows:
(a) A dictionary is created for each page. The address of a byte within the page and
the decimal value of a byte are stored as the key-value pairs.
(b) All dictionaries are then compared and the results are written to a new dictio-
nary, called the results dictionary. If the values across all dictionaries match for
a particular key, the byte value and its address are recorded in the results dictio-
nary; otherwise, the address and the value -1 is added to the results dictionary.
2. Using the results dictionary, all sequences of two to three contiguous bytes are con-
sidered.
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3. The longest sequence with the minimum number of NULL characters is returned as
the general page identifier and the address of this sequence from beginning of the
page is returned as the general page identifier address. In case of a tie, the first
sequence is chosen.
4.2.1.2 Structure Identifier
The structure identifier is a 16-bit or 32-bit integer that is shared by all pages that com-
prise an individual structure (e.g., table or index); this identifier is unique across structures.
The structure identifier is ascertained by the structure identifier address and structure
identifier size parameters. These parameters can be NULL. Note that most DBMSes store
a structure identifier in the page header. However, if a structure identifier is not stored in
the page header, one may be stored with each record in the row data of the page. In this
instance, the structure identifier would be considered a piece of row data metadata.
In determining where the structure identifier is located, only the low byte of the identi-
fier is considered. Although more rigorous comparisons could be utilized, such a process
would require creating at least 256 structures and comparing them. Experience has shown
that such a robust process for this identification is unnecessary. The following steps sum-
marize how we determine the structure identifier address and structure identifier size:
1. Byte commonalities are found using the process described in Section 4.2.1.1; how-
ever, only pages from the same table are used to determine candidate identifiers.
2. The first byte of common sequences are compared across structures. If they differ
and either that byte or the next one is non-null, then the byte position is returned.
3. When sequences of bytes across all pages are found to meet the conditions, the ad-
dress of these sequences is returned as structure identifier address, and the number
of high bytes plus the low byte is returned as structure identifier size.
4.2.1.3 Unique Page Identifier
The unique page identifier is a 32-bit integer that is unique for each page across the entire
database or within a file. The unique page identifier is located using the unique page
identifier address parameter, which is the address of the unique page identifier. This
parameter can be NULL in the case there is no unique page identifier.
The unique page identifier address is determined as follows. Byte differences are
found across all data pages that comprise a single synthetic table (since the unique page
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identifier need only be unique per structure). To reduce runtime, we currently consider dif-
ferences for the first three bytes and assume the fourth byte. A fourth byte can be confirmed,
but 2563 (or 16M) pages are needed. Currently then, each three byte sequence is tested for
uniqueness among all of the data pages. Additionally, the identifier must increase as page
address within the file increases. When a sequence of bytes across all pages is found to
meet these conditions, the address of these sequences is returned as unique page identifier
address.
4.2.1.4 Record Count
The record count is a 16-bit number that represents the number of active records stored
within the page. The record count is located using the record count address.
The record count address is determined using the following process. Each page con-
taining synthetic table data is searched for records. In particular, the synthetic data contains
unique string data that conforms to a specific pattern, e.g., ‘Curly0001’, ‘Curly0002’, ....
The count of these strings indicates the number of records on that page. The page header
is then searched for a 16-bit number representing that count. This process is repeated on
several table data pages in order to confirm that the location of the record count is consis-
tent across pages, thereby confirming that the actual position of the record count has been
located.
4.2.2 Row Directory
4.2.2.1 Assumptions
The row directory stores pointers, in the form of byte offsets, to records within the page.
The row directory may be dense (i.e., a pointer to each record) or sparse (i.e., a pointer for
a group of records). We assume, based on our earlier experience inspecting DBMS files,
that a pointer is a 16-bit integer and that a sparse row directory may have a maximum of
10 records. Along with pointers, the row directory may also store the size of each record.
Only deconstruction of pointers is currently implemented since record size is not commonly
observed. Again, based on our experience, we assume that no more than 8 bytes may exist
between pointers.
4.2.2.2 Pointer Order Sequence
Pointer order sequence refers to the placement of pointers as they are added to the row
directory. Notably, the order of the records appended to the row data is the inverse of the
pointer order. For example, if records are added to the row data from bottom-to-top of
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the page, then row directory pointers are appended from top-to-bottom on the page. The
pointer addition sequence is represented with the Boolean order sequence parameter, with
top-to-bottom being True and bottom-to-top being False. This parameter must be non-
NULL.
The following steps summarize how we determine the order sequence:
1. A random sample of several pages containing synthetic data are arbitrarily selected.
2. The synthetic data contains strings that indicate the order in which they were added
to the database through Insert statements. For example, ‘Curly0001’ was inserted
first, ‘Curly0002’ was inserted second, etc.
3. If the address of the record inserted first is greater than the record that was inserted
second, then we conclude that records are inserted from bottom-to-top; otherwise,
records are inserted from top-to-bottom. This conclusion is confirmed with the re-
maining records in the page and the other sample pages.
4. If records are inserted bottom-to-top, then row directory pointers are added from
top-to-bottom. In this case, order sequence is assigned True. If records are inserted
top-to-bottom, then row directory pointers are added from bottom-to-top. In this
case, order sequence is assigned False.
4.2.2.3 Row Directory Location
The row directory location refers to the address of the pointer for the first inserted record
within the page. Since a row directory may be dense or sparse, the number of records
referenced by each pointer is also necessary; this quantity is referred to as the slot size. The
row directory location, pointer distance (number of bytes between pointers), and slot size
are represented with the row directory start, pointer distance, and slot size parameters.
These parameters must be non-NULL.
The following steps summarize how we determine the row directory start, pointer
distance, and slot size parameters:
1. A random sample page containing synthetic data is selected.
2. Each page stores records that each have a unique string containing numeric data that
indicates the order in which the record was inserted. For example, ‘Curly0001’ was
inserted first, ‘Curly0002’ was inserted second, etc. We collect the distances between
each unique string.
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3. The page is scanned for a sequence of bytes whose values differ by the distances
between unique strings. Each such sequence would constitute a candidate for the
sequence of pointers; therefore, the distance between them must be no more than
eight bytes, as mentioned above.
4. Candidate sequences are selected by varying independently both the pointer distance
and the slot size. Initially, a slot size of one (or a dense row directory) is first consid-
ered.
5. If the sequence is not found, then the slot size is incremented by one until a slot size
of 10 is reached. When the slot size is increased the distances between unique strings
are combined to reflect this change.
6. If a sequence is found, then we conclude that we have located the low byte of each
two-byte row directory pointer. The start of this sequence is returned as row direc-
tory start, the distance between each low byte is returned as pointer distance, and
the slot size is returned as slot size. The high byte for the pointers will be considered
in Section 4.2.2.4.
4.2.2.4 Pointer Deconstruction
After the parameters in Section 4.2.2.3 are collected, the position of the high byte must be
determined. The high byte either immediately precedes or follows the low value byte. This
is represented with the high value position parameter. This parameter is determined with
the following steps:
1. An arbitrary page containing synthetic data is selected.
2. Each page stores records that each have a unique string containing numeric data that
indicates the order in which the record was inserted. For example, ‘Curly0001’ was
inserted first, ‘Curly0002’ was inserted second, etc. We collect the distances between
each unique string.
3. Starting from the row directory start, we consider each 16-bit integer using the
preceding byte as the high value byte.
4. If the difference between each 16-bit integer equals each distance between records,
then high value position is returned as -1.
5. If there is a discrepancy between the 16-bit integers and the record distances, then
high value position is returned as 1.
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Additionally, the 16-bit integer used for a row directory pointer may not represent the
explicit record address. To decode the explicit address, two decoding constants are re-
quired: Cx and Cy. These constants are used in the following equation:
RecordAddress = (Y − Cy) ∗ 256 +X + Cx (4.1)
where Y is the decimal value of the high value byte and X is the decimal value of the low
value byte. Cx and Cy are represented with the parameters Cx and Cy. These constants are
determined with the following steps:
1. An arbitrary page containing synthetic data is selected.
2. Let P1 be the integer value of a pointer from the row directory of that page.
3. Let A1 be the actual byte address of the record that corresponds to P1. The actual
address includes additional metadata in the row data; it is not the address of the
known string.
4. The beginning of the additional metadata is determined using the order sequence
parameter, which was determined earlier. If order sequence is True we know that
the first record inserted into the page directly follows the second record in the page.
Therefore, the metadata for the first record begins directly after the second record
ends, giving us A1. If order sequence is False we know that the first record was
inserted at the beginning of the row data. Therefore, the metadata for the first record
is the first thing stored in the row data, giving us A1.
5. Cy is then returned as (P1 - A1)/256, where integer division is used.
6. Cx is then returned as A1 - (Y - Cy) * 256 - X.
4.2.3 Row Data
As mentioned earlier, each row contains metadata and user data; the metadata describes the
user data and is discussed below.
4.2.3.1 Row Delimiter
The row delimiter is a single byte that marks the beginning of a row. Row directory pointers
typically reference the address of the row delimiter. Moreover, the row delimiter may be
used to mark a row as deleted. The row delimiter is represented by the row delimiter
parameter, which we determine by the following steps:
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1. A large quantity of pages containing synthetic data is selected, specifically 257 or
more pages from each of two different tables, each having different schema. In prac-
tice, we typically use thousands of pages of synthetic data.
2. If the row data is stored bottom-to-top, then we define Row1 as the bytes from the
end of the last column of Row2 to the end of the last column of Row1.
3. Conversely, if the row data is stored top-to-bottom, then we define Row1 as the bytes
from the first byte of the row data to the end of the last column of Row1.
4. If the first byte for every row is common and non-NULL across all rows for all of
the synthetic data, then that byte value is returned as row delimiter. Otherwise, row
delimiter is NULL.
4.2.3.2 Row Identifier
The row identifier is an internal pseudo-column that the DBMS uses to uniquely identify
rows; it is typically used within an index to point to a row. The row identifier typically
requires 1 - 4 bytes of storage. The presence of a row identifier in the row data is represented
with the Boolean row identifier exists parameter. The following steps summarize how we
determine the row identifier exists parameter:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
2. For a single-column table containing all string values of the same size, we consider
the row headers.
3. If the the row headers are exactly the same (byte-for-byte) for all records, row iden-
tifier exists is set to False. Otherwise, row identifier exists is set to True.
4. To confirm the results, this process is repeated for a table containing two columns of
string where the all of the values are the same size.
From our experience, the row identifier is always at a static position, which is described
with the row identifier offset parameter. The following steps summarize how we determine
this parameter:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
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2. For a single-column table containing all values of the same size, we consider the row
headers.
3. The offset of the bytes that change between all row headers are recorded.
4. We assume that the byte with the highest offset is the low byte. Row identifier offset
is returned as this position.
The row identifier may use a static or variable number of bytes, which is represented
with the row identifier static size parameter. The following steps summarize how we
determine the row identifier static size parameter if and only if row identifier exists is
True:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
2. For a single-column table containing all values of the same size, we consider the row
headers.
3. If the the row headers are exactly the same size (i.e., the number of bytes) for all
records, row identifier static size is set to True. Otherwise, row identifier static
size is set to False.
4. To confirm the results, this process is repeated for a two-column table where the all
of the values are the same size.
If row identifier static size is True, we represent that size of the row identifier with
the row identifier size parameter. The following steps summarize how we determine this
parameter:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
2. For a single-column table containing all values of the same size, we consider the row
headers.
3. Row identifier size is set to the number of the bytes that change between all row
headers.
4. To confirm the results, this process is repeated for a two-column table where the all
of the values are the same size.
If the row identifier is variable in size, its value for each row by the parsing code, which
is described later.
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4.2.3.3 Column Count
The column count represents the number of columns in the row. The presence of the column
count is represented with the Boolean column count exists parameter. The row identifier, if
included in the row, may be treated as a column, although it is technically a pseudo-column.
In such cases, the column count would be the total number of user data columns plus one.
The inclusion of the row identifier pseudo-column in the column count is represented with
the column count includes row identifier parameter. The following steps summarize
how we determine the column count exists and column count includes row identifier
parameters:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
2. We consider synthetic tables with 1, 2, and 3 columns.
3. For the 1 column table, the row header is scanned for a decimal value 1 at the same
position across all row headers. If such a commonality is found, the 2 column table is
scanned for the same commonality of decimal value 2. If the commonality is found
again, the 3 column table is scanned for the commonality of decimal value 3. If this
final commonality is found, column count exists is returned as True and column
count includes row identifier is returned as False.
4. If a column count is not identified, the previous step is repeated except the decimal
value 2 is used for the 1 column table, 3 is used for the 2 column table, and 4 is used
for the 3 column table. If these commonalities are found, column count exists is
returned as True and column count includes row identifier is returned as True.
5. If a column count is still not identified, column count exists and column count
includes row identifier are returned as False.
The location of the column count may be indicated in a few different ways. The nec-
essary parameters include column count fixed offset, column count delimiter, column
count delimiter offset, and column count pointer offset. The following steps summarize
how we determine the column count fixed offset parameter:
1. We consider a synthetic table with 1 column.
2. If the decimal value 1 (or 2 if column count includes row identifier is True) is at
the same offset within the row header, column count fixed offset is set to this offset.
Otherwise, column count fixed offset is set to NULL.
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3. These results are confirmed with the 2 and 3 column synthetic tables.
If column count fixed offset is NULL, tests for the column count delimiter are per-
formed. The following steps summarize how we determine the column count delimiter
and column count delimiter offset parameters:
1. Based on our experience, we assume the column count delimiter is a sequence of two
or three non-NULL bytes shared by all row headers.
2. Byte commonalities are found for all row headers in a synthetic table with 1 column.
3. If a sequence of 3 contiguous bytes are found in all row headers and the distance
between this sequence and the decimal value 1 (or 2 if column count includes row
identifier is True) is the same for each row, column count delimiter is set to the
sequence of bytes and column count delimiter offset is set to the distance between
the sequence of bytes and the decimal value 1.
4. If a sequence of 3 bytes is not found, a sequence of 2 bytes is considered.
5. If a 2 byte sequence is not found, column count delimiter and column count de-
limiter offset are set to NULL.
6. These results are confirmed with the 2 and 3 column synthetic tables.
If column count delimiter is NULL, tests for a column count pointer are performed.
The column count pointer is a pointer to the column count stored in the row header. The
following steps summarize how we determine the column count pointer offset parameter:
1. For all rows in 1, 2, and 3 column synthetic tables, the distance between the beginning
of the row and the decimal value 1, 2, and 3 (or 2, 3, and 4 if column count includes
row identifier is True) are collected.
2. Each row header is scanned for a value that equals the respective distance found in
the previous step.
3. If a matching value is found at the same offset within each row, column count
pointer offset is set to this offset. Otherwise, column count pointer offset is set
to NULL
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4.2.3.4 Column Sizes
Column sizes refers to the size of strings. This section focuses on locating the column sizes
to learn the general layout of the row, rather than decoding these values, which is discussed
in Section 4.2.4. Column sizes are either adjacent to each value or stored in the row header.
We first consider the case when column sizes could be stored adjacent to each value.
This information is represented with the Column Sizes are Stored with Raw Data param-
eter. The following steps summarize how we determine this parameter:
1. For a single-column table containing all values of the same size, we consider the byte
that precedes our known synthetic value (one per row).
2. If this byte is the same value for all rows, and the decimal value is greater than or
equal to the actual length of the value, we continue; otherwise, Column Sizes are
Stored with Raw Data is returned as False.
3. For a two-column table containing all values of the same size, although a larger
size than in the single-column table, we consider the byte that precedes our known
synthetic values (two per row).
4. If these bytes are the same value for all rows, and the decimal values are greater
than or equal to the actual length of the values and greater than values found for the
single-column table, Column Sizes are Stored with Raw Data is returned as True;
otherwise, Column Sizes are Stored with Raw Data is returned as False.
If Column Sizes are Stored with Raw Data is False, we next consider the case
when column sizes are stored in the header. This information is represented with the Col-
umn Sizes in Header parameter. When this parameter is True, the Column Sizes Offset
parameter is also needed to locate the column sizes. The following steps summarize how
we determine these parameters:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
2. For a single-column table containing all values of the same size, the row header is
scanned for a value that is equal to or greater than the length of our known synthetic
value.
3. If a common byte is found for all rows and at the same location, Column Sizes in
Header is set to True and Column Sizes Offset is set to the location of the common
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byte; otherwise, Column Sizes in Header is returned as False and Column Sizes
Offset is returned as NULL.
4. For a two-column table containing values of the same size (but different size than the
single-column table), the row header is scanned for a value that is equal to or greater
than the length of our known synthetic values.
5. If two common bytes are found for all rows and at the same location as the single-
column table, Column Sizes in Header is returned as True and Column Sizes
Offset is returned as the location of the common bytes; otherwise, Column Sizes in
Header is returned as False and Column Sizes Offset is returned as NULL.
If Column Sizes in Header is False, we finally consider the case when column sizes
are stored at a floating location within the header. In such a case, column sizes are stored
before the position referenced by the row directory pointer. This information is represented
with the Column Sizes at Floating Location parameter. The following steps summarize
how we determine this parameter:
1. For a single-column table containing all values of the same size, the byte before the
row directory pointer address is scanned for a value that is equal to or greater than
the length of our known synthetic value.
2. If a common byte is found for all rows, Column Sizes at Floating Location is set to
True; otherwise, Column Sizes at Floating Location is returned as False.
3. For a two-column table containing values of the same size (but different size than the
single-column table), the row header is scanned for a value that is equal to or greater
than the length of our known synthetic values.
4. If two common bytes are found for all rows, Column Sizes at Floating Location
is returned as True; otherwise, Column Sizes at Floating Location is returned as
False.
4.2.3.5 Column Directory
The column directory stores pointers to each value within the row. The column directory
is either at a fixed offset from the beginning of the row or a fixed offset from the column
count. If column sizes were previously found, we assume that a column directory does not
exist.
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We first consider the case when the column directory is at a fixed position from the
beginning of the row, which is represented with the column directory at fixed offset pa-
rameter. While determining the location of the column directory, we also determine the
distance between pointers, which is represented with the column directory pointer size
parameter. The following steps summarize how we determine these parameters:
1. We first assume that the distance between the low bytes of two consecutive column
directory pointers will not be more than 4 bytes apart.
2. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
3. For a two-column table containing all values of the same size, we scan the row head-
ers for the low bytes of the two column pointers.
4. These column pointers will have a difference of the length of the first column value,
i.e., the low byte of the first pointer plus the length of the first column equals the low
byte of the second pointer.
5. While scanning the row header for these bytes, we consider that the distance between
the low bytes could be 1, 2, 3, or 4 bytes.
6. If a correct sequence of bytes is found at the same position for all rows, column
directory at fixed offset is set to the location of the first low byte, and column
directory pointer size is set to the distance between the low bytes when the sequence
was found.
It is possible that the position of the column directory may be shifted by other metadata.
From our experience, we have found that a shift in the column directory matches a shift
with the column count. Therefore, we believe it is more accurate to locate the column
directory using the column count (if the column count is available). The column directory
column count offset parameter describes the distance of the column directory from the
column count. The following steps summarize how we determine this parameter:
1. If a column count exists, column directory column count offset is set to column
directory at fixed offset minus the address of the column count; otherwise, column
directory column count offset is returned as NULL.
2. This result is confirmed for all rows.
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4.2.3.6 Raw Data
The raw data refers to the user data. The raw data can be located at a fixed offset within the
row, following a delimiter, following the column directory, or following column sizes that
may be stored in the row header.
We first consider the case when the raw data could be located at a fixed offset, which
is described with the Raw Data Fixed Offset parameter. The following steps summarize
how we determine this parameter:
1. We define the row header as the storage between the beginning of the row (i.e., the
row directory pointer) and the first column of user data.
2. For a single-column table and a two-column table, we consider the row headers.
3. If the row headers are exactly the same size (i.e., the number of bytes) for all records
in both tables, Raw Data Fixed Offset is set to the size of the row headers. Other-
wise, Raw Data Fixed Offset is set to NULL.
If Raw Data Fixed Offset is NULL, we consider the case when a delimiter may indicate
where the raw data is located, which is described by the Raw Data Delimiter and Raw
Data Delimiter Offset parameters. The following steps summarize how we determine
these parameters:
1. Based on our experience, we assume the raw data delimiter is a sequence of two or
three non-NULL bytes shared by all row headers.
2. Byte commonalities are found for all row headers in a single-column table and a
two-column table.
3. If the same sequence of 3 contiguous bytes is found in all row headers, Raw Data
Delimiter is set to that sequence of bytes. Raw Data Delimiter Offset is set to the
distance between the sequence of bytes and the first byte of the first known synthetic
value.
4. If a sequence of 3 bytes is not found, a sequence of 2 bytes is considered.
5. If a 2 byte sequence is not found, Raw Data Delimiter and Raw Data Delimiter
Offset are set to NULL.
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If Raw Data Delimiter is NULL and if a column directory is known to exist, we con-
sider the case when the raw data follows the column directory, which is described with the
Raw Data Succeeds Column Directory Offset parameter. The following steps summarize
how we determine this parameter:
1. The column directory is located in the row headers for all rows in a single-column
table and a two-column table.
2. The distance between the row directory and the first known synthetic value are col-
lected for all rows in both tables.
3. If the distance is the same for all rows in the single-column table, the distance is same
for all rows in the two-column table, and the distance in the single-column table plus
column directory pointer size equals the distance in the two-column table, Raw
Data Succeeds Column Directory Offset is returned as the distance in the single-
column table minus column directory pointer size. Otherwise, Raw Data Succeeds
Column Directory Offset is returned as NULL.
If Raw Data Succeeds Column Directory Offset is NULL and the column sizes are
stored in row data headers, we consider the case when the raw data follows the column
sizes, which is described with the Raw Data Succeeds Column Sizes Offset parameter.
The following steps summarize how we determine this parameter:
1. The column sizes are located in the row headers for all rows in a single-column table
and a two-column table.
2. The distance between the column sizes and the first known synthetic value are col-
lected for all rows in both tables.
3. If the distance is the same for all rows in the single-column table, the distance is same
for all rows in the two-column table, and the distance in the single-column table plus
1 equals the distance in the two-column table, Raw Data Succeeds Column Sizes
Offset is returned as the distance in the single-column table minus 1. Otherwise,
Raw Data Succeeds Column Sizes Offset is returned as NULL.
4.2.4 Data Encoding
Data encoding parameters describe how a given DBMS stores values in the row data.
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4.2.4.1 Strings
Column sizes for strings may be stored in either the row header or adjacent to the string
data; however, these values may not represent the actual string sizes. In practice, some
DBMSes compute and store column sizes that differ from the actual column sizes. To de-
code the actual sizes from the columns sizes as stored, two decoding constants are required:
Cx and Cy. These constants are used in the following equation:
ColumnSizestored = Cx × ColumnSizeactual + Cy (4.2)
Once determined, these constants are used by the parser to determine actual column sizes.
These constants are determined with the following steps:
1. We consider synthetic two tables, T1 and T2, with variable length strings.
2. For the string columns from any given pair of rows from each table,
Cx =
T2.ColumnSizestored − T1.ColumnSizestored
T2.ColumnSizeactual − T1.ColumnSizeactual
(4.3)
3. For any given column from either table,
Cy = ColumnSizestored − (Cx × ColumnSizeactual) (4.4)
Strings may sometimes be padded with extra NULL character to achieve 4-byte align-
ment, represented with the Boolean 4-byte alignment parameter.
1. We consider a table with three columns: a variable-length string, an integer, and
another fixed-length string.
2. If the distance between the variable length string and the integer is constant, then
4-byte alignment is returned as False.
3. If the distance between the variable length string and the integer is not constant,
the variable bytes between the string and the integer are NULL characters, and the
number of NULL characters corresponds to 4-byte alignment; then 4-byte alignment
is returned as True.
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4.2.4.2 Integers
We first determine where integers are stored within the rows. Integers can either be stored
with the other columns (i.e., strings) or in the row data header. We represent this informa-
tion with the Integer Location parameter. The following steps describe how we determine
this parameter:
1. We consider a table with three columns: a fixed-length string, an integer, and another
fixed-length string. In our synthetic data, we populate the integer with a value in a
linear series, starting from 1.
2. If the space between the two fixed-length strings contains the same value for all rows
or no space exists, we assume that integers are stored in the row data header, and
we set Integer Location equal to ‘header’. Otherwise, we assume that integers are
stored with the string column data, and we set Integer Location equal to ‘strings’.
When Integer Location equals ‘strings’, some DBMSes write integer values at 4-
byte aligned positions. Accordingly, they pad strings that immediately precede them with
NULLs. We represent this information with the 4 Byte Integer Alignment parameter. The
following steps describe how we determine this parameter:
1. We consider a table with three columns: a fixed-length string of 19 characters, an
integer, and another fixed-length string. In our synthetic data, we populate the integer
with a value in a linear series, starting from 1.
2. If the space between the two fixed-length strings is greater than 4 bytes and the pre-
vious string is padded with NULL bytes, 4 Byte Integer Alignment is returned as
True. Otherwise, 4 Byte Integer Alignment is returned as False.
Integers are commonly stored as 32-bit numbers; the 32-bit Integer parameter
represents this information. The following steps describe how we determine this parameter:
1. For this parameter to be True, four bytes must be used to represent the value and
the following equation will yield the actual value:
V alueactual = 256
0×Byte1+2561×Byte2+2562×Byte3+2563×Byte4 (4.5)
2. We consider a table with three columns: a fixed-length string, an integer, and another
fixed-length string. In our synthetic data, we populate the integer with a value in a
linear series, starting from 1.
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3. We collect all of the bytes used to represent the integer. This is either the space
between the two string columns or the space between the two row directory pointers.
This is based on the previously determined Integer Location parameter.
4. If the space is 4 bytes for all rows and the above equation is true for all rows,
32-bit Integer is returned as True. Otherwise, 32-bit Integer is re-
turned as False.
4.2.4.3 Other Datatypes
Currently, we do not detect parameters for data types other than strings and integers. We
intend to continue working on parameter detection for other data types in the future.
4.3 Carving Pages
This chapter discusses page carving, a method to reconstruct the internal database
page format that was generalized for all RDBMSes by the parameters previously defined
in Chapter 4.2. We divided page carving into four main categories based on the high-level
page format used by all RDBMSes: page header (Section 4.3.1), row directory (Section
4.3.2), row data (Section 4.3.3), and datatype decoding (Section 4.3.4).
Once the parameter collector generates parameter files, they are passed to the carver to
reconstruct metadata and raw user data from digital evidence. For each provided parameter
file, everything in this chapter is done for each evidence file passed to the carver.
4.3.1 Page Header
This section discusses how to carve the most common page header metadata, which in-
cludes general page identifier (Section 4.3.1.1), structure identifier (Section 4.3.1.2), unique
page identifier (Section 4.3.1.3), and record count (Section 4.3.1.4). Other metadata may
exist in a page header, such as free space pointer, checksum, or logical timestamp. Page
header metadata is generally carved using the respective steps:
1. Locate a metadata field using an offset parameter.
2. Collect all metadata field bytes using a size parameter.
3. Decode the metadata field using either a specified equation or the default 32-bit little
endian encoding.
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4.3.1.1 General Page Identifier
To find a page header, the evidence file is scanned for the general page identifier parame-
ter. When this sequence of bytes is found, the carver uses the address of the general page
identifier to locate the start of a page and begins page carving. It is possible that a sequence
of bytes matching the general page identifier parameter is found, but a DBMS page is not
present. To eliminate such false-positives, we make assumptions throughout this chapter.
If an assumptions is broken, page carving is terminated and NULL is returned for that page.
4.3.1.2 Structure Identifier
The following steps summarize how to carve the structure identifier. When structure iden-
tifier address and structure identifier size are not NULL:
1. Move to the page offset of the structure identifier address parameter.
2. The number of bytes (typically 2 or 4) are collected based on structure identifier
size.
3. The value is calculated assuming a little-endian integer unless otherwise specified in
the parameter file.
Assumption: The structure identifier integer value must be greater than 1. Other-
wise, page reconstruction is terminated. This assumption is safe because a DBMS builds a
collection of system catalog tables, which are assigned a structure identifier, upon instance
creation. Since the structure identifier is a sequential integer, any structure created by the
user is assigned a structure identifier greater than 1.
4.3.1.3 Unique Page Identifier
The unique page identifier is carved using the unique page identifier address parameter.
This parameter can be NULL when there is no unique page identifier. The following steps
summarize how to carve the unique page identifier. When unique page identifier address
is not NULL:
1. Move to the page offset of the unique page identifier address.
2. The value is calculated assuming a 32-bit little-endian integer unless otherwise spec-
ified in the parameter file.
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4.3.1.4 Record Count
The record count is carved using the record count address. The following steps summarize
how to carve the record count. When record count address is not NULL:
1. Move to the page offset of the record count address.
2. The value is calculated assuming a 16-bit little-endian integer unless otherwise spec-
ified in the parameter file.
4.3.2 Row Directory
The row directory is carved with the following steps:
1. The carver moves to offset of the row directory start parameter.
2. For each ith iteration, the carver moves to pointer distance * i. This is the location
of the pointer low byte. Note that pointer distance is a positive integer when order
sequence is True and it is a negative integer when pointer distance is False.
3. Since endianness is not assumed, the high byte is retrieved using the high value
position, which is either 1 or -1.
4. Using the Cx and Cy parameters, the pointer value is determined with the following
equation where Y is high byte and X is the low byte.
Pointer = (Y − Cy) ∗ 256 +X + Cx (4.6)
5. These steps are repeated until an invalid pointer is found based on assumptions.
When order sequence is True, we assume a pointer must be greater than pointer
distance * i and less than pointer distance * i. When order sequence is False,
we assume a pointer must be less than pointer distance * i.
Note that other rules and assumptions can be customized for specific DBMS storage
engines. For example, a pointer may be zero upon delete for some DBMSes. In such a case,
valid pointers may follow this zero. Therefore, zero is not a reasonable break condition.
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4.3.3 Row Data
Every row in the row data contains both metadata and user data. This section discusses
how to carve the metadata and use it to reconstruct the user data.
For every row directory pointer, a record is located (except for the case of a sparse
row directories). Figure 4.1 provides an overview of how record carving is performed.
For each record, all of the metadata from the record header is reconstructed using the
respective parameters from the parameter file. When the raw data is parsed, the data types
are determined for every value (Section 4.3.4 provides a more detailed description for data
type decoding). Once all row directory pointers are considered, any unallocated storage
within the row data is scanned for bytes that resemble the structure of a record (i.e., deleted
records).
RowID Column Count
Column Directory
Column Sizes
Raw Data 
& Column Sizes
Raw Data Return 
Values
c
Figure 4.1: Record parsing overview.
4.3.3.1 Row Delimiter
If the row delimiter parameter is not NULL, then a row directory pointer must point to a
byte(s) that equals the row delimiter parameter. Otherwise, the carving for that record is
aborted and that row directory pointer is considered invalid.
4.3.3.2 Row Identifier
A row identifier is carved using the row identifier exists, row identifier offset, row iden-
tifier static size, and row identifier size parameters. The following steps summarize how
to carve a row identifier when the row identifier exists parameter is True:
1. Move to the row offset of the row identifier offset parameter.
2. If row identifier static size is True, the row identifier size parameter is used to
collect the appropriate number of bytes, and the unsigned integer is returned.
3. If row identifier static size is False, every byte is assumed to be signed. All bytes
greater than or equal to decimal value 128 are collected, and the integer is returned.
61
4.3.3.3 Column Count
A column count is carved using the column count exists, column count includes row
identifier, column count fixed offset, column count delimiter, column count delimiter
offset, and column count pointer offset parameters. The following steps summarize how
to carve a column count when the column count exists parameter is True:
1. If the column count delimiter parameter is not NULL, find the column count de-
limiter value, move column count fixed offset, and read the byte.
2. Else if the column count fixed offset parameter is not NULL, move to the row offset
of column count fixed offset and read the byte.
3. Else if the column count pointer offset parameter is not NULL, move to offset col-
umn count pointer offset, decode the pointer as a 16-bit unsigned integer, move to
the pointer location, and read the byte.
4. Finally, if column count includes row identifier is True, the byte read minus one
is returned as the column count. Otherwise, the byte read is returned as the column
count.
4.3.3.4 Column Directory vs. Column Sizes
Up until this point, the raw user data parsing is not dependent on the metadata parsed (i.e.,
the row delimiter, row identifier, and column count); although the column count metadata
can be leveraged for more accurate raw user data parsing. The parser next decides between
a either column directory or column size (format) to reconstruct since the raw user data is
dependent on this information. If either the Column Directory at Fixed Offset or Column
Directory Column Count Offset parameters are not NULL, then a column directory is
parsed and column sizes are not considered. If both the Column Directory at Fixed Offset
or Column Directory Column Count Offset parameters are NULL, then the parser moves
to determine the format in which the column sizes are stored and a column directory is not
considered.
Since the raw user data is dependent on the column directory or column size metadata,
the raw data is often located and evaluated in parallel.
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4.3.3.5 Column Directory
A column directory is reconstructed if either Column Directory at Fixed Offset or Col-
umn Directory Column Count Offset parameters are not NULL. To reconstruct the col-
umn directory, the column directory is located and then the pointers are parsed.
The following steps describe how the column directory is located:
1. If Column Directory at Fixed Offset is not NULL, then the parser moves to the
offset of the Column Directory at Fixed Offset parameter.
2. Else if a column count was parsed (from Section 4.3.3.3 and Column Directory
Column Count Offset is not NULL, the parser moves the number of bytes stored as
Column Directory Column Count Offset from the column count location.
The following steps describe how the column directory pointers are parsed. Since in-
tegers are stored in the column directory with pointers, the parser determines if the each
value is an integer or a pointer:
1. For each field in the column directory, a pointer is first assumed.
2. If the assumed pointer stores an unreasonable address (i.e., an address within the
column directory, an address outside of the row, and the sequence of pointers does
not ascend), an integer is assumed. The integer is reconstructed and returned.
3. Else if a reasonable pointer is determined, the user data value is evaluated for a string
– string conditions are discussed in Section sec:datadecoding2. Since the size of the
string is not provided, the carver considers all bytes up until the next pointer or up
until the row end as part of the string.
4. If the user data value is determined to be a string, it is returned. Otherwise, unknown
data type is assumed.
5. The breaking condition for iterating over fields in the column directory is either the
column count (when present) or when the carver reaches the address of the first col-
umn directory pointer (or the end of the row in the case of all integers).
4.3.3.6 Column Sizes
Column sizes refers to the size of strings. Column sizes are carved using the following pa-
rameters: Column Sizes are Stored with Raw Data, Column Sizes in Header, Column
Sizes Offset, and Column Sizes at Floating Location. The followings steps summarize
to carve column sizes when Column Sizes are Stored with Raw Data is True:
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1. As each user data field in the row is considered as string is first assumed.
2. The first byte in field is evaluated as an appropriate string size (i.e., the size must not
overflow into the next row and an integer must be returned when the string decoding
constants (Cx and Cy) are applied). Otherwise, another data type is assumed to be
present.
3. Finally, the string conditions (discussed in Section sec:datadecoding2) must be meet
for the given field. Otherwise, another data type is assumed to be present.
4. The breaking condition for iterating over fields in the user data fields is either the
column count (when present) or when the carver reaches the next row.
The followings steps summarize to carve column sizes when Column Sizes in Header
is True:
1. The carver assumes that the next byte(s) read is a string size.
2. The byte(s) evaluated is an appropriate string size (i.e., the size must not overflow
into the next row and an integer must be returned when the string decoding constants
(Cx and Cy) are applied). Otherwise, the end of the column sizes stored in the header
has been reached.
3. Finally, the string conditions (discussed in Section sec:datadecoding2) must be meet
for the given string size. Otherwise, the end of the column sizes stored in the header
has been reached.
4. Another breaking condition used by the carver to determine the end of the column
sizes stored in the header are the column count (when present) or when the sum of
the column sizes is equal to the end of the row.
The followings steps summarize to carve column sizes when Column Sizes at Floating
Location is True:
1. The carver assumes that the next byte(s) read is a string size.
2. The byte(s) evaluated is an appropriate string size (i.e., the size must not overflow
into the next row and an integer must be returned when the string decoding constants
(Cx and Cy) are applied). Otherwise, the end of the column sizes stored in the header
has been reached.
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3. Finally, the string conditions (discussed in Section sec:datadecoding2) must be meet
for the given string size. Otherwise, the end of the column sizes stored in the header
has been reached.
4. Another breaking condition used by the carver to determine the end of the column
sizes stored in the header are the column count (when present) or when the sum of
the column sizes is equal to the end of the row.
4.3.3.7 Raw Data
The raw data refers to the user data fields. The carver locates the raw data and then de-
termines datatypes and reconstructs fields using data decoding rules discussed in Section
4.3.4. The following steps describe how the carver locates the raw data:
1. If Raw Data Fixed Offset is not NULL, then the carver moves to offset of the Raw
Data Fixed Offset parameter value.
2. Otherwise, the carver searches for the bytes stored in the Raw Data Delimiter pa-
rameter and moves to the offset of the Raw Data Delimiter Offset parameter value.
4.3.3.8 Additional Obsolete Record Pass (Unallocated Storage Scan)
We define an obsolete record as a record that resides in unallocated storage. Obsolete
records are typically created by SQL DELETE or UPDATE, but can also be created by other
commands, such as object reorganization or defragmentation commands. For example,
the PostgreSQL VACUUM command defragments a table. The VACUUM command moves
active records to a new page location, an obsolete copy remains in the old page location.
The VACUUM command then erases the row directory pointer for the obsolete copy making
it unallocated storage in the page.
Up until this point, obsolete records in unallocated storage are carved if the corre-
sponding metadata for a record is still intact (i.e., the row directory pointer and row header
metadata). However, it is still possible that metadata for an obsolete record in unallocated
storage was destroyed (e.g., a row directory pointer was NULL-ed upon record deletion).
As a final step to carve a page, the carver searches for any remaining obsolete data in un-
allocated storage. The following describes the process to reconstruct this data when the
row directory pointer no longer exists, but the row data header metadata is still intact. If a
row data header is not completely intact, data can still be carved, but we do not make any
claims on this process.
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1. The carver collects all remaining byte segments of the page that were not carved.
2. We assume that a record must contain at least 4 bytes. Therefore, if a byte segment
is less than 4 bytes, the carver does not consider it for carving.
3. To determine if a record is present, the carver iterates over the bytes in a given seg-
ment.
4. For each iteration, the carver assumes a record is present and attempts to reconstruct
all metadata fields described in this section.
5. If any of the metadata fields cannot be reconstructed or a metadata field does not meet
any declared assumptions, then the carver continues to iterate through the segment.
6. If all metadata and user data conditions are fulfilled, the record is returned and itera-
tion continues.
4.3.4 Data Decoding
4.3.4.1 ASCII Strings
The parser evaluates each byte to confirm if a raw data value is an ASCII string. We assume
that ASCII strings only contain printable characters (i.e., decimal value 32 to 127). If any
byte is found to be outside of this range, the parser aborts string parsing, and moves on to
another data type.
If 4-byte alignment is True, then the appropriate number of NULL bytes following the
string are removed from the record.
4.3.4.2 Integers
The default integer reconstruction for the parser is an unsigned 32-bit little endian integer.
Known exceptions are listed below.
Anonymous DBMS#1. A signed 32-bit little endian integer is reconstructed.
Anonymous DBMS#2. A zero-compression key is used to reconstruct the number. In
this case, there are three main components to integer reconstruction:
1. The first byte represents the number of bytes needed to store the integer.
2. The second byte is a zero-compression key. For example, the value 192 means a 1-
digit integer, 193 means a 2-digit integer, 194 means a 4-digit integer, and 195 means
a 6-digit integer. Each time the zero-compression key increases by (past 193), the
66
number of digits for the integer increases by two. The integer zero uses the value 128
for the zero-compression key.
3. Any remaining bytes represent two digits of the integer, but 1 must be subtracted
from that value. For example, the values 12 and 12 represent the integer 1111. If
the resulting integer does not have a number of digits that corresponds to the zero-
compression key, the the integer is padded to the right with the appropriate number
of zeros.
4.3.4.3 Other Datatypes
Besides strings and integers, other datatypes often require DBMS-specific functions. A
decoding function can be created by collecting the byte storage representation for a set
of known synthetic values and determining the encoding. Once a decoding function is
created for a specified DBMS datatype, an IF condition is added to the carver to detect
the datatype; the DBMS is known since this information is included in the parameter file.
When the IF condition is met by the carver, the bytes are passed to the respective decoding
function.
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Chapter 5
Standard Storage Format
5.1 Introduction
Database forensic carving tools have been proposed [33, 17, 86, 87, 91, 65], but incorporat-
ing their output into an investigation remains difficult to impossible. The storage disparity
between DBMSes and operating systems may well in fact be the main culprit for the stunted
growth and limited applications of database forensics. We identified two major pieces cur-
rently missing from the field of database forensics that have prevented its involvement in
forensic investigations: 1) a standardized storage format, and 2) a toolkit to view and search
database forensic artifacts.
Standard Storage Format A standard database forensic storage format would abstract
the specifics of DBMS storage engines for users unfamiliar with DBMS internals and guide
the development of database carving tools. All DBMSes use their own storage engine. A
standard storage format would allow users to view and search database forensic artifacts,
generate reports, and develop advanced analytic tools without knowledge of storage engine
specifics for any given DBMS. A uniform output for database carving tools would also
allow these tools to be compared and tested against each other.
View and Search Toolkit A toolkit to view and search reconstructed DBMS artifacts
would allow investigators to easily interpret the artifacts. While database data is stored and
queried through records in tables, the records alone do not accurately represent the forensic
state of a database since this data is accompanied by a variety of metadata (e.g., byte offset
of the record). Investigators need a way to view how the metadata and table records are
interconnected.
In this chapter, we describe a comprehensive framework to represent and search database
forensic artifacts. A preliminary version of this framework was implemented for this chap-
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Figure 5.1: The role of DB3F and DF-Toolkit in database forensics.
ter, which includes a format specification document and an evidence querying application.
Section 5.2 considers the work related to our framework, and Section 5.3 defines our frame-
work requirements. Next, Sections 5.4 and 5.5 present the two main contributions of the
research work presented in this chapter, which are the following:
1. We define a storage format and data abstraction for database forensic artifacts called
the Database Forensic File Format (DB3F). Section 5.4 provides a detailed descrip-
tion of DB3F. The DB3F definition can be downloaded from our research group
website:
http://dbgroup.cdm.depaul.edu/DF-Toolkit.html
2. We describe a toolkit called the Database Forensic Toolkit (DF-Toolkit) to view and
search data stored in DB3F. Along with a description of DF-Toolkit, Section 5.5
presents a user interface that implements DF-Toolkit. This user interface can be
downloaded from our research group website:
http://dbgroup.cdm.depaul.edu/DF-Toolkit.html
Figure 5.1 displays how DB3F and DF-Toolkit are used in database forensic analysis.
Database carving tools return output in DB3F. DB3F files are filtered and searched us-
ing DF-Toolkit, which stores filtered results in DB3F. DB3F files are then either directly
reported to the end user or passed to further advanced analytic applications.
The introduction of a standardized intermediate format and a comprehensive toolkit for
database forensics benefits the community in two important ways. First, it streamlines the
addition of new tools on either side of the flow chart in Figure 5.1. With the introduction of
a new database carving tool (e.g., Tool D), users would benefit from all available advanced
applications that support DB3F. Similarly, any newly developed advanced application can
trivially process output from any carving tool that supports DB3F output. This intermedi-
ary approach is conceptually similar to Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) [44], a collec-
tion of reusable compiler technologies that defines a set of common language-independent
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primitives. The second benefit is the explicit documentation and built-in reproducibility
of the analyses process and outcomes, bringing a scientific approach to digital forensics.
Garfinkel [24] emphasized the lack of scientific rigor and reproducibility within the field;
although in [24] he focused on developing standard corpora, a standard storage format
as well as a querying and viewing mechanism is also necessary to achieve these goals.
Rather than building custom analytic tools (e.g., [85]), DF-Toolkit’s approach will offer
a well-documented querying mechanism based on defined standard fields in DB3F. Any
query report can be easily reproduced by another party or re-tested via a different database
carver.
This chapter serves as the foundation for a vision of a complete system with full sup-
port for database forensics and integration with other forensic tools. Section 5.6 discusses
planned improvements for future developments to our framework, including advanced an-
alytic applications.
5.2 Related Work
This section presents work related to both DB3F and DF-Toolkit. To help formulate our
storage format, we took into consideration metadata usage by many forensic tools, the capa-
bilities of database carving tools, and forensic languages used outside of database forensics.
To help design our view and search toolkit, we consider the evidence tree structure used by
many forensic tools and current data filtering approaches.
5.2.1 Storage Format
Metadata Standards File system metadata is widely used in digital forensics to navigate
file system information and reconstruct event timelines. Popular tools, such as The Sleuth
Kit [9], FTK [1], and EnCase [32] use body files to represent this metadata. Thus, our
database forensic storage format was designed to include not only the records that could be
accessed through a live system, but also the DBMS metadata, which users may not always
have access to through the DBMS API.
Database Carving Tools Several database carving tools exist, but they lack a unified
output to store their results. These tools examine and reconstruct database forensic arti-
facts at the page level. Pages (typically 4K or 8K) are the minimum read/write unit for
all row-store relational DBMSes. Page configuration is typically described in documen-
tation by DBMS vendors (e.g., Oracle [61], Microsoft SQL Server [52], IBM DB2 [36],
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PostgreSQL [30], MySQL [62], and SQLite [81]). Drinkwater was one of the earliest to de-
scribe a database carving approach for SQLite DBMSes [17]. Guidance Software’s SQLite
Parser implements much of what Drinkwater discussed; they reconstruct both allocated
and unallocated SQLite data [33]. SQLite Parser returns the results in the form of a new
SQLite instance (i.e., a single database file). Wagner et al. proposed a generalized method
to learn and reconstruct DBMS storage through page carving [86, 91]. They proved this
method worked for most row-store relational DBMSes, including Apache Derby, Firebird,
IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle, PostgreSQL, and SQLite. Their tool,
DBCarver, returned much of the metadata along with the allocated and unallocated user
records in a series of CSV files. Percona’s Recovery Tool for InnoDB recovers MySQL
DBMS files [65], but we do not consider it a tool for forensic investigations. Once MySQL
files are recovered, they are imported into a live MySQL instance. Therefore, none of the
unallocated data or metadata is presented to the user. One of the main goals in this chapter
is to define a unified storage format for the allocated data and unallocated data returned by
the work of Drinkwater and Guidance Software, and the allocated data, unallocated data,
and metadata returned by the work of Wagner et al. To evaluate DB3F and DF-Toolkit
for this chapter, we used our previously developed page carving tool, DBCarver [91]. As
DBCarver does not support DB3F output, we converted its output (CSV files) into DB3F.
Structured Forensic Languages File names and file system properties are represented
in formats such as JSON or XML with digital forensic tools. Some examples include Man-
diant’s Indicators of Compromise in Malware Forensics [47], The MITRE Corporation’s
Making Security Measurable Project [50], and DFXML by Garfinkel et al. [26, 22]. For
this project we used JSON to represent database forensic artifacts. JSON can readily be
migrated to XML if needed using most programming languages.
5.2.2 View and Search Model
Evidence Tree Most forensic tools (e.g., FTK, The Sleuth Kit/Autopsy, and Encase) that
offer an interface to traverse and view artifacts use a tree structure to present these forensic
artifacts. Database forensic artifacts are inherently different from typical forensic objects;
therefore, objects such as files cannot serve as tree nodes. For example, a database table
can span across multiple files (as in PostgreSQL) or a database file can contain multiple
database tables and indexes (as in Oracle). In this chapter, we present a new evidence tree
that was inspired by existing tools, but designed to represent database forensic artifacts.
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Filtering SQL is a powerful tool that can enhance searching forensic artifacts. Instead of
iterating over a series of files, forensic filtering tools can integrate SQL (i.e., relational)
database capabilities. FTK [1] and The Sleuth Kit [9] store case information in SQL
databases, and we believe our framework should take the same approach. The main chal-
lenge with this, which we address in this chapter, is that to properly use SQL, the data must
be first stored in a properly defined relational schema. Some of the forensic SQLite tools
(e.g., Guidance Software’s SQLite Parser) return results as a SQLite DBMS file, which can
be natively filtered using SQL. However, it does not include forensically relevant metadata
defined in [86], which we believe should be incorporated. Therefore, simply recreating the
DBMS is insufficient as it provides only data and not metadata. The following examples
illustrate this problem with two simple questions a database filtering framework should be
capable of answering.
Example 1: “Return all deleted records and their offsets” A recreated DBMS does not
store metadata that describes deletion status of a record or its offset within a disk image. To
answer this query, at least two additional columns (deletion flag and position offset) must
be added to every table reconstructed in the DBMS. It is immediately apparent that such a
model is not extensible, as additional metadata columns will be needed to support answers
for other types of forensic queries. Furthermore, by adding meta-columns, distinguishing
the meta-columns from the original (“real”) data columns could become a challenge for
users.
Example 2: “Find all records containing the string ‘MaliciousText”’ This query
poses even more challenges than the previous example. The user must search all columns
across all tables. Such operation is not well-supported by SQL, as SQL language has no
capability to apply a filter condition “for all columns”. To illustrate this problem, assume
we know there is just one table, Employee. The following query would have to be written
for every table:
SELECT *
FROM Employee
WHERE FirstName LIKE ‘%MaliciousText%’
OR LastName LIKE ‘%MaliciousText%’
OR Department LIKE ‘%MaliciousText%’
OR JobTitle LIKE ‘%MaliciousText%’;
We discuss our solution for this problem in Section 5.5.1.
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5.3 Design Requirements
The requirements identified for this work were based on the overall goals and challenges in
digital forensics discussed by Garfinkel [27] and the requirements defined by other digital
forensic frameworks, including Autopsy [8], DFXML [26, 22], and FROST [18]. This
section describes some of the key requirements we considered for the design DB3F and
DF-Toolkit.
5.3.1 DB3F Requirements
Storage Engine Agnostic One of the major goals of DB3F is to abstract DBMS storage
engine specifics. This abstraction must generalize to all row-store DBMSes and not lose
any forensic artifacts. One example of an artifact that may be interpreted differently de-
pending on the specific DBMS is the storage of the DBMS-internal object identifier meta-
data. An object identifier is a unique identifier for each object in the DBMS; it maps back
to a system table for the object’s plaintext name (e.g., Employee). Most DBMSes store the
object identifier in the page header. Alternatively, PostgreSQL stores the object identifier
with each individual record (even though it is redundant, as a single database page can
only contain data belonging to one object). The function of the object identifier remains
the same despite where it stored. Therefore, DB3F should remove the need to know the
specifics of how such metadata is stored.
Simple to Generate and Ingest DB3F should be generated by all database carving tools
and used by any searching or advanced analytic tools. Therefore, the DB3F should be easy
to generate, and parsing data from DB3F should be trivial.
Open and Extensible DB3F should be publicly available and open sourced. Fields
should be easy to add to the public standard. Additionally, given the potentially wide
variety of organizations and databases that may use DB3F, custom field addition should
be allowed – new custom fields should be easy to introduce. For example, the standard
operating procedure for one organization may require chain of custody information that
is currently not a field in the DB3F file header. In such cases, it should be easy for an
organization to introduce this information into DB3F.
Scalable The amount of database forensic artifacts that may be discovered and will re-
quire processing is unpredictable (and projected to continuously increase). An investigation
may involve a small (KBs), lightweight DBMS from a personal device, or it may involve
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a large (PBs), data warehouse stored on multiple servers. Moreover, an investigation may
involve multiple computers (e.g., a network of IoT devices), each with their own individual
DBMS. Therefore, the amount of carved data stored in DB3F should not impact the system
capabilities.
5.3.2 DF-Toolkit Requirements
Visibility Forensic tools return a wide variety of data and metadata to users. These ar-
tifacts should be organized and presented to users in a manner such that the data can be
traversed. This is traditionally done using a representative tree structure where the root
nodes are the critical data structures (e.g., disk partitions), the next level nodes are used to
store the data objects (e.g., stand-alone files), and all other node levels are used to store
information about the carved data objects.
Display Data Objects Given that the user can view a logical organization of the forensic
artifacts in an evidence tree, the user would most certainly want to view the data objects
and their content. Such viewing should be allowed through a user interface.
Object Filtering When a user is presented with a large number of data objects, she may
desire to filter these to a relevant subset. For example, a user may only be interested in
JPEG files so a corresponding filtering condition (filetype = ‘JPEG’) may be applied.
In DBMSes, a user may want to filter objects based on the metadata, such as object type
(e.g., table, index, materialized view), number of columns, or object size.
Keyword Searches Keyword searches are commonly used in forensic investigations to
find relevant evidence. String matches and regular expressions should be supported for
filtering records (e.g., find all mentions of ‘Bob’).
Reporting Reports need to be generated to help analysts make conclusions and present
their findings. Furthermore, this reporting should allow for comparison and validation of
database forensic carving tool output.
5.4 The Database Forensic File Format
This section presents our storage format for database forensics, DB3F. This is the format
that should be used by different database carving tools to output their results.
74
5.4.1 File Layout
When a database carving tool is passed a file, a carver tool analyzes it for the presence of
one or more different DBMSes. Since each DBMS is a self-contained system, data from
different DBMSes should not be mixed within the same carver output file. Each DBMS is
stored as a separate output file.
Multiple DBMSes may exist on the same piece of evidence. However, it is acceptable
for multiple carver output files to be associated with a single DBMS. For example, a series
of DBMS files (from a single file system or multiple nodes) belonging to the same DBMS
may be passed to the carver as opposed to a single disk image. Moreover, the RAM snap-
shot(s) will be a separate evidence file for any given DBMS. Therefore, this condition is
required if one wants to compare the data from a disk image and a RAM snapshot.
Example 3: File Layout DiskImage01.img is passed to a database carving tool. The
carving tool analyzes the evidence for data belonging to PostgreSQL and SQLite DBMSes.
This results in two output DB3F files (one for each DBMS): PostgreSQL.json and
SQLite.json.
5.4.2 DB3F Files
Each DB3F file stores a series of JSON objects. The first line in a DB3F files contains a
JSON object that serves as a header. Every other line in the DB3F contains a JSON object
that represents a database page.
Representing the entire carved DBMS with a single JSON object has scalability prob-
lems because the amount of data in a DBMS can be arbitrarily large. Therefore, one JSON
object per DBMS page allows us to achieve the scalability requirement (see Section 5.3).
The physical order of DBMS pages is irrelevant because each page object stores its offset
within the disk image.
5.4.3 DB3F Header
The DB3F file header JSON object contains high-level metadata about the artifacts in the
file and how they were collected. The list below describes the fields, which should be
returned by the database carving tool, stored in the header. Additionally, Figure 5.2 dis-
plays a DB3F file header with example data. Since we cannot anticipate all of the header
information each specific organization may require, JSON fields can easily be added.
context (array): namespace information.
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1 {
2 "@context": {
3 "name": "DePaul Database Group",
4 "uri": "http://dbgroup.cdm.depaul.edu"
5 },
6 "evidence_file": "DiskImage01.img",
7 "forensic_tool": "Anonymous Tool",
8 "carving_time": "2019-01-19 22:45:32",
9 "dbms": "PostgreSQL 8.4",
10 "page_size": 8192
11 }
Figure 5.2: An example of DB3F header
name (string): the organization name used to identify custom header information.
uri (string): unique identifier for an organization.
evidence file (string): the disk image or RAM snapshot from where the forensic artifacts
originated.
forensic tool (string): the database carving tool used to generate the forensic artifacts.
carving time (string): the system global time when the carver finished generating the
DB3F file.
dbms (string): the DBMS vendor and its version.
page size (number): the page size used by the DBMS. Page size is assumed to be constant
across an entire DBMS. It is theoretically possible to use more than one page size
in a DBMS. However, we assume the database carving process will extract different
page sizes as belonging to different DBMSes.
5.4.4 DB3F Database Pages
Each line following the DB3F header contains a single JSON object that represent a database
page. Each page stores 1) page header fields and 2) an array of JSON objects that represent
records. Figure 5.3 displays an example of how DB3F represents a PostgreSQL DBMS
page storing Star Schema Benchmark data [59]. The fields in this figure are defined in this
section.
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1 {
2 "offset": 3743744,
3 "page_id": "0",
4 "object_id": "1113440",
5 "page_type": "Table",
6 "schema": ["Nbr","Str","Str","Str","Str","Str","Str"],
7 "records": [
8 {
9 "offset": 382,
10 "allocated": true,
11 "row_id": "71"
12 "values": [
13 "71",
14 "Supplier#000000071",
15 "3lCSQET",
16 "ARGENTINA5",
17 "ARGENTINA",
18 "AMERICA",
19 "11-710-812-5403"
20 ]
21 }, {
22 "offset": 486,
23 "allocated": true,
24 "row_id": "70"
25 "values": [
26 "70",
27 "Supplier#000000070",
28 "jd4djZv0cc5KdnA0q9oO",
29 "FRANCE 0",
30 "FRANCE",
31 "EUROPE",
32 "16-828-107-2832"
33 ]
34 }, {
35 "offset": 589,
36 "allocated": true,
37 "row_id": "69",
38 "values": [
39 "69",
40 "Supplier#000000069",
41 ...
42 ]
43 }, ...
44 ]
45 }
Figure 5.3: An example DB3F page JSON object
Page Header The page header stores information that is general to all records within the
page. The page header fields are the following:
offset (number): the page address within the evidence.
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page id (string): a unique identifier the DBMS assigns to a page.
object id(string): an identifier that the DBMS uses to map to the plaintext name of each
object (e.g., table or index).
page type (string): the type of object to which the page belongs.
schema (array): the data types for the record columns within the page.
records (array): a list of JSON objects for each record.
Record A JSON object exists for each record in the page. The record fields are the
following:
offset (number): the record address within the page.
allocated (boolean): True indicates the record is allocated, while False indicates the
record is deleted (i.e., unallocated storage).
row id (string): an internal DBMS pseudo-column.
values (array): the individual record values.
The fields defined in this section is not an exhaustive list. We anticipate that new fields
will be added to the DB3F standard as the tool use grows and organizations will want to
add their own custom fields.
Discussion: Datatype Support While the example data in Figure 5.3 illustrates only
strings and numbers, DB3F supports all DBMS datatypes. Each datatype is described in
the page header schema field, and the value is stored among the values field for a record.
Users may be concerned about storing values that do not fit into a single page, such as
Binary Large Objects (BLOBs) and large text fields. To store BLOBs, DBMSes do not
directly store the binary data within the page, but rather store a reference to a file containing
the binary data. For example, a DBMS would store a reference to a JPEG file in a page
rather than the binary JPEG data. DB3F would similarly store a reference to a file, with
the actual binary file (e.g., JPEG) stored in a separate dedicated location. It is possible
for a text value to span across more than one page. In this instance, each DB3F page
object describes the text stored in an individual page, allowing the long text value to be
reconstructed independently. Additionally, in some case text field will store pointers to the
remainder of the text located in different pages. In such cases, DB3F will store whatever
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information is provided by the database page carving tool. Additional analysis is required
to rebuild the entire text value – a DBMS pointer can be reconstructed using the metadata
already stored in DB3F fields. The work in [89] discusses DBMS pointer reconstruction in
more detail.
5.4.5 Evaluation
To verify the reliability of DB3F, we used three DBMSes: PostgreSQL, Oracle, and SQLite.
We loaded Star Schema Benchmark data [59] at Scale 1 (600MB) into each DBMS, used
DBCarver to carve the DBMS files, and converted the CSV file output into DB3F. We con-
verted the artifacts carved from Oracle and PostgreSQL DBMS files into DB3F without
any problems. However, since SQLite does not store an object identifier in the pages, this
metadata could not be included in DB3F directly. As an alternative, we used the table
schema (i.e., the string with column datatypes) to represent the object identifier. This deci-
sion was made because all records for the same table will have the same number of columns
and the same datatype for each column. However, we note that more than one table can
have the same schema; thus, our decision merged tables with identical columns in SQLite.
Table 5.1 summarizes the sizes of the DBMS files passed to DBCarver and our generated
DB3F files for the 600MB Scale 1 SSBM data used. The DB3F storage overhead allows
for human readability. However, DB3F can be compressed to scale for analysis of larger
forensic datasets.
DBMS DBMS(MB) DB3F(MB)
Oracle 625 1329
PostgreSQL 648 1298
SQLite 445 1308
Table 5.1: File size comparison of DB3F file to the DBMS file for a 600 MB CSV file of
raw data.
5.5 The Database Forensic Toolkit
This section presents our toolkit, DF-Toolkit, to view and filter DBMS forensic artifacts
stored in DB3F. First, we describe the evidence tree structure that serves as a core concept
behind this toolkit. This tree structure allows users to traverse and view metadata and data
stored in DB3F files. Next, we discuss how this tree allows carved database metadata and
data to be searched and filtered by the the user. Finally, our solution to reporting filtered
metadata and data in DB3F is described.
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Figure 5.4: DF-Toolkit evidence tree implemented with a user interface.
Throughout this section we refer to Figures 5.4 and 5.5. As a proof of concept, Fig-
ure 5.4 displays our implemented user interface to display the evidence tree. Figure 5.5
contains the relational schema used to store the evidence tree nodes in a SQL database for
searching and filtering results. These tables are populated when a tree is first viewed; they
can be cached or rebuilt by DF-Toolkit as necessary.
5.5.1 The Evidence Tree
The evidence tree presented in this section follows the same principles as many popular
digital forensic tools (e.g., The Sleuth Kit, FTK, EnCase). Similar to these tools, we clas-
sify three main node levels in the tree: root, object, and object description. Alternatively in
this chapter, the tree nodes are defined to accurately represent database forensic artifacts.
Root The root node serves as a critical storage structure from which all other data can
be reached. For example, a disk partition may be a root in commonly used forensic tools.
Since DBMSes manage their own storage, a disk partition does not represent a major stor-
age structure in a DBMS. For example, a DBMS may store files across multiple disk parti-
tions. When this is done, system tables and user tables would likely be stored on different
partitions. Furthermore, a single table could be stored on multiple disk partitions. There-
fore, a DBMS sample (i.e., the complete or partial DBMS storage content taken from a
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storage medium) makes an appropriate storage structure for a root. A database root node is
not expected to contain an entire DBMS. It is likely that the piece of evidence is a disk par-
tition, RAM snapshot, or contains a corrupt (e.g., partially overwritten) DBMS. Therefore,
by “DBMS sample”, we mean all of the data associated with a DBMS for a given piece of
evidence.
In Figure 5.4, there are two images that represent evidence, Image01.img and Im-
age02.img. Image01.img contains two root nodes (i.e., DBMS samples), PostgreSQL and
MySQL. Since DB3F requires that a carver tool store DBMS samples in separate output
files, each root node always corresponds to a single DB3F file.
In Figure 5.5, the DBMS Sample table stores a record for each root node. DB3F File
is a reference to the DB3F file. This also serves as a unique identifier (i.e., primary key) for
each DBMS sample record. DBMS is the DBMS vendor name and version. PageSize is
the page size used by the DBMS sample. PageCnt refers to the number of pages associated
with the DBMS sample. Therefore, the total DBMS sample storage size can be calculated
using PageSize × PageCnt. DiskImage is a reference to the evidence (e.g., disk image,
RAM snapshot) associated with this DBMS sample. This column also references (i.e., a
foreign key) the Evidence table. For every entry in the DBMS Sample table, a new schema
is created containing an Object table, Page table, and Record table.
Data Objects The next level in the tree are the data objects for which the root is exam-
ined. For example, a stand-alone file (e.g., PDF, Word document) may be a data object in
commonly used forensic tools. DBMS files can contain multiple DBMS objects (e.g., ta-
bles), and a DBMS object can span across multiple DBMS files. Artifacts belonging to each
DBMS object should be associated with each other. Therefore, DBMS files themselves
should not be treated as the data objects like traditional stand-alone files. A more suitable
candidate for the data object node are the DBMS objects (e.g., customer table, employee
table, customer name index). DBMS metadata and data can be associated with DBMS
objects by using the object identifier metadata stored within DBMS pages (discussed in
Section 5.3.1). Additionally, viewing the DBMS files themselves does not provide the user
with much useful information since they are not stand-alone.
In Figure 5.4, the PostgreSQL root node has four data objects: 1113438, 1113446,
1113441, and 1113440. Statistics and metadata describing the selected object, 1113440,
is displayed in the bottom left-hand box. This object is a table with 28 pages (not all
displayed) and seven columns (one number and six strings), beginning under the heading,
“Record”.
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In Figure 5.5, the Objects table stores information about each object. ObjectID is the
object identifier used by the DBMS, which also serves as the primary key. Type represents
the type of DBMS object (e.g., table, index, or materialized view). PageCnt stores the
number of pages associated with the object. ObjectSchema represents the data types for
each column in the table.
EVIDENCE
DiskImageName Description
DBMS Sample
DB3F File DBMS PageSize PageCnt DiskImage
DB3F File.OBJECT
ObjectID Type PageCnt ObjectSchema
DB3F File.PAGE
Offset PageID ObjectID
DB3F File.RECORD
PageOffset RecordOffset RowID Allocated Record
Figure 5.5: The relational schema used to store the evidence tree data in a SQL database.
Object Information Two more tree levels are used to recursively store information about
each object at the page level and the record level. Storing information about each DBMS
page allows for statistics to be quickly collected for an object (or a fast stochastic analysis),
and removes data redundancy at the record level.
In Figure 5.4, the pages associated with the selected object, 1113440, are displayed in
the right-hand side box. We know there are a total of 28 pages, which are not all displayed
in the figure, based on the object information in the bottom left-hand box.
In Figure 5.5, the Page table stores information about each page. Offset refers to the
byte address of the page with the evidence file. This also serves as the primary key. PageID
is metadata used by the DBMS to uniquely identify pages. Note, that we do not use this
as the primary key because multiple copies of a page may exist (e.g., one from the DBMS
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file and one from a paging file on the same disk image). ObjectID is metadata used by the
DBMS to identify objects, and this column also references the Object table.
Information about each record within a page is the last node level in our evidence tree.
In Figure 5.4, the records associated with the selected page, offset = 3784704, are displayed
in the right-hand side box. In Figure 5.5, the Record table stores information about each
records. PageOffset refers to the byte address of the page within the evidence file. This
column also references the Page table. RecordOffset refers to the byte address of a record
within the page. PageOffset and RecordOffset together serve as the primary key. RowID
is metadata, which is a DBMS internal pseudo-column. Allocated identifies the record as
‘active’ or ‘deleted’ (i.e., unallocated). Record is a string that combines all record values.
Each value within the string has single quotes around it, and all values are separated by a
comma.
Offset RowID Alloc. Pos. Value
318 72 True 1 ‘430’
318 72 True 2 ‘Supplier#000000430’
318 72 True 3 ‘9eN nRdw0Y4tl’
318 72 True 4 ‘ARGENTINA5’
318 72 True 5 ‘ARGENTINA’
318 72 True 6 ‘AMERICA’
318 72 True 7 ‘11-406-611-4228’
Table 5.2: Sample representation of carved rows on per-value basis.
We stop recursively constructing the tree at the record level. That is, the leaf level of the
evidence tree is a database record (e.g., a single row in Figure 5.4) rather than a field (e.g.,
’ARGENTINA’ in Figure 5.4). Logically, another tree level could be added for individual
values. For our current version of DF-Toolkit, this step is not needed for plaintext searches.
We believe that extending the evidence tree to include individual fields of the database
table should be explored in the future to support more advanced analysis; however, the
proper execution of such a feature will introduce significant implementation challenges.
Continuing to represent data with a proper relational schema (as in Figure 5.5) does not
scale well when individual values are considered because each value must now be stored
as an entry in the Value table – for example, representing the first row from Figure 5.4 at
individual value level as shown in Table 5.2. Therefore, to search for an individual value,
an entry from the Value table would need to JOIN with the Record table.
Another possible approach would be to create a new table for each DBMS object from
each DBMS. The data would be ingested from a CSV file generated from the DB3F file.
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This approach would be similar to Guidance Software’s SQLite Parser (discussed in Sec-
tion 7.2). While we envision this to be a more viable solution, an incomplete DBMS from
evidence such as a RAM snapshot or corrupt DBMS poses an implementation challenge;
table columns would be ambiguously defined causing problems when querying data. For
example, column names would need be created as Column1, Column2, etc. In general, we
do not consider the presence of a complete DBMS to be a safe assumption for DF-Toolkit
purposes.
5.5.2 Data Display Filters
Data filtering is performed at the DBMS level; tables (or objects) for each DBMS schema
are considered. The following is the basic query need to properly connect a DBMS schema
before applying filtering conditions, where DB3F File is the root node:
SELECT *
FROM DB3F_File.Object O,
DB3F_File.Page P,
DB3F_File.Record R
WHERE O.ObjectID = P.ObjectID
AND P.Offset = R.PageOffset
This query returns all rows from the Objects, Page, and Record tables for a given
DBMS so that the data can be put back into DB3F (this is further explained in Sec-
tion 5.5.3). Beyond this query, only a basic understanding of SQL is needed to perform
custom filtering.
Objects Users can filter objects by simply adding WHERE clause conditions to the query
above. Objects can be filtered based on the following metadata fields: ObjectID, Object
Type, Object Page Count, and Object Schema. For example, if the user was only concerned
with the object with seven columns (one number and six strings), the following condition
would be added:
AND O.Schema = ‘NSSSSSS’
Pages Users can also filter pages with WHERE clause conditions. Pages can be filtered
based on the following metadata fields: Page Offset, PageID, and Page ObjectID.
Records Finally, users can filter record with WHERE clause conditions. Records can be
filtered based on the following metdata fields: Record PageOffset, Record Offset, Record
RowID, Record Allocated/Deallocated, and the data stored in the record. Most importantly,
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users would want to apply keyword searches to the data stored in records. All of the values
for a carved record are stored as a single string making this feature easy to support. Since
SQL supports string matches, wildcards, and regular expressions, keyword searches can
be applied by adding another WHERE clause condition(s). For example, to search for all
records containing a phone number (in the format of the data from Figure 5.4):
AND R.Record REGEXP ‘\d{2}-\d{3}-\d{3}-\d{4}’
Figure 5.6 displays an example interface to apply filtering within our user interface.
The JOIN conditions are previously written, simplifying user interaction. The user then
adds the two example conditions presented for object filtering and keyword searches.
Figure 5.6: DF-Toolkit filtering implemented with a user interface.
5.5.3 Report Generation
After filtering is applied, the results are returned as DB3F. Storing the report back into
DB3F allows the data to be viewed within the evidence tree, available for further filtering,
and to future advanced analytic tools. We note that DF-Toolkit was able to find every rel-
evant carved artifact in its search (providing a search accuracy of 100%). Report accuracy
is thus dependent only on the accuracy of carving provided by the database carving tool(s).
5.6 Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter presented a new storage format for database forensic artifacts called the Database
Forensic File Format (DB3F), and a toolkit to view and search data stored in DB3F called
the Database Forensic Toolkit (DF-Toolkit). Additionally, a user interface was presented to
provide a display of DF-Toolkit.
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We envision that DB3F and DF-Toolkit will serve as the groundwork for a complete
forensic and security analysis system. Future work for this system is discussed below,
which includes: incorporating DBMS system data carved from the evidence, carver tool
integration, multi-evidence analysis, and non-page data integration.
5.6.1 System Catalog Information
While the metadata presented to users through DF-Toolkit is accurate, some DBMS foren-
sic artifacts may become difficult to interpret for users, especially as the amount of data
increases. For example, the object identifiers (e.g., ‘1113440’) alone do not mean as much
as the plaintext object name (e.g., ‘Supplier’) to an investigator exploring evidence. Our
top priority for future work is to automate the detection and association of DBMS system
catalog information, which is stored in DBMS system tables, to replace such metadata with
more readable plaintext. We do see two main challenges with this work. First, the system
catalog may not always be present (e.g., corruption of data on disk or when using a RAM
snapshot). Therefore, DF-Toolkit would need to accurately communicate to a forensic an-
alyst why such metadata is not available. Second, each DBMS has its own system table
schema. Therefore, detection and association of this information requires tailored functions
for each DBMS vendor.
5.6.2 Carver Tool Integration
For this chapter, we generated DB3F files from carved output stored in CSV files. This step
would be tedious for users, and we believe it should be streamlined. Ideally, we would like
to work with the current and future creators of database carving tools (Section 5.2) to return
their results in DB3F. Making DB3F publicly available will help to catalyze this effort.
5.6.3 Advanced Analysis
This chapter presented straightforward filter and search examples for single pieces of ev-
idence. However, we envision a more complete toolkit to access and interpret database
forensic artifacts. This mostly comes in the form of a database forensic API, which would
be a DBMS complement to Garfinkel’s Fiwalk [26]. The primary uses for such work in-
clude multi-evidence analysis and integration with non-DBMS page data and other forensic
tools.
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Multi-Evidence An investigation may involves multiple pieces of evidence when a series
of disk images or RAM snapshots was collected, a DBMS was distributed across multiple
nodes, or multiple devices contained individual DBMSes. In these cases, metadata and data
can be compared to recreate event timelines. Most IoT devices typically store information
locally on a lightweight DBMS (e.g., SQLite), send information to a server that uses a
more robust DBMS (e.g., MySQL), or both. For example, the Amazon Alexa and Samsung
Galaxy images from the DFRWS IoT Challenge 2018 - 2019 [15] each contain a SQLite
DBMS. Assuming that these devices had some form of interaction, connecting data and
metadata from both devices would help to create an event timeline.
Integration of Non-DBMS Page Data Almost all of the DBMS data and metadata is
stored in pages; thus, it can be represented in DB3F and searched with DF-Toolkit. How-
ever, connecting metadata and data outside of DBMSes to DB3F files would create more
complete timelines. These sources include audit logs, network packets, and files which are
referenced by DBMS records. Section 5.2 discussed just some of the tools used to store
and searched these data and metadata. We hope that bringing this discussion to the digi-
tal forensics community will help bridge the gap between these different domains within
digital forensics.
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Chapter 6
Database Forensics API
6.1 Introduction
Relational DBMSes adhere to the principle of physical data independence: DBMSes ex-
pose a logical schema of the data while hiding its physical representation. A logical schema
consists only of a set of relations (i.e., the data). On the other hand, a physical view consists
of several objects, such as pages, records, directory headers, etc. Hiding physical repre-
sentation is a fundamental design of relational DBMSes: DBMSes transparently control
physical data layout and manage auxiliary objects for efficient query execution. However,
data independence inhibits several security and performance applications requiring low-
level storage access. A small example is provided here, while Section 6.2 presents more
detailed use cases.
Example 1. Consider a bank or a hospital that manages sensitive customer data with a
commercial DBMS. For audit purposes, they must sanitize deleted customer data to ensure
that it cannot be recovered and stolen. Very few DBMSes support explicit sanitization
of deleted data (e.g., secure delete in SQLite exists but provides no guarantees or
feedback to the user)1. To programmatically verify the destruction of deleted data, a DBA
must inspect all storage ever used by a DBMS where such data may reside. This includes
DBMS auxiliary objects such as indexes, unallocated fragments in DBMS storage, as well
as any DBMS storage released to the OS.
Comprehensive DBMS storage-level access is an inherent challenge due to DBMS
storage management. DBMSes control allocated storage objects such as a) physical byte
representation of relations, b) metadata to annotate physical storage of relation data, and
c) auxiliary objects associated with relations (e.g., indexes, materialized views). Users can
manipulate allocated objects exposed by SQL. However, as illustrated in Example 1, the
1DBMS encryption is similar in not providing any feedback. Furthermore, encrypted values should still
be destroyed on deletion.
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DBA may also need access to unallocated storage objects not tracked by a DBMS such as
deleted data that lingers in DBMS-controlled files, and DBMS-formatted pages released
back to the OS and no longer under DBMS control (e.g., files deleted by the DBMS or OS
paging files). These objects are certainly part of the physical view and required for any
storage access, but currently not exposed by any DBMS. Vendors such as Oracle incorpo-
rate the DBMS REPAIR package [60], enabling users to manually fix or skip corrupt pages,
but such tools only access DBMS-controlled storage.
ODSA
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Figure 6.1: ODSA storage access.
In order to enable such security and performance applications, we present Open Data
Storage Access (ODSA), an API that provides comprehensive access to all DBMS meta-
data and data in both (unallocated and allocated) persistent and volatile storage. ODSA does
not instrument any RDBMS software; it interprets underlying data using database carving
methods [91], which we use to expose physical level details. Carving itself is insufficient
because the carved data consists of disk-level details making it difficult to program DBMS
storage. ODSA abstracts low-level disk-level details with a hierarchical view of DBMS stor-
age that is familiar to most DBAs. In particular it organizes them into pages, records, and
values, which are resolved to internal, physical addresses. ODSA also guarantees the same
hierarchy applies to multiple DBMS storage engines, ensuring portability of programmed
applications. Figure 6.1 shows the storage access enabled by ODSA.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents three representative
uses cases that require storage-level access. Section 6.3 provides an overview of how ap-
plications previously had limited access to internal DBMS storage. Section 6.4 describes
the hierarchy exposed by ODSA and how it provides a comprehensive view of storage.
Section 6.5 demonstrates implementation and use of ODSA. Finally, Section 6.6 discusses
future work for ODSA.
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6.2 Use Cases
This section presents three representative use cases that require direct access to different
abstractions of storage.
6.2.1 Intrusion Detection
A bank is investigating mysterious changes to customer data. Unbeknownst to the bank, a
disgruntled sysadmin modified the DBMS file bytes at the file system level. This activity
bypassed all DBMS access control and logging, and still effectively altered account bal-
ances. The sysadmin also disabled file system journaling with tune2fs to further hide
their activity. The bank cannot determine the cause for inconsistencies with the logs alone.
Forensic analysis [85, 89] that detects such malicious activity requires comprehensive stor-
age access to compare volatile storage with allocated and unallocated persistent storage.
6.2.2 Performance Reproducibility
Alice, an author, wants to share her computation and data based experiments with Bob so
he can repeat and verify Alice’s work. Out of privacy and access constraints, Alice builds a
container consisting of necessary and sufficient data for Bob to reproduce. If the shared data
is much smaller than original DBMS file, Bob cannot reproduce any performance-based
experiment as the data layout of the smaller data will significantly differ from the original
layout. To achieve a consistent ratio between Alice’s experiment and Bob’s verification,
data layout specification at the record and page level must itself be ported. Currently, data
layouts as part of a shared DBMS file in a container cannot be communicated [67].
6.2.3 Evaluating Data Retention
Continuing with Example 1 (Section 6.1), the bank validates their compliance with data
sanitization regulations (e.g,. EU General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR [72]). Af-
ter deleting data, the bank independently validates data destruction to ensure compliance.
No data sanitization validation guidelines for DBMSes exist beyond a complete file over-
write [38]. This guideline is too coarse, especially for DBMS files containing a few deleted
records.
Alternatively, consider a compliance officer that has programmatic access to DBMS
storage via ODSA for validation. The officer can easily access all unallocated storage, and
determine the location of deleted data that was not destroyed (e.g., DBMS index or table
file, OS paging file).
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6.3 Related Work
We describe built-in tools and interfaces supported by popular DBMSes, which provide
physical storage information at different granularities, but no comprehensive views of stor-
age. The ROWID pseudo-column represents a record’s physical location within DBMS
storage (not disk), and is one of the simplest examples of storage-based metadata available
to users most DBMSes. Commercial DBMSes typically provide utilities to inspect and fix
page-level corruption. Examples include Oracle’s DBMS REPAIR, Oracle’s BBED (a page
editing tool available from Oracle 7 to 10g), and SQL Server’s DBCC CHECKDB. How-
ever, even for accessible metadata such as ROWID, built-in tools do not help interpret its
meaning; a DBA must manually make such interpretations. Moreover, no DBMS offers ac-
cess to unallocated storage. Finally, existing tools only consider persistent storage. ODSA
offers a universal meaning of DBMS storage (including IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server,
Oracle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQLite, Firebird, and Apache Derby) with support for both
persistent and volatile storage.
The term carving refers to interpreting data at the byte-level, e.g., reconstructing deleted
files without the file system. We previously extended carving to interpret DBMS storage
with DBCarver [86, 87, 91], retrieving both allocated and unallocated data and meta-
data without relying on the DBMS. DBCarver reads individual files or disk/RAM snap-
shots and extracts data, including user data and system metadata; it then writes data to
a DB3F [88] formatted file. This chapter uses DBCarver to demonstrate the physical
information a DBMS can provide.
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Figure 6.2: ODSA completes raw database storage abstraction in an end-to-end process for
storage access.
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6.4 Open Database Storage Access
Figure 6.2 shows how ODSA relies on carving to access raw storage. ODSA abstracts two
details from raw storage.
First, it interprets each sequence of raw bytes and classifies it into a physical storage
element: Root, DBMS Object, Page, Record, or Value. Thus, given a collection of
interpreted raw storage elements, ODSA provides a hierarchical access to these elements
by linking them. We provide a brief description of the hierarchy. The root level represents
the entry point from all other data to be reached. DBMSes manage their own storage, and
a disk partition consisting of both Oracle and PostgreSQL pages, will result in two DBMS
roots. The DBMS object level calls return metadata, data, and statistics describing a DBMS
object, such as a list of pages or column data types. Pages are uniquely identified by a byte
offset in raw storage, rather than the PageID. We also do not rely on the page row directory
pointers because deletion may zero out a record’s entry.
Second, the ODSA hierarchy hides DBMS heterogeneity by accessing physical ele-
ments (e.g., pages, records) with physical byte offsets, rather than DBMS-specific pointers.
Computing a DBMS pointer varies between vendors. For example, Oracle incorporates
FileID into index pointer while PostgreSQL does not; index pointers in MySQL differs
from both Oracle and PostgreSQL because MySQL relies on index organized tables. Even
if all vendors used similar pointer encodings, abstraction is needed in terms of pages since
duplicate pages may exist across a storage medium (outside of DBMS-controlled storage,
such as paging files). Given PageA and its physical copy Page′A, ODSA enables application
developers to connect an index pointer referencing PageA along with Page′A.
Implementation There are multiple ways to implement the hierarchy. The ODSA hier-
archy is currently implemented as a pure object hierarchy (Figure 6.3) and as a relational
schema (Figure 6.4). The pure object hierarchy is stored as a JSON file in the DB3F for-
mat [88]. The relational schema is a starting representation – it supports basic applications
and is normalized to 3NF requirements. A relational schema is realized since application
developers may prefer to access a DBMS storage with SQL rather than calling the ODSA
directly. However, as we show in Section 6.5 the SQL implementation requires several
joins and is quite counter-intuitive, despite it being DBMS physical storage.
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#4.A. Root
class Root:
def __init__(self, db3f):
#Initialize
def get_object_ids(self):
#Return a list of object ids
#Calls to Other Instance and Namespace Data
#4.B. Object
class DBMS_Object(Root):
def __init__(self, parent, object_id):
#Initialize
def get_page_offsets(self):
#Return a list of page offsets
def get_object_type(self):
#Return the object type string
def get_object_schema(self):
#Return a list of column datatypes
#4.C. Page
class Page(Object):
def __init__(self, parent, page_offset):
#Initialize
def get_record_offsets(self):
#Return a list of record offsets
def get_page_id(self):
#Return a string for page id
def get_page_type(self):
#Return a string for page node type
def get_checksum(self):
#Return a string for the checksum
def get_row_directory(self):
#Return a list of row pointers
#4.D. Record
class Record(Page):
def __init__(self, parent, record_offset):
#Initialize
def get_value_offsets(self):
#Return a list of value positions
def get_record_allocation(self):
#Return Boolean allocation status
def get_record_row_id(self):
#Return a string for the row id
def get_record_pointer(self):
#Return a string for row pointer
#4.E. Value
class Value(Record):
def __init__(self, parent, value_offset):
#Initialize
def get_value(self):
#Return string for a data value
Figure 6.3: A sample set of ODSA calls.
6.5 Using ODSA
For use cases in Section 6.2, two fundamental physical storage access operations are find-
ing unallocated records and matching index pointers to records. ODSA calls enable these
operations and show how these operations are achieved in Python and SQL, respectively.
The two implementations are shown to contrast programmatic verbosity and maintainabil-
ity. We focus on ODSA access and do not consider implementation performance.
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VALUE
DB3F File PgOffset RecOffset ValueOffset Value
Figure 6.4: The relational schema used to store ODSA data.
Example 2: Find Unallocated Records. Use cases 2.1 and 2.3 require a DBA to
search and retrieve unallocated records. To retrieve unallocated records, the user must
know the carved DBMS file name and the table name (Customer table in this example)
from which unallocated records are considered. Figure 6.5 finds and prints all unallocated
(e.g., deleted) records from the Customer table. All ODSA calls are highlighted.
The implementation in Figure 6.5 uses ODSA calls to search for unallocated records:
Line 3 retrieves page offsets, which uniquely identify pages. Line 5 then iterates through
the pages, Line 6 loads each page, and Line 7 retrieves the record offsets for that page.
Finally, Line 7 iterates through records using their identifying offsets within a page. Line 11
retrieves the record allocation status to identify and print unallocated records. The same
search and retrieval requires an 8-way join in SQL due to the data hierarchy:
SELECT PageOffset, RecordOffset, ValueOffset, Value
FROM Object NATURAL JOIN Page
NATURAL JOIN Record NATURAL JOIN Value
WHERE Object.DB_File = ’MyDatabase1.json’
AND Object.ObjectID = ’Customer’
AND Record.Allocated = FALSE;
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1 DBRoot = odsa.Root(’MyDatabase1.db3f’)
2 CustomerTable = odsa.Object(DBRoot, ’Customer’)
3 PageOffsets = CustomerTable.get page offsets()
4
5 for PageOffset in PageOffsets:
6 CurrPage = odsa.Page(CustomerTable, PageOffset)
7 RecordOffsets = CurrPage.get record offsets()
8
9 for RecOffset in RecordOffsets:
10 CurrRecord = odsa.Record(CurrPage, RecOffset)
11 allocated = CurrRecord.get record allocation()
12 #print unallocated (e.g., deleted) record
13 if not allocated:
14 print CurrRecord
Figure 6.5: Using ODSA to find deleted records.
Example 3: Match a Record to an Index Pointer(s). To match a record to pointers in
a DBMS object such as an index, the user provides as input specific instances of the record
and index objects. In Figure 6.6, Line 5 iterates through all index pages to determine if
the input record matches any of the index records. Recall, in an index, records are value-
pointer pairs. The code in Figure 6.6 determines offsets of all index pages (Line 7), and
for each index page (Line 9) iterates over all index records in that page. Lines 10 fetches
the index entry and Line 12 loads the pointer (offset 1 in value-pair) of the current index
entry. Finally, for any index pointer match to the record pointer (Line 13), the index entry
is printed.
In this example a brute-force iteration over all index pages is necessary, i.e., the program
cannot break at the first occurrence of a match in Line 13. In practice, DBMS indexes often
contain records of entries that were deleted or updated. For example, consider the record
(42, Jane, 555-1234) in the Customer table where name column is indexed. In addition
to the expected (Jane, {PAGEID: 12, ROWID: 37}) entry in the index, the index may also
contain (Jehanne, {PAGEID: 12, ROWID: 37}) if the customer changed their name from
Jehanne to Jane (old index entries will only be purged after the index is rebuilt). Moreover,
the index might also contain a (Bob, {PAGEID: 12, ROWID: 37}) entry if another customer
named Bob previously deleted their account, free-listing the space for Jane’s record at the
same location.
As demonstrated in Figure 6.6, the Python-specific implementation retrieves all records.
On the contrary, matching a record to an index in SQL requires a dynamic SQL (shown
below) in which after the customary 8-way join to find record values, parameters of each
record value must be supplied to match the values. Moreover, this query assumes that there
is only one indexed column which is transparently accounted for in the abstraction of the
DBMS Object class.
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SELECT V1.Value
FROM Page NATRUAL JOIN Record
NATURAL JOIN Value V1 NATURAL JOIN Value V2
AND Page.ObjectID = ? --Index name placeholder
AND V1.ValueOffset = 0 --Indexed value at offset 0
AND V2.ValueOffset = 1 --Pointer is at offset 1
AND V2.Value = ( SELECT Record.Pointer FROM Record
WHERE (DB_File, PageOffset, RecordOffset) =
(?, ?, ?) /*Record ID placeholders*/);
1 def findIndexEntries(record, Index):
2 RecordPtr = record.get record pointer()
3 IndPageOffsets = Index.get page offsets()
4
5 for IndPageOffset in IndPageOffsets:
6 IndPage = odsa.Page(Index, IndPageOffset)
7 IndROffsets = IndPage.get record offsets()
8
9 for IndROffset in IndROffsets:
10 IndEntry = odsa.Record(IndPage, IndROffset)
11 # IndEntry is a pair (Value, Pointer)
12 IndexPointer = odsa.Value(IndEntry, 1)
13 if IndexPointer == RecordPtr:
14 print IndEntry
Figure 6.6: Using ODSA to find all index entries for one record
6.6 Conclusion
ODSA was designed based on the principles and challenges described in [5, 74]. In particu-
lar, it was designed to be simple and easy-to-use by integrating the terminology used across
DBMS documentation. Classes were named based on general concepts giving them an in-
tuitive meaning while abstracting DBMS-specific implementation details. ODSA adheres
to single-responsibility principle in that calls focus on single pieces of data and metadata.
ODSA supports both 3rd party carving and built-in DBMS mechanisms should vendors
choose to expose storage. As a result, ODSA complements physical data independence and
enables simple yet powerful implementations of a variety of applications that require ac-
cess to storage. Additional requirements such as versioning and backward compatibility
are future work.
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Chapter 7
Log Tampering Detection
7.1 Introduction
Database Management Systems (DBMSes) are commonly used to store sensitive data and,
accordingly, significant effort has been invested into securing DBMSes with access con-
trol policies. However, once a user has gained elevated privileges in the DBMS (either
legitimately or through an attack), the security scheme put into effect can be bypassed, and
therefore, can no longer assure that data is protected according to policy. A well-known
fact from security research and practice is that it is virtually impossible to create security
measures that are unbreakable. For example, access control restrictions 1) may be incom-
plete, allowing users to execute commands that they should not be able to execute and 2)
users may illegally gain privileges by using security holes in DB or OS code or through
other means, e.g., social engineering. Thus, in addition to deploying preventive measures
such as access control, it is necessary to be able to 1) detect security breaches when they
occur in a timely fashion and 2) in event of a detected attack collect evidence about the
attack in order to devise counter-measures and assess the extent of the damage, e.g., what
information was leaked or perturbed. This information can then be used to prepare for legal
action or to learn how to prevent future attacks of the same sort.
When malicious operations occur, whether by an insider or by an outside attacker that
breached security, an audit log containing a history of SQL queries may provide the most
critical evidence for investigators [51]. The audit log can be used to determine whether data
has been compromised and what records may have been accessed. DBMSes offer built-in
logging functionality but can not necessarily guarantee that these logs are accurate and have
not been tampered with. Notably, federal regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [3]
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act [2], require maintaining an
audit trail, yet the privileged user can skirt these regulations by manipulating the logs. In
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Database Storage 
T1, INSERT INTO Record  
      VALUES (‘Peter’, 2005, ‘murder’); 
T2, UPDATE Record  
      SET Crime = ‘DUI’  
      WHERE Name = ‘Bob’; 
Audit Log File 
 
 
Peter, 2005, murder 
Bob, 2012, DUI 
Malice, 2016, fraud 
 
          Page Type: Table 
          Structure: Record 
Del. 
Flag 
 
Figure 7.1: Illustrates that the active records for Peter and Bob can be explained by audit
log events, whereas the deleted record Malice can not be explained by any audit log events.
such cases, companies maintaining these systems are, technically, in violation of these reg-
ulations. Hence, assurance that security controls have been put into place properly cannot
rest merely on the existence of logging capabilities or the representations of a trusted DBA.
Internal controls are needed in order to assure log integrity.
Example 1 Malice is the database administrator for a government agency that keeps crim-
inal records for citizens (an example instance is shown in Figure 7.1). Malice recently got
convicted of fraud and decided to abuse her privileges and delete her criminal record by
running DELETE FROM Record WHERE name = ‘Malice’. However, she is aware that database
operations are subjected to regular audits to detect tampering with the highly sensitive data
stored by the agency. To cover her tracks, Malice deactivates the audit log before running
the DELETE operation and afterwards activates the log again. Thus, there is no log trace
of her illegal manipulation in the database. However, database storage on disk will still
contain evidence of the deleted row (until several storage artifacts caused by the deleted
are physically overwritten). Our approach detects traces of deleted and outdated record
versions and matches them against the audit log to detect such attacks and provide evidence
for how the database was manipulated. Using our approach, we would detect the deleted
row and since it does not correspond to any operation in the audit log we would flag it as a
potential evidence of tampering.
In Section 7.3 we showcase, for several databases, how an attacker like Malice can
ensure that her operations are not being included in the audit log. Given that it is possible
for a privileged attacker to erase log evidence and avoid detection, the challenge is to detect
such tampering and collect additional evidence about the nature of the malicious operations
(e.g., recover rows deleted by a malicious operation). It may not be immediately clear that
this recovery of evidence is possible at all. However, any operation leaves footprints in
database storage on disk (writes) or in RAM (both reads and writes). For instance, DBMSes
mark a deleted row rather than overwrite it. Thus, if we recover such evidence directly from
storage then, at least for some amount of time until the deleted value is overwritten by future
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Figure 7.2: Architecture of the DBDetective.
inserts, we would be able to detect that there exists a discrepancy between the content of
the audit log and database storage.
Given that evidence of operations exists in database storage, the next logical question to
ask is whether Malice can remove this evidence by modifying database files directly. While
a user with sufficient OS privileges may be able to modify database files, it is extremely
challenging to tamper with database storage directly without causing failures (e.g., DBMS
crashes). Direct manipulation of DBMS files will uncover the tampering attempt because:
1) in addition to the actual record data on a page, the database system maintains additional
references to that record (e.g., in index structures and page headers). Deleting a record
from a page without modifying auxiliary structures accordingly will leave the database
in an inconsistent state and will lead to crashes; 2) databases have built-in mechanisms to
detect errors in storage, e.g., checksums of disk pages. A tampering attempt has to correctly
account for all of these mechanisms; 3) incorrect storage for a value can corrupt a database
file. To directly modify a value, an attacker needs to know how the DBMS stores datatypes.
Because it is not only hard but, at times, next to impossible to spoof database storage,
it follows that database storage can provide us with valuable evidence of attacks. We use
an existing forensic tool called DBCarver [91] to reconstruct database storage. However,
we are still left with the problem of matching recovered artifacts to queries in audit log
– doing so requires a thorough analysis of how database storage behaves. Our approach
automatically detects potential attacks by matching extracted storage entries and reporting
any artifacts that cannot be explained by logged operations (summarized in Figure 7.2).
Our method is designed to be both general (i.e., applicable to any relational database)
and independent (i.e., entirely outside of DBMS control). Our system DBDetective
inspects database storage and RAM snapshots and compares what it finds to the audit
log; the analysis of this data is then done out of core without affecting database opera-
tions. DBDetective can operate on a single snapshot from disk or RAM (i.e., multiple
snapshots are not required), but additional snapshots provide extra evidence and improve
detection quality. Data that has changed between two snapshots need be matched only
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against audit log entries of commands that were executed during the time span between
these snapshots. Thus, more frequent snapshots increase the detection accuracy because it
is less likely to match a row against an incorrect operation and the probability that deleted
rows are still present is higher. Moreover, frequency of snapshots increase the performance
of detection because a smaller number of recovered rows have to be matched against a
smaller number of operations. We can reduce storage requirements by only storing deltas
between snapshots in the same fashion as incremental backups are used to avoid the storage
overhead of full backups.
Our focus is on identifying the likelihood of database tampering, as well as pointing
out specific inconsistencies found in database storage. Determining the identity of the
party responsible for database tampering is beyond the scope of this chapter. Due to the
volatile nature of database storage, it is not possible to guarantee that all attacks will be
discovered. We will discuss how false negatives or positives can occur for particular types
of tampering in Sections 7.4 and 7.5. It may sound unsatisfactory that we are not able to
detect all attacks. However, these types of attack bypass the database audit log and thus
have no chance of being detected natively.
In this chapter, we demonstrate techniques to detect and identify database operations
that were masked by the perpetrator through use of our system DBDetective. For each
of the major DBMSes we evaluated, we assumed that the DBMS has enabled an audit
log to capture SQL commands that are relevant to an investigation. We further assumed
an attacker who found a way to prevent logging of executed malicious commands by: a)
deactivating audit policies and temporarily suspending logging or b) altering the existing
audit log (both discussed in Section 7.3).
By applying forensic analysis techniques to database storage or buffer cache and match-
ing evidence uncovered by these techniques against the audit log, we can:
• Detect multiple types of database access and manipulation that do not appear in the
DBMS audit log.
• Classify unattributed record modifications as an obfuscated INSERT, DELETE, or UPDATE
command.
• Detect cached data from (read-only) SELECT queries that cannot be derived from ac-
tivity in the audit log.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 covers related work. Sec-
tion 7.3 discusses DBMS logging mechanisms and how operations can be hidden from logs
by an attacker. Section 7.4 details how table modifications that are missing from the log
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files can be identified in storage. Section 7.5 discusses how read-only (SELECT) queries
hidden from the logs can be detected based on memory snapshots. We evaluate our system
in Section 7.6.
7.2 Related Work
7.2.1 Database Forensics
Database page carving [91] is a method for reconstructing the contents of a relational
database without relying on file system or DBMS metadata. Database carving is simi-
lar to traditional file carving [25, 73] in that data, including deleted data, can be recon-
structed from images or RAM snapshots without the use of a live system. The work in [86]
presented a comparative study of the page structure of multiple DBMSes. Subsequent
work [87] described how long forensic evidence resides within a database even after be-
ing deleted and defragmented. While a multitude of built-in and 3rd party recovery tools
(e.g., [55, 65, 68]) can extract database storage, none of these tools are helpful for indepen-
dent audit purposes because they only recover “active” data. A forensic database tool (just
like a forensic file system tool) should also reconstruct unallocated pieces of data, including
deleted rows, auxiliary structures (indexes) or buffer cache space.
7.2.2 Database Auditing and Security
Peha used one-way hash functions to verify an audit log and detect tampering [64]. They
relied on an external, trusted notary to keep track of every transaction. Snodgrass et al.
also used a one-way hash function to validate audit logs [80]. Alternatively, their hash
function uses the record itself and a last modification timestamp, avoiding the external
notary. Pavlou et al. expanded this work by determining when audit log tampering oc-
curred [63]. While this mechanism ensures an accurate audit log with high probability by
sending the secure hashes to a notarization service, it is ultimately useless if logging has
been disabled by a privileged user. Our approach detects log tampering even if logs files
have been disabled.
Sinha et al. used hash chains to verify log integrity in an offline environment [79]. In
this situation, communication with a central server is not required to ensure log authen-
ticity. Crosby et al. proposed a data structure called a history tree to reduce the log size
produced by hash chains in an offline environment [13]. Rather than detecting log tamper-
ing, Schneier and Kelsey made log files impossible to read and impossible to modify [77].
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Under this framework, an attacker does not know if his activity has been logged, or which
log entries are related to his activity.
An event log can be generated using triggers, and the idea of a SELECT trigger was
explored for the purpose of logging [19]. This would allow all table access to be logged
– but a malicious user could also utilize triggers to remove traces of her activity or simply
bypass a SELECT trigger by creating a temporary view to access the data.
ManageEngine’s EventLog Analyzer [48] provides audit log reports and alerts for Or-
acle and SQL Server based on actions, such as user activity, record modification, schema
alteration, and read-only queries. However, the Eventlog Analyzer creates these reports
based on native DBMS logs. Like other forensic tools, this tool is vulnerable to a privi-
leged user who has the ability to alter or disable logs.
Network-based monitoring methods have received significant attention in audit logging
research because they can provide independence and generality by residing outside of the
DBMS. IBM Security Guardium Express Activity Monitor for Databases [37] monitors
incoming packets for suspicious activity. If malicious activity is suspected, this tool can
block database access for that command or user. Liu et al. [46] monitored DBAs and other
users with privileged access. Their method identifies and logs network packets containing
SQL statements.
The benefit of monitoring activity over the network and, therefore, beyond the reach of
DBA’s, is the level of independence achieved by these tools. On the other hand, relying on
network activity ignores local connections to the DBMS and requires intimate understand-
ing of SQL commands (i.e., an obfuscated command could fool the system). By contrast,
our approach detects both local and network activity because SQL is ultimately run against
the database instance affecting database storage state.
7.3 Reliability of Database Logs
An attacker can alter two types of logs to interfere with an investigation: write-ahead logs
(WAL) and audit logs (event history records). WALs record database modifications at a low
level in order to support ACID guarantees, providing a history of recent table modifications.
Audit logs record configured user database actions, including SQL operations and other
user activity.
WALs WALs cannot normally be disabled or easily modified, and require a special-
purpose tool to be read (e.g., Oracle LogMiner or PostgreSQL pg xlogdump). Some
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DBMSes allow WALs to be disabled for specific operations, such as bulk load or struc-
ture rebuild. Thus inserting records without leaving a log trace can be done through this
feature. Since the WAL file format is not human-readable, and requires specific tools for
parsing, this would seem to protect it from tampering. However, DBMSes (including Or-
acle, MySQL, PostgreSQL, and SQL Server) allow the administrator to switch to a new
WAL file and delete old WAL files. Therefore, executing a WAL switch and deleting the
original WAL can effectively allow a user to perform transactions without leaving a WAL
record. For example, an administrator could switch from log file A to log file B, perform
the malicious SQL operation(s), switch back to log file A (or a new log file C), and delete
log file B. For example, to implement this operation in Oracle:
1) ALTER DATABASE ADD LOGFILE (‘path/logB.rdo’)
2) ALTER SYSTEM SWITCH LOGFILE
3) Run the malicious SQL operation(s)
4) ALTER SYSTEM SWITCH LOGFILE
5) ALTER DATABASE DROP LOGFILE MEMBER ‘path/logB.rdo’
Audit Logs Audit logs store executed SQL commands based on logging policies that
are configured by database administrators. Therefore, an administrator can disable log-
ging or modify individual log records as they see fit. For example, records in the Oracle
sys.aud$ table can be modified with SQL commands, and records in the PostgreSQL
pg audit log and MySQL general query log are stored as human-readable text files. Ta-
ble 7.1 summarizes how to modify the audit log for three major DBMSes.
DBMS Command
Oracle SQL commands against sys.aud$
PostgreSQL Edit files in the pg log directory
MySQL Edit the general log file
Table 7.1: Commands to edit the audit log.
7.4 Detecting Hidden Record Modifications
When a table record is inserted or modified, a cascade of storage changes occurs in the
database. In addition to the affected record’s data itself, page metadata may be updated
(e.g., a delete mark is set) and page(s) of an index storing the record may change (e.g., to
reflect the deletion of a record). Each of the accessed pages would be brought into RAM
if it is not already cached. Row identifiers and structure identifiers can be used to tie all
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of these changes together. Furthermore, DBAs can also disable logging for bulk modifi-
cations (for performance considerations); this privilege can be exploited to hide malicious
modifications. In this section, we describe how we detect inconsistencies between modified
records and logged commands.
7.4.1 Deleted Records
Deleted records are not physically erased but rather marked as “deleted” in the page; the
storage occupied by the deleted row becomes unallocated space, and eventually will be
overwritten by a new row. Unlike audit log records, these alterations to database storage
cannot be bypassed or controlled – thus if a reconstructed deleted record does not match
the WHERE-clause condition of any delete statement in the audit log, then a log record is
missing.
DBCarver returns the status of each row as either “deleted” or “active.” Reconstructed
deleted rows and the audit log are used in Algorithm 2 to determine if a deleted row can be
matched with at least one DELETE command. Here we use cond(d) to denote the condition
of delete d. The conditions of delete operations may overlap, potentially creating false-
negative matches (i.e., a delete’s condition may match a row that was already deleted by
another DELETE). However, we are interested in identifying deleted rows in storage that
do not match any delete operation in the log. A false-negative match presents a problem
if it hides a missing match with a delete that the attacker attempted to hide. Only if all
reconstructed deleted rows that the attacker attempted to hide have false-negative matches
will the attack go unnoticed, because a single unaccounted for deleted record is sufficient
to detect suspicious activity.
Algorithm 2 Accounting for Deleted Records in Log Files
1: Deletes← DELETE statements in audit log
2: DelRows← deleted records reconstructed by DBCarver
3: Unaccounted← DeletedRows
4: for each d ∈ Deletes do
5: for each r ∈ DelRows do
6: if r |= cond(d) then
7: Unaccounted← Unaccounted− {r}
8: return Unaccounted
Figure 7.3 gives an example for detecting unaccounted deleted rows. DBCarver re-
constructed three deleted rows from the Customer table: (1,Christine,Chicago),
(3,Christopher, Seattle), and (4,Thomas,Austin). The log file contains two operations:
T1 DELETE FROM Customer WHERE City = ‘Chicago’
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T2 DELETE FROM Customer WHERE Name LIKE ‘Chris%’
In Algorithm 2, DeletedRows was set to the three reconstructed deleted rows. Algorithm
2 returned (4,Thomas, Austin), indicating that this deleted record could not be attributed
to any of the deletes. We cannot decide which operation caused deletion of (1,Chris-
tine,Chicago) row (T1 or T2), but that is not necessary for our purpose of finding that
record #4 is an unattributed delete.
1, Christine, Chicago
3, Christopher, Seattle
4, Thomas, Austin
2, George, New York
5, Mary, Boston
T1, DELETE FROM Customer 
WHERE City = ‘Chicago’;
T2, DELETE FROM Customer 
WHERE Name LIKE ‘Chris%’;





Page Type: Table
Structure: Customer
Log File
UNATTRIBUTED 
DELETE
DBCarver Output
Del. 
Flag
Figure 7.3: Detection of unattributed deleted records.
7.4.2 Inserted Records
New inserted rows are either appended to the end of the last page (or a new page if the
last page is full) of a table or overwrite free space created by previously deleted rows. A
new row has to be smaller than or equal to the old deleted row to overwrite its previous
storage location; some databases (Oracle and PostgreSQL) explicitly delay the overwriting
unallocated page space. When an inserted row is smaller than the deleted row, only a part
of the deleted row is overwritten leaving traces of the old row behind. If an “active” new
table row does not match any of the insert operations from the audit log, then this row is a
sign of suspicious activity. These “active” records are used in Algorithm 3 to determine if
a reconstructed row can be attributed to an insert from the audit log.
Algorithm 3 Accounting for Inserted Data in Log Files
1: InsertedRows← rows created by INSERT log entries
2: Rows← reconstructed active rows
3: Unaccounted← Rows
4: for each r ∈ Rows do
5: if r ∈ InsertedRows then
6: Unaccounted← Unaccounted− {r}
7: return Unaccounted
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Figure 7.4 shows an example for detecting an INSERT operation that does not match any
commands in the audit log. The log contains six operations. As rows are inserted from T1
to T4, they are appended to the end of the table. At T5, (3,Lamp) was deleted followed
by an insert of (5,Bookcase) at T6. Since row (5,Bookcase) is larger than the deleted
row (3,Lamp), it is appended to the end of the table. DBCarver reconstructed five active
records, including (0,Dog) and (2,Monkey). Rows was initialized to the five reconstructed
active rows for Algorithm 3. Algorithm 3 thus returned (0,Dog) and (2,Monkey) because
these records could not be matched to logged inserts (only the latter is an INSERT as we
will see in Section 7.4.3). The character p found with (0,Dog) was not part of the record,
indicating that this record overwrote a previously deleted row. Since (0,Dog) is one char-
acter smaller than (3,Lamp) and the last character from (3,Lamp) was found, it was likely
that (0,Dog) overwrote the deleted record (3,Lamp). We describe how to confirm this in
Section 7.4.4.
1, Chair
Page Type: Table
Structure: Furniture
5, Bookcase
T1, INSERT INTO Furniture VALUES (1, ‘Chair’);
T2, INSERT INTO Furniture VALUES (2, ‘Desk’);
T3, INSERT INTO Furniture VALUES (3, ‘Lamp’);
T4, INSERT INTO Furniture VALUES (4, ‘Dresser’);
T5, DELETE FROM Furniture 
WHERE Name LIKE ‘Lamp’;
T6, INSERT INTO Furniture VALUES (5,‘Bookcase’);
Log File
Unattributed Insert
Unattributed Update
0, Dogp
2, Monkey
4, Dresser






2, Desk
DBCarver Output
UNATTRIBUTED 
INSERT
UNATTRIBUTED 
UPDATE
Figure 7.4: Detection of unattributed inserted and updated records.
7.4.3 Updated Records
An UPDATE operation is essentially a DELETE operation followed by an INSERT operation. To
account for updated rows, we use unmarked deleted rows returned by Algorithm 2 and
unmarked inserted rows returned by Algorithm 3 as the input for Algorithm 4. If a deleted
row can be matched to the WHERE clause of an update, then this deleted row operation is
marked as present in the log. Next, if an unmarked inserted row can be matched to the
value from the SET clause, and the inserted row matches all values in the deleted row except
for the SET clause value, then this inserted row operation is present in the log. Currently,
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our implementation is limited to simple SET clause expressions of the form A = c for an
attribute A and constant c. In the algorithm, we use cond(u) for an update u to denote the
update’s WHERE clause condition and set(u) to denote the its set clause. Furthermore, we
use APPLY(r,s) to denote evaluating SET-clause s over row r.
Algorithm 4 Accounting for Updated Data in Log Files
1: Deleted← unmarked deleted rows from Alg. 2
2: Inserted← unmarked inserted rows from Alg. 3
3: Updates← set of updates from the audit log
4: for all rdel ∈ Deleted do
5: if ∃u ∈ Updates : rdel |= cond(u) then
6: Deleted← Deleted− {rdel}
7: for all rins ∈ Inserted do
8: if APPLY(rdel, set(u)) = rins then
9: Inserted← Inserted− {rins}
10: return Deleted, Inserted
Figure 7.4 also shows an example of how we detect an UPDATE operation not present
in the log. Algorithm 2 returned the row (2,Desk), and Algorithm 3 returned the row
(0,Dog) and (2,Monkey). Using these sets of records, Algorithm 4 returned (2,Desk) as
the list of deleted records, and (0,Dog) and (2,Monkey) as the list of inserted records.
Additionally, Algorithm 4 recognized the shared value, 2, for the first column in (2,Desk)
and (2,Monkey). While this does not confirm an UPDATE operation by itself, it is reasonable
to conclude that (2,Desk) was updated to (2,Monkey).
7.4.4 Indexes
In some cases, records from table pages are insufficient to draw reliable conclusions about
record modification. For example, in Figure 7.4 we did not have enough information to
confirm that (3,Lamp) was overwritten by (0,Dog). Reconstructed index pages provide
additional information because deleted index values have a significantly longer lifetime
compared to deleted records themselves [87]. Using the pointer associated with deleted (but
still recoverable) index entry allows us to determine values previously stored at a particular
location within a page.
Figure 7.5 demonstrates how old index values supply evidence of a deleted record that
was overwritten by new values. The index stores the furniture table ID and a pointer to the
row address. Using index pointers, we can be certain that the overwritten row once stored
record with ID of 3. This allows us to extrapolate a partial deleted record, (3, ?), that we
can include in Algorithms 2 and 4. If a secondary index on the second column (furniture
name) is available, we could also extrapolate Lamp from the index.
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Figure 7.5: Matching index values to table records.
7.5 Detecting Inconsistencies for Read-Only Queries
DBMSes use a component called buffer manager to cache pages from disk into memory.
Data is read into the buffer pool in units of pages, that can be reconstructed by DBCarver.
In this section, we describe how artifacts carved from the buffer pool can be matched to
read-only queries in the audit log. A database query may use one of two possible way of
accessing a table: a full table scan (FTS) or an index scan (IS). An FTS reads all table pages,
while an IS uses an index structure (e.g., B-Tree) to retrieve a list of pointers referencing
particular table pages (or rows) to be read based on a search key. All accessed index pages
and some of the table pages (depending on access type) are placed in the buffer pool by the
DBMS.
7.5.1 Full Table Scan
When a query uses an FTS, only a small part of a large table will be cached. A small
table (relative to the buffer pool size) may be cached in its entirety. Every database stores a
unique page identifier within the page header which allows us to efficiently match cached
pages to their counterpart on disk. The particular number of pages cached by a FTS can
be derived from the size of the table, although it is not always proportional (e.g., a larger
table may result in fewer cached pages). Thus, after FTS is executed, typically pages from
the physical end of table storage would be in the cache (i.e., a few pages including the one
where new inserts would be appended). In Section 7.6.3 we analyze caching behaviour for
multiple DBMSes.
Figure 7.6 provides an example of an FTS over the Employee table. We can identify
pages that belong to Employee by the structure identifier 131, which is stored in the page
header. DBCarver can return just the page structure identifiers (without parsing page
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Table Customer 
Index Customer City 
Table Employee 
PID: 4 
SID: 126 
PID: 15 
SID: 124 
PID: 53 
SID: 124 
PID: 2 
SID: 126 
PID: 24 
SID: 124 
PID: 100 
SID: 131 
PID: 99 
SID: 131 
PID: 97 
SID: 131 
PID: 98 
SID: 131 
PID: 100 
SID: 131 
PID: 99 
SID: 131 
PID: 97 
SID: 131 
PID: 98 
SID: 131 
PID: 100 
SID: 131 
PID: 99 
SID: 131 
PID: 97 
SID: 131 
PID: 98 
SID: 131 
PID: … 
SID: 131 
PID: 1 
SID: 131 
PID: 2 
SID: 131 
PID: 4 
SID: 126 
PID: 3 
SID: 126 
PID: 2 
SID: 126 
PID: 1 
SID: 126 
PID: … 
SID: 126 
PID: 1 
SID: 124 
PID: 3 
SID: 124 
PID: … 
SID: 124 
PID: 2 
SID: 124 
Disk 
Memory 
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SELECT *  
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WHERE E_Name LIKE ‘%ne’ 
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PID: Page Identifier         
SID: Structure Identifier 
Figure 7.6: Read-only query matching between disk and buffer cache.
content) at a much faster speed. Both Q2 and Q4 access Employee via an FTS. Each time
the Employee table is scanned, the same four pages (identifiers: 97, 98, 99, and 100)
from the table are loaded into the buffer pool. Therefore, when four pages with the page
identifiers 97, 98, 99, and 100 and a structure identifier of 131 are found in memory, a
FTS on the Employee table can be assumed.
7.5.2 Index Access
DMBSes use IS to optimize performance for queries that access data based on the key at-
tributes of an index. Caching of index pages identifies what attribute was queried (a query
posed conditions over this attribute) and provides a rough estimate of what value range was
selected for an indexed attribute (since values stored in index pages are ordered). Cached
index pages are more precise in determining what the query accessed because cached ta-
ble pages contain the entire table row (regardless of which columns were accessed), but
index pages contain only the relevant columns. A sequence of index pages in the buffer
pool that does not correspond to any logged query can present evidence of hidden access.
Algorithm 5 describes how to use the minimum and maximum values of index pages to de-
termine if a cached index page can be attributed to logged query. Again, cond(q) denotes
the conditions used by query q (OR’ed together).
Figure 7.6 shows examples of index accesses on the Customer table. The Customer
table’s structure identifier is 124, and the secondary index on the C City column has a
structure identifier of 126. Q1 filters on the city Dallas, and it caches the index page with
identifier 2. This page has a minimum value of Chicago and a maximum value of Detroit.
Q3 filter on the city Jackson, and it caches the index page with the page identifier of 4.
This page has a minimum value of Houston and a maximum value of Lincoln. If a query
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Algorithm 5 Accounting for Index-Access Queries
1: IndexPages← set of all cached index pages
2: Queries← queries from the audit log
3: for each i ∈ IndexPages do
4: if ∃q ∈ Queries : ∃r ∈ i : r |= cond(q) then
5: IndexPages← IndexPages− {i}
6: return IndexPages
in the audit log filters on a values within the minimum and maximum range of values for
an index page, then that page can be attributed to that query.
7.5.3 Data Lifetime in Memory
As new data is read into cache, old data is evicted (using a buffer replacement strategy such
as LRU) providing us with an approximate timeline of recent accesses. A malicious user
can not directly control the buffer pool; regardless of one’s permission level, there are no
direct APIs to control buffer pool behavior. Assuming that the attacker cannot do something
as conspicuous as powering down the computer, the only available command is to flush the
cache (only available in Oracle, SQL Server and MySQL). Interestingly, flushing buffer
cache will mark pages as unallocated instead of physically evicting any data from RAM.
7.6 Experiments
Our experiments use three databases (Oracle, PostgreSQL, and MySQL) that we consider
representative (both open- and closed-source, all three very widely used) due to space lim-
itations. We have used data and queries from TPCC [43, 71] and SSBM [59] benchmarks.
These benchmarks were used because they were designed to measure the performance of
DBMSes.
Our experiments were carried out on servers with an Intel X3470 2.93 GHz proces-
sor and 8GB of RAM running Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise SP1 or CentOS 6.5.
Windows OS memory snapshots were generated using a tool called User Mode Process
Dumper (version 8.1). We used regular SATA magnetic drives for storage and process-
ing. Linux OS memory snapshots were generated by reading the process’ memory under
/proc/$pid/mem.
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7.6.1 Experiment 1: DBDetective Performance Evaluation
The objective of this experiment is to explore the costs associated with DBDetective
and the estimated reaction time to detect tampering. In Part-A of this experiment, we
provide cost estimates to perform memory snapshots. In Part-B, we test the carving process
performance against database files. In Part-C, we test the carving speed against memory
snapshots.
Part A To estimate the cost to perform memory snapshots, we copied a 2.5GB snapshot
from an Oracle database process to a magnetic disk. This operation took approximately 31
sec. In practice, the snapshot cost is dominated by the cost of writing the result to disk but
and can be sped up significantly by shipping data to a remote machine or using a faster drive
(e.g., PCIe). As long as snapshots are taken as often as the entire buffer pool is replaced by
query activity, we expect to detect most activity.
Part B To obtain a performance estimate for file carving, we ran DBCarver tool against
five Oracle database files ranging in size from 1MB to 3GB. All Oracle files contained
8KB database pages. We observed that DBCarver parsed the files at an average rate of
1.1 MB/s and continued to scale linearly with respect to the file size (using SATA magnetic
disk).
Part C Finally, we tested the performance of the carving tool against memory snapshots
of Oracle buffer cache. We collected a 2.5GB snapshot taken from the Oracle database
process and an 8GB snapshot of the entire RAM content. Each of the snapshot required
detecting and parsing the contents of roughly 80,000 pages (600MB). The 2.5GB snapshot
was carved at a rate of 4.2 MB/s, and the 8GB snapshot was carved at a rate of 13.2 MB/s.
We can thus conclude that the runtime of page parsing depends solely on the number of
database pages rather than raw file size.
7.6.2 Record Modification Detection
7.6.2.1 Experiment 2: Deleted Record Detection
The objective of this experiment is to identify deleted rows from storage that could not be
matched to commands in the log files. We also evaluate the situation where a row deleted
by a malicious query was overwritten or was attributed to a non-malicious query (a false-
negative match).
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Part A For this experiment we use MySQL. By default, MySQL creates an IOT when
a primary key is declared for a table. MySQL uses the primary key as the row identifier,
and all rows are physically ordered within index (leaf) pages by the row identifier. If no
primary key is declared, MySQL will synthesize a unique row identifier for each row.
MySQL stores the row identifier as the pointer in the index value-pointer pairs.
We initially started with the Item table (100K records) from the TPCC benchmark. We
created a primary key on the I ID column, a secondary index on the I Name column, and
a secondary index on the I IM ID column. Next, we issued two delete commands:
(Delete 1) DELETE FROM Item WHERE I_Name LIKE ‘w2G%’
(Delete 2) DELETE FROM Item WHERE I_IM_ID = 8563.
Delete 1 represents malicious activity, and was therefore removed from the log. Delete
1 deleted records with the I ID values of 92328 and 95136. Delete 2 is in the log and was
responsible for deletion of 10 records. We used DBCarver to reconstruct deleted rows
from Item in storage: and 12 deleted rows were reconstructed.
Algorithm 2 returned one record with the I ID value of 92328. 11 of the deleted records
were matched with the logged Delete 2 command: the 10 records it deleted and the record
with I ID 95136. Even though the 11th record was caused by Delete 1, it resulted in false-
negative match to Delete 2 because it happened to have a I IM ID value of 8563. However,
false-negatives are only problematic if they prevent all maliciously deleted records to be
detected.
Part B Realistically, investigators may not be able to perform forensic analysis at the
most opportune time. We next consider what determination can be made if the trace of the
maliciously deleted record has been overwritten.
To instrument an overwrite of a deleted record in an IOT, a record with the same primary
key value had to be inserted. We inserted the record (92328,100,DBCarver1,0.0, This
is a trick1). The original deleted record with the I ID value of 92328 was permanently
overwritten. However, the secondary indexes on I Name and I IM ID columns retain traces
of this record until something causes an index rebuild. The pointers stored with index
values are the row identifiers (or primary key) for table records.
We found that the row identifier 92328 had two entries in the I Name index: the value
for the current (new) record, w2GSyVRavpUbCr2bEzqOb for the old record, and two
entries in the I IM ID index: the value for the current record and 4763 for the overwritten
record. This allowed us to extrapolate a partial deleted record as an input to Algorithm
2: (92328,4763,w2GSyVRavpUbCr2bEzqOb,?,?). Since Algorithm 2 could not match
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the partial record to any of the logged commands, it also provides evidence of the missing
log record.
7.6.2.2 Experiment 3: Updated Record Detection
The objective of this experiment is to identify the by-product of an UPDATE operation in
persistent storage that can not be matched to commands in the log. Similar to Experiment
7.6.2.1-B, we evaluated records that were overwritten by an in-place UPDATE.
Part A We again use MySQL and the Item table with 100K rows and indexes defined as
in previous experiments. Records in Item include (53732, 1004, Name Val53732, 14.55,
Data Val53732) where Name Val53732 is
Us65fCVCCfrOMDT6bpDDE and Data Val53732 is
mpDSxHpz0ftrSI2aP0rXpZhdYSakGcqrSqeI6a6p2cE4Q.
All of INSERT commands creating the table were logged. Next, we issued an update,
UPDATE Item SET I_Name = ‘DBCarver’WHERE I_ID = 53732
to simulate malicious activity, and removed this operation from the log. We then passed the
database files containing the Item table and the I Name secondary index to DBCarver.
Algorithm 3 returned the record (53732, 1004, DBCarver, 14.55, Data Val53732)
since it does not match any logged INSERT command. DBCarver did not return deleted
rows because when the row was updated, the new version of the row physically overwrote
the old version. Two pieces of evidence help classify the row 53732 as an overwrite of a
deleted row: table pages and the pages for the index on I Name. In the table page, the new
row used less storage space than the old overwritten row. Therefore, part of the old row
was still present – 13 characters from the last column were reconstructed:
mpDSxHpz0ftrSI2aP0rXpZhdYSakGcqrSqeI6a6p2cE4Q
These 13 characters could be distinguished from new row because new row metadata spec-
ifies where the current row ends. This behavior is illustrated in Figure 7.4. In the secondary
index page, the pointer (or row identifier) 53732 had two entries, both with the new value
(DBCarver) and the old value (Name Val53732). Since the value DBCarver was present in
the current active record, we could assert that DBCarver overwrote Name Val53732. This
allowed us to extrapolate a partial pre-update record, (53732, ?, Name Val53732, ?, ?)
despite the fact that it was destroyed.
Part B Having detected unmatched active record (53732, 1004, DBCarver, 14.55,
Data Val53732), and a partially reconstructed deleted record, (53732, ?, Name Val53732,
?, ?), we can link them as evidence of an update in Algorithm 4. First, we use Algorithm 2,
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which returned our partially deleted record as not a non-match. We next added our partially
deleted record 53732 to Deleted and our active record to Inserted in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 returned (53732, 1004, DBCarver, 14.55, Data Val53732) as an active
record and (53732, ?, Name - Val53732, ?, ?) as a deleted record. Since they share the
53732 primary key value, it is reasonable to conclude that these records should match with
an UPDATE command, rather than both a DELETE and INSERT. Technically, this behavior could
be caused by a hidden combination of DELETE and INSERT – either way, we uncovered a
maliciously hidden modification. We can also determine that the third column was changed
from Name Val53732 to DBCarver.
7.6.2.3 Experiment 4: Modified Record Detection
We now explore the objectives of Experiments 1 and 2 in an Oracle setting. In Part A of
this experiment, we identify the by-products of DELETE and UPDATE commands in storage
that do not match any logged operations. In Part B, we simulated a scenario in which
deleted records are overwritten. We then determined what malicious DELETE and INSERT
commands could still be detected. In Part C, we used available indexes and results from
Part B to match UPDATE operations.
Unlike MySQL, Oracle does not create an IOT by default when a primary key is de-
clared (IOTs must be created explicitly). Instead, a regular B-Tree index is created on the
primary key. Without IOT, unique row identifier are not stored with each row. Instead,
Oracle uses physical row identifiers consisting of a structure identifier, page identifier, and
row’s position within the page.
Part A We use the TPCC NewOrders (NO O ID, NO D ID, NO W ID) table with 9K
rows. We declared a primary key on the NO O ID column and a secondary index on the
NO D ID column. Next, we issued the following queries to simulate malicious activity:
(Command 1) DELETE FROM New_Orders
WHERE NO_O_ID = 2500 AND NO_D_ID = 1
(Command 2) UPDATE New_Orders SET NO_D_ID = 777
WHERE NO_O_ID = 2700 AND NO_D_ID = 1.
We removed both Command 1 and Command 2 from the log. We then passed the
database files containing the NewOrders table and both indexes to DBCarver.
We reconstructed the deleted record (2500, 1, 1) caused by Command 1. A copy of the
indexed values for this record were reconstructed from the primary and secondary index.
DBCarver also reconstructed the active record (2700, 777, 1) – Command 2 caused an
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in-place update and overwrote the old version, (2700, 1, 1). However, the old NO D ID
value is still present in the index, and could be mapped back to the overwritten row.
Part B To continue this experiment, we simulated normal database activity to observe
what causes commands from 7.6.2.3-A to be no longer immediately detectable. This
was done by repeatedly deleting 10 records using the NO O ID column, and inserting
20 records. We passed the database files containing the NewOrders table and indexes to
DBCarver after each set of operations. We passed the carved output to Algorithms 2 and
3 after each set of operations.
After the first and second sequence of 30 commands, Algorithm 2 returned (2500, 1,
1), and Algorithm 3 returned (2700, 777, 1). This meant that we had detected a DELETE
command and an INSERT command missing from the log file. After the third set of com-
mands, Algorithm 2 did not return any records because (2500, 1, 1) was overwritten by an
inserted record, and Algorithm 3 returned (2700, 777, 1). Now, only an INSERT command
was only detected as missing from the log file.
Part C While we detected missing operations during our simulation, we wanted to see
if indexes can serve as an extra source of evidence of malicious activity. The unidentified
DELETE command was no longer detected after the third set of database activity commands,
and the unidentified INSERT command could have actually been an in-place update that we
demonstrated in Experiment 7.6.2.2.
The third set of database activity commands overwrote the deleted record of interest,
seemingly avoiding detection. However, we found multiple values for the pointer to this
record in both the primary key index and the secondary index. We then reconstructed
a partial deleted record using the index values that weren’t found in the current record:
(2500, 1, ?). Algorithm 2 did not associate this partial record with any DELETE command
in the log file since all of the DELETE commands were on the primary key. Therefore, we
had found evidence of a DELETE operation not recorded in the log files.
Throughout all of the database activity, we detected that the record (2700, 777, 1) was
part of an INSERT command removed from the log files. However, more conclusions could
be derived from the index values.We found the one value for the pointer in the primary key
index, but we found two values for the same pointer in the secondary index. This indicated
that the record was likely updated by a previous command. Given the one value in the pri-
mary key index and the two values in the secondary index, we could reconstruct the partial
deleted record: (2700, 1, ?). Finally, Algorithm 4 identified the commonality, 2700, be-
tween the unattributed active record, (2700, 777, 1), and the partial deleted record, (2700,
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1, ?). Based on this result, it was reasonable to assume that the record with the NO O ID
value of 2700 was involved in a hidden UPDATE command.
7.6.3 Read-Only Query Detection
7.6.3.1 Experiment 5: Full Table Scan Detection
Part A The objective of this experiment is to demonstrate full table scan (FTS) detection.
FTSes leave a consistent pattern of pages in the buffer cache for each table they access
which can be detected in RAM.
We used a PostgreSQL DBMS with 8KB pages and a buffer cache of 128MB (or 16,000
pages). We evaluated FTS for two tables: the Item table (1284 pages) from the TPCC
benchmark and the LineOrder table (77K pages) from the SSBM. To do this, we ran three
queries that all used an FTS. The first query accessed Item, and the second and third queries
accessed LineOrder.
In Snapshot 1, we observed 32 pages from the Item table. The 32 pages reconstructed
by DBCarver represented the 32 highest page identifiers for Item table (i.e., the last 32
pages in the physical database file), just as described in Figure 7.6. We verified that this is
the case by inputting the Item database file into DBCarver. We did not observe any other
cached table pages or cached index pages related to the Item table in the buffer cache. In
Snapshot 2, DBCarver reconstructed the same 32 pages from Item and an additional 32
pages from LineOrder. The by-product from scanning Item was still detectable in memory,
although it is unallocated space from DBMS’s perspective. Similar to the Item FTS, the 32
pages cached for LineOrder had the highest page identifiers from the database file where
LineOrder was stored. For Snapshot 3, DBCarver returned 32 pages from Item and 64
pages from LineOrder. The Item pages were the same pages from Snapshots 1 and 2.
The new set of 32 pages from LineOrder had the exact same page identifiers, found at
a different location in the memory snapshot. Each FTS access demonstrated a consistent
caching pattern in PostgreSQL, 32 pages for every table, producing a new set of pages at
a location in memory adjacent to the previous pattern thereby creating a crude timeline of
queries in buffer cache. Note that other DBMSes exhibit their own (consistent) caching
pattern for an FTS. For example, the exact number of pages cached for a table in Oracle is
not constant, but relies on a predictable pattern for each table.
Part B To demonstrate that FTS caching depends on buffer cache size, we increased
buffer cache to 256MB in PostgreSQL and performed the same sequence of queries. As
a result, we observed that the FTS(Item) query switched to caching the whole table (all
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1284 pages). However, the FTS(LineOrder) query cached 32 pages each in the exact same
pattern as before. In general, DBMSes use an internal heuristic threshold to decide when a
whole table is “small enough” to be fully read into the buffer cache.
7.6.3.2 Experiment 6: Index Access Detection
The objective of this experiment is to demonstrate index access detection. When a table is
accessed using an index, both the index pages and table pages are cached in memory. The
ordered values stored in the index pages (leaves and intermediate nodes) provide a rough
estimate of the range of values accessed by a query.
For this experiment, we used a PostgreSQL DBMS with 8KB pages and a buffer cache
of 128MB (or 16,000 pages). We created the Item table with a secondary index on the
I NAME column. Next, we issued two queries that used an index access for the Item table:
(Query 1) SELECT * FROM Item
WHERE I_Name BETWEEN ‘aa’ AND ‘ab’
(Query 2) SELECT * FROM Item
WHERE I_Name BETWEEN ‘ba’ AND ‘bb’.
Query 1 selected 105 rows (0.08 selectivity) and Query 2 selected 109 rows (0.08 se-
lectivity). After each query, we captured a cache snapshot that we passed to DBCarver.
DBCarver reconstructed 102 table pages and 2 leaf index pages from the memory
snapshot after Query 1. Since Query 1 used a secondary index (the table is not organized
on this column), almost every accessed row cached a new table page. DBCarver recon-
structed 94 new table pages and 2 new index leaf pages from the memory snapshot after
Query 2, while the pages cached by Query 1 remained in memory. Similar to Query 1,
Query 2 cached a page for almost every row selected. Since the indexes stored ordered
values, they provided an estimate of how the table was accessed. Table 7.2 summarizes
the detailed breakdown of index page contents returned by DBCarver. Table 7.2 shows
that a value range between ‘a6j3’ and ‘AaBD’ must have been read to cache index page 1,
a value between ‘AaBd’ and ‘ac5U’ was accessed to cache index page 2, a value between
‘b76G’ and ‘bAGT’ must have been to read to cache index page 3, and a value between
‘BaGW’ and ‘bcDi’ was accessed to cache index page 4. These index value ranges matched
to Query 1 and Query 2 in Algorithm 5.
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Snapshot Index Page Min Val Max Val
1 1 a6j3 ... AaBD ...
1 2 AaBD ... ac5U ...
2 3 b76G ... bAGT ...
2 4 BaGW ... bcDi ...
Table 7.2: Index page contents found in memory.
7.7 Conclusions and Future Work
Audit logs and other build-in DBMS security mechanisms are designed to detect or prevent
malicious operations executed by an attacker. An inherent weakness of such mechanisms is
that attackers with sufficient privileges can bypass them to hide their tracks. We present and
thoroughly evaluate DBDetective, an approach for detecting database operations that
were hidden by an attacker by removing them from the audit log and collecting evidence
about what data was accessed and modified by an attacker. Our approach relies on forensic
inspection of database storage and correlates this information with entries from an audit
log to uncover evidence of malicious operations. Importantly, database storage is nearly
impossible to spoof and, thus, is a much more reliable source of tampering evidence than,
e.g., audit logs.
Given that storage snapshots provide incomplete information, we will explore proba-
bilistic matching that determines the likelihood of a storage artifact being caused by the
operations in the audit log, exploit additional constraints based on temporal ordering of
operations, simulate partial histories of SQL commands from an audit log for more pre-
cise matching, and dynamically adapt the frequency of taking snapshots based on detected
anomalies.
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Chapter 8
File Tampering Detection
8.1 Introduction
DBMSes use a combination of defense and detection mechanisms to secure access to data.
Defense mechanisms, such as access control, determine the data granularity and system
access granted to different database users; defense mechanisms, such as audit logging,
monitor all database activity. Regardless of the defense mechanisms, security breaches are
still a legitimate concern – sometimes due to unintentional granting of extra access control
and sometimes due to outright hacking, such as SQL injection. Security breaches are typ-
ically detected through analysis of audit logs. However, audit log analysis is unreliable to
detect a breach that originated from privileged users.
Privileged users, by definition, already have the ability to control and modify access
permissions. Therefore, audit logs fundamentally cannot be trusted to detect suspicious
activity. Additionally, privileged users commonly have access to database files. Consider
a system administrator who maliciously, acting as the root, edits a DBMS data file in a
Hex editor or through a programming language, such as Python. The DBMS, unaware of
external file write activity taking place outside its own programmatic access, cannot log it,
and thus the tampering attack remains undetected.
Current DBMSes do not provide tools against insider threats – in general, a built-in se-
curity mechanism is vulnerable to insider attacks. While a DBMS will not be able to detect
direct storage changes, file-level modifications potentially create inconsistencies within the
auxiliary data structures maintained by a DBMS. Forensics tools that examine file con-
tents can be used to detect such inconsistencies, and determine if insider threats have taken
place. We proposed the first database forensic tool, DBCarver, that can be used to detect
deleted data from database pages (Chapter 3). However, database forensic tools such as
DBCarver merely extract forensic artifacts but do not search for inconsistencies within
the data structures maintained by a DBMS.
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In this chapter, we propose a system, DBStorageAuditor, that detects database file
tampering by identifying inconsistencies in storage through a direct inspection of internal
database structures. DBStorageAuditor utilizes existing database forensic techniques
and expands them to extract additional necessary storage artifacts. These artifacts are then
used to detect inconsistencies within indexes and between indexes and tables. The under-
lying premise of our approach is that all relational databases follow patterns in storage over
which the privileged user has little or no control. We inspect these storage patterns to detect
unusual activity. We motivate DBStorageAuditor through an example:
T1, 
DELETE 
FROM Orders 
WHERE ID = 2;
T2, 
DELETE 
FROM Orders 
WHERE ID = 6;
Orders Table

Audit Log Database Storage
Del. 
Flag
1, Bookcase, Austin
3, Desk, Chicago
2, Chair, New York
5, Table, Boston


6, Chair, Detroit


City Index
Austin
Chicago
New York
Boston
Seattle
Detroit
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 8.1: Example attack through DBMS files.
Example 2 Malice is the system administrator for a shipping company, FriendlyShipping.
Malice is bribed by a competing company to interfere with the orders going to Seattle.
Malice does not have access to the DBMS, but she does have access to the server where
the database files reside.
Malice writes a Python script that will open and directly modify the database file con-
taining the Orders table. The script then opens the database file, finds all records con-
taining the string ‘Seattle’, and explicitly overwrites entire records with the NULL ASCII
character (decimal value 0).
Figure 8.1 illustrates the result of Malice’s script actions. Since the record was erased
without the DBMS (API has never seen that command) all DBMS security was bypassed,
and the operation was never recorded in the log file. When FriendlyShipping investigates
the missing Seattle orders, the audit log can only explain deleted orders for (2, Chair,
New York) and (6, Chair, Detroit). The audit logs contain no trace of the
Seattle order being deleted because it was not deleted but rather wiped out externally.
To simplify in the above example, we have omitted some details of database file tam-
pering, which we expand on later in Section 8.4. Barring those details in Example 1, the
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value in the City index still exists in index storage even though the entire record is erased.
Therefore, an inconsistency can be identified by mapping back the index value to the empty
gap in table storage. The empty gap in table storage exists because a database only marks
a record when it is deleted, and only overwrites the record with data from a newly inserted
record. However, making the mapping from the index value to the associated record must
be based on the behavioral rules of database storage, such as page and record layout. We
use database forensic tools to understand database layout, and using that layout, perform
the necessary mapping.
It is not impossible for a scrupulous system administrator to (i) tamper with the index
and create a cascade of inconsistencies throughout the index structure, or (ii) for an attacker
who has privileges to modify database files to acquire privileges to suspend or kill logging
mechanisms at the operating system level if necessary, or (iii) for a knowledgeable adver-
sary to easily avoid corrupting storage and keep checksum values consistent. However, in
spite of increased level of threat, we repeatedly show that accurate knowledge about data
layout can be used to gather evidence and prove if any malicious activity has taken place.
Previously we developed an approach to detect malicious activity when DBMS logging
is disabled [85]. In this approach we analyzed unlogged activity (executed through a proper
DBMS API) but strictly assumed that database files were not exposed to tampering. In this
chapter, we address the tampering vulnerability where the database files are physically
altered. Developing an auditing system for DBMSes is part of our larger goal to open up
the database system and its storage to users, for performance and forensics investigation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 8.2 covers related work. Sec-
tion 5.4 discusses concepts of database storage used throughout the chapter. Section 8.3 de-
fines the adversary we seek to defend against. Section 8.4 details how to perform database
file tampering. Section 8.5 provides an overview of DBStorageAuditor. Section 8.6
describes how we utilize database forensics. Section 8.7 addresses index tampering. Sec-
tion 8.8 proposes a method to organize carved index output making our system scalable.
Section 8.9 discusses how to detect file tampering using inconsistencies between carved
index data and table data. Section 8.10 provides a thorough evaluation of our system.
8.2 Related Work
This chapter focuses on the detection of database file tampering. Therefore, we discuss
work related to protecting DBMSes against privileged users as well as work that detects reg-
ular (non-DBMS) file tampering. We outline why existing file tampering and anti-forensic
methods are inapplicable to database files.
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8.2.1 Database Auditing and Security
Database audit log files are of great interest for database security because they can be used
to determine whether data was compromised and what records were accessed. Methods to
verify log integrity have been proposed to detect log file tampering [80, 64]. Pavlou et al.
expanded upon this work to determine the time of log tampering [63]. Sinha et al. used
hash chains to verify log integrity in an offline environment without requiring communi-
cation with a central server [79]. Crosby et al. proposed a data structure, history tree, to
reduce the log size produced by hash chains in an offline environment [13]. Rather than
detecting log tampering, Schneider and Kelsey developed an approach to make log files
impossible to parse and alter [77]. An event log can be generated using triggers, and the
idea of a SELECT trigger was explored for the purpose of logging [19]. ManageEngine’s
EventLog Analyzer provides audit log reports and alerts for Oracle and SQL Server based
on actions, such as user activity, record modification, schema alterations, and read-only
queries [48]. We previously described a method to detect inconsistencies between storage
and log files, allowing tampering detection when logging was disabled (i.e., when an oper-
ation was excluded from the log) [85]. All of this work assumes that database storage can
not be altered directly – an action which bypasses logging mechanisms.
Network-based monitoring methods have received attention in audit log research be-
cause they provide independence and generality by residing outside of the DBMS. IBM
Security Guardium Express Activity Monitor for Databases [37] monitors incoming pack-
ets for suspicious activity. Liu et al. [46] monitored DBAs and other privileged users by
identifying and logging network packets containing SQL statements. The benefit of mon-
itoring activity over the network and, therefore, beyond the reach of DBA’s, is the level
of independence achieved by these tools. On the other hand, relying on network activity
ignores local DBMS connections and requires intimate understanding of SQL commands
(i.e., an obfuscated command can fool the system).
8.2.2 Database Forensics
Stahlberg demonstrated the retention of deleted data and proposed techniques to erase data
for a MySQL DBMS [82]. While this work was only ever implemented for MySQL, it
validates our threat model by imposing custom DBMS file modifications.
Database page carving [91] is a method for reconstructing the contents of a relational
database without relying on the file system or DBMS. Page carving is inspired by traditional
file carving [73, 25], which reconstructs data (active and deleted) from disk images or RAM
snapshots without the need for a live system. The work in [86] presented a comparative
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study of the page structure for multiple DBMSes. Subsequent work in [87] described how
long forensic evidence resides within a database even after being deleted or reorganized.
While a multitude of built-in and third party recovery tools (e.g., [55, 65, 68]) aim to extract
database storage, none of these tools are helpful for forensic analysis because they can only
recover “active” data. Forensic tools, such as Sleuth Kit [7] and EnCASE Forensic [20],
are commonly used by digital investigators to reconstruct file system data, but they are not
capable of parsing database files. A database forensic tool (just like a forensic file system
tool) should also reconstruct unallocated pieces of data, including deleted rows, auxiliary
structures (indexes) or buffer cache space.
8.2.3 File Tampering and Anti-Forensics
One-way hash functions have been used to detect file tampering at the file system level [41,
28]. However, we expect database files to be regularly modified by legitimate operations.
Distinguishing a malicious tampering operation and a legitimate SQL operation would be
nearly impossible at the file system level without knowledge of metadata in DBMS storage.
Authenticating cached data on untrusted publishers has been explored by Martel [49] and
Tamassia [83]. Their threat model defends against an untrusted publisher that provides
cached results working with a trusted DBMS and, while our work addresses an untrusted
DBMS.
Anti-forensics is defined as a method that seeks to interfere with a forensic process [35];
file tampering threat model we address in this chapter exhibits anti-forensics behavioral
properties. Two traditional anti-forensics techniques are data wiping and data hiding [21,
40]: 1) data wiping explicitly overwrites data to delete it rather than mark it as deleted,
2) data hiding seeks to hide the message itself. We are not aware of any existing litera-
ture that addresses anti-forensics within DBMSes [75]; we consider adding or erasing data
through file tampering (that bypasses DBMS itself) to be the equivalent of anti-forensics
for DBMSes.
8.3 Threat Model
In this section, we define the attack vectors, different possible adversary types, and the priv-
ileges we expect them to wield. We consider two types of privileged users: database admin-
istrator (DBA) and system administrator (SA). A DBA can issue privileged SQL commands
against the DBMS including disabling logs or granting privileges to users. However, a DBA
would not have administrative access to the server OS. The SA has administrative access to
the server OS including the ability to suspend processes and read/write access to all files,
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but no access to privileged SQL commands in the DBMS. The SA can still have a regular
DB user account without affecting our assumptions.
Since a DBA can bypass DBMS defense mechanisms, detection mechanisms are best
suited to identify anomalous behavior. An audit log containing a history of SQL commands
is accepted as one of the best detection mechanisms for a DBMS. In Section 8.2, we dis-
cussed prior work designed to prevent audit log tampering and detect malicious behavior
in the event that logging was disabled. In this chapter, we focus on a detection mechanism
for a user often ignored in DBMS security, the SA.
The SA can bypass all DBMS security defense and detection mechanisms by reading
and editing a database file with a tool other than the DBMS. For example, a SA could use
Python to open a file and change the value ‘Hank’ to ‘Walt.’ In Section 8.4 we discuss
additional steps that must be considered to successfully perform such an operation, but it
can ultimately be achieved. Since this operation occurs outside of the DBMS, it bypasses all
DBMS access control, and it will not be included any of the DBMS log files. Furthermore,
one can assume that the SA would have the ability to suspend any logging mechanism in
the server OS. Although changes to a file will also be recorded in the file system journal, the
SA has the ability to turn off journaling to the file system by using tune2fs on Unix or the
FSCTL DELETE USN JOURNAL control code on NTFS (Windows). However, the file
system must be shutdown first in order to prevent possible corruption. Therefore, the SA
may have to effect a shutdown of the DBMS before making changes to the database files.
The shutting down and restarting of the database instance and the system will generate
events that are logged; however, as mentioned earlier, the SA can turn off system logging
easily. Moreover, the SA could revise the DBMS log in order to hide evidence of the
shutdown and restart. Hence, it would be somewhat involved but not difficult for a SA to
cover his/her tracks when tampering with a DBMS file.
8.4 File Tampering
The threats to data we consider in this chapter occur at the OS level outside of DBMS
control. In this section, we formulate the threat and introduce concepts and categories of
tampering.
A DBMS allows users and administrators to access and modify data through an API.
Access control guarantees that users will be limited to data they are privileged to access.
In this section, we discuss how an adversary can perform file tampering. To limit the
scope of this chapter, we assume that file tampering involves user data and not metadata
(changing metadata can easily damage the DBMS but that will not alter any of its records).
124
We define user data as records created by the user or copies of record values that may
reside in auxiliary structures (e.g., indexes). File tampering actions that we discuss in this
section ultimately produce one of two results in storage: 1) Extraneous data is a record
or a value that has been added through file tampering or 2) Erased data is a record that
has been explicitly overwritten (rather than marked deleted by a command as described in
Chapter 3).
Three things must be considered when performing database file tampering: 1) page
checksum, 2) write lock on files, and 3) dirty pages. In Chapter 2, we discussed the func-
tionality and placing of the page checksum. Figure 8.2 shows three different page alter-
ations, in all of which the checksum is (also) updated. Some DBMS processes hold write
locks on the database files. Therefore, tampering would require that the attacker release or
otherwise bypass OS file write locks. DBMSes do not immediately write pages back to disk
after they are modified in the buffer cache. That is significant because a maliciously altered
page on disk can be overwritten when a dirty page is flushed to disk – or, alternatively, a
dirty page could be altered directly in RAM instead (bypassing file locks that way).
Write-Locks The file locking system API, through the fcntl system call in Unix, is set
up so that a process can prevent writes to (as well as reads from) a file that it has locked
successfully. An attacker can potentially cause the process holding the lock, in this case
the DBMS, to release the lock. Otherwise, a sophisticated attacker with root privileges can
release the lock without involvement of the process by using kernel code. Once the lock
is released, the attacker would lock the file, tamper with its content, and then release the
lock. The DBMS would not receive any signal or other indication of the tampering and
could continue to use the file as if it were locked after the attacker releases the lock. While
the attacker holds the lock, however, DBMS access to the file would be suspended. In
order to prevent the DBMS from discovering this condition, the attacker could suspend the
DBMS process temporarily until the tampering has been completed. An attacker with root
privileges could also mark memory used by the DBMS as shared and tamper directly with
memory.
Data Encryption Different levels of encryption can be employed to protect database
files, but they can ultimately be bypassed by an adversary with SA privileges. It is rea-
sonable to assume that the SA would have the ability to decrypt any data that has been
encrypted at the OS level. The SA would most likely not have the privileges to decrypt
any internal database encryption. However, individual (value or record based encryption)
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is still subject to tampering since the metadata describing the encrypted values is still read-
able. Furthermore, column-level encryption values are decrypted when they are read into
memory making it possible to map the decrypted values in memory back to the encrypted
values in persistent storage.
8.4.1 Value Modification
The first category of file tampering action we consider is value modification. Value mod-
ification is logically similar to a SQL UPDATE command; this type of tampering results in
extraneous data. Storage space and value encoding (see Chapter 3) are the main consider-
ations when modifying a value.
If a modified value requires the same storage space as the original entry, no metadata
needs to be updated. If the newly modified value requires less storage than the original,
then metadata needs to be modified, and other values in the record may need to be shifted.
For example, many DBMSes explicitly store string sizes on page – e.g., changing ‘Hank’
to ‘Gus’ requires metadata value with the size of the string to be changed from 4 to 3.
Furthermore, if the modified value is not the last column in the record, all other columns
must be shifted by one byte. Only the columns in the modified record need to be shifted;
other records in the page can remain as-is, leaving a gap (1 byte in our example). Shifting
all other records in the page to close the gap would require all of the corresponding row
directory addresses and relevant index pointers to be updated. If a value is modified to a
value that requires more storage space, the old version of the record must be erased and the
new version of the record must be appended to the table. These operations are discussed in
the remainder of this section. Shifting the following records to accommodate a large value
modification is not practical – unless the modified value happens to be in the last record on
the page (and there is free space at the end of the page).
Figure 8.2.2 shows an example of a value changed to a smaller size. Since ‘Andy’ is
one byte smaller than ‘Alice’, the column size must be changed from 5 to 4. Furthermore,
the name is not the last column so next column (‘Austin’) is shifted by one byte, which
overwrites the ‘e’ at the end of ‘Alice’ and leaves an unused ‘n’ character from ‘Austin’.
8.4.2 Record Addition
The next file tampering action we consider is new record addition, which is logically similar
to a SQL INSERT command. This type of file tampering results in extraneous data generated
within the DBMS. When adding a record to a file, metadata in the row data, row directory,
and page header must be considered along with the correct value encodings.
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Figure 8.2: Database file tampering examples.
When a record is appended to an existing page, the structure of the record must match
the proper active record structure for that DBMS. Section 5.4 discusses metadata that a
DBMS uses to store records. For the DBMS to recognize a newly added record, a pointer
must be appended to the page row directory. Finally, the free space pointer must be updated
and the active record count (if used by the DBMS in question) must be incremented.
Figure 8.2.3 shows an example of the record (‘Carl’, ‘Chicago’) added to the page.
Along with the values themselves, additional metadata is included in the row data. The
size of each column, 4 and 7 bytes, is included, the column count, 2, and the row delimiter,
44. Next, a pointer, 8050, is added to the row directory, and the record count is updated to
3. Finally, the free space address is updated since the record was added to free space of the
page.
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Figure 8.3: Architecture of the DBStorageAuditor.
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8.4.3 Record Wiping
The final tampering action category we discuss is record wiping. Record wiping is logically
similar to a SQL DELETE command, except that it fully erases the record. A proper SQL
DELETE command will merely mark a record as deleted; record wiping explicitly overwrites
the record to destroy the data, even from a forensic recovery tool. Record wiping erases
data with no forensic trace as there is no indication that a record existed in a place where it
was overwritten. Wiping a record from a file is essentially the reverse operation of adding
a record to a file: the metadata in the row data, row directory, and page header must all be
altered.
When a record is overwritten in a page, the entire record (including the metadata) is
overwritten with the NULL ASCII character (a decimal value of 0). Next, the row directory
pointer must also be overwritten in the same way. Finally, the free space pointer must be
updated and the active record count (if used by the DBMS) must be decremented.
Figure 8.2.4 shows an example of the record (‘Alice’, ‘Austin’) erased from the page.
Every byte used for the values and their metadata (column sizes, column count, and row
delimiter) is overwritten with the decimal value 0. The row directory address for that row
is erased and the row directory is defragmented. Finally, the record count is updated to 1.
Record Removal Rather than explicitly overwriting a record, the record metadata could
also be marked to mimic a SQL DELETE. We define such changes as a record removal
(versus record wiping). We do not address record removal in this chapter because such
unlogged action can be detected by our previous work in [85] by comparing and flagging
inconsistencies between DBMS storage forensic artifacts and the audit logs.
8.5 Approach Overview
Our goal in this chapter is to eliminate a major security vulnerability stemming from file
tampering; our solution is envisioned as a component of a comprehensive auditing sys-
tem that employs database forensics. We have previously built a tool that detects mali-
cious activity when database logging was disabled [85] by comparing forensic artifacts and
database logs. That approach relied on forensic artifacts left by SQL commands and as-
sumed no OS level file tampering. DBStorageAuditor finds inconsistencies that were
done by direct file modification. Future work, such as recovering a time line of events or
user attribution, would involve expanding upon the current components to the system.
The remainder of the chapter describes our system to detect database file tampering,
DBStorageAuditor, followed by an experimental evaluation in Section 8.10. Figure
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8.3 provides an overview of DBStorageAuditor, which consists of four components:
forensic extraction(A), index integrity verification(B), carved index sorting(C), and tam-
pering detection(D).
The forensic processing component is based on the forensic tool DBCarver [91] de-
scribed in Section 8.2. DBCarver retrieves from storage all table records (including
deleted records), record metadata, index value-pointer pairs, and several additional stor-
age artifacts. We discuss new functionality that was added to DBCarver for this chapter
in Section 8.6 (e.g., a page checksum extraction and comparison, a generalized approach
to pointer deconstruction for several RDBMSes).
We first verify the integrity of indexes (discussed in Section 8.7) because indexes are
used later to detect tampering of table data, so it is critical to verify index structure integrity.
To achieve that, we evaluate the B-Tree in storage, consider corrupt data that matches B-
Tree organization, and check for traces of an index rebuild (e.g., REORG, VACUUM –
depending on a DBMS).
We cannot assume that index artifacts can be fully stored in RAM while matching index
values to table records. Therefore, the carved index sorting component discussed in Sec-
tion 8.8 pre-processes index artifacts to make DBStorageAuditor approach scalable.
We approximately sort the index values based on their pointers which correspond to the
physical location of records in a file and improves the runtime the matching process.
Finally the tampering detection component discussed in Section 8.9 detects cases of
extraneous and erased data in storage. If a record and its artifacts can not be reconciled
with index value-point pairs, such entries are flagged and returned to the user as suspected
file tampering.
8.6 Forensic Analysis
Our proposed analysis relies on an expanded version of DBCarver (Chapter 3) to ex-
tract database storage artifacts that can not be queried using the DBMS. These artifacts
include record metadata, deleted records, and index value-pointer pairs. In this section, we
discuss the addition of a checksum comparison and generalized pointer deconstruction to
DBCarver.
8.6.1 Checksum Comparison
In Section 5.4, we defined the checksum stored in the page header. Whenever data or
metadata in a page is updated, either legitimately or through data tampering, the checksum
must be updated accordingly. If the checksum is incorrect, the DBMS will recognize the
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page as corrupt. This will result in warnings as well as data loss ranging from page to the
table or the entire database instance. Therefore, we can assert that if a checksum did not
change between time T1 (previous inspection) and T2 (current inspection), then the page
has not been modified and the records have not been exposed to tampering.
We implemented a dictionary of checksums taken from the DBMS pages that are to be
evaluated by DBCarver (it is possible to inspect any subset of the DBMS for tampering
signs – focusing only on data-sensitive tables). Our dictionary stores the checksum values,
where the object identifier and page identifier (Section 5.4) were the key and the checksum
was the value. The checksum dictionary should be stored off-site so it is not at risk of
tampering.
If the checksum has changed for a given page, the entire page must be inspected and
validated by DBCarver. If the checksum did not change for a page, only page metadata
was necessary to reconstruct. The metadata is needed to avoid false-positives in Algo-
rithm 2. Some DBMSes (e.g., Oracle, MySQL) allow the page checksum to be disabled. If
the checksum is disabled or believed to have been disabled at some point, then a checksum
comparison is unreliable and all data must be carved and inspected.
8.6.2 Index Carving and Pointer Deconstruction
DBStorageAuditor uses index value-pointer pairs to identify inconsistencies in DBMS
storage. Therefore, the value-pointer pairs must be inspected. DBMSes do not allow in-
dexes to be queried directly (i.e., indexes can not appear in the FROM clause) which is why
we use DBCarver to retrieve index contents. However, the pointer parsing by DBCarver
was limited and specific to each DBMS; we developed a generalized approach to pointer
deconstruction allowing DBStorageAuditor to be compatible with any investigated
RDBMS.
We performed an analysis of pointers for 7 commonly used RDBMSes. Table 8.1 lists
these RDBMSes and summarizes our conclusions. We found that all of these DBMSes,
except for MySQL, stored a PageID and a Slot#. By default, MySQL creates an indexed
organized table (IOT) so the pointer deconstruction process is slightly different. We address
index pointers for IOTs later in this section. The PageID refers to page identifier that is
stored in table page header (Section 5.4). The Slot# refers to a records position within a
page. SQLServer and Oracle both store a FileID, which refers to file in which the page
is located. The DBMSes that do not include a FileID in the pointer, use a file-per-object
storage architecture (i.e., each table and index are stored in different files). The FileID for
these pointers is the ObjectID or it can be mapped back to the ObjectID if the object name
is the file name. Thus, an index pointer can be deconstructed into a FileID, PageID, and
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Slot# to map a value back to a table record location. Index pointers are typically the same
as the internal DBMS row identifier pseudo-column.
DBMS Version FileID PageID Slot#
SQLServer Yes Yes Yes
Oracle Yes Yes Yes
ApacheDerby No Yes Yes
PostgreSQL No Yes Yes
Firebird No Yes Yes
DB2 No Yes Yes
MySQL No Yes* No
*The pointer references the second level of an IOT.
Table 8.1: Pointer Deconstruction.
Figure 8.4 demonstrates how index values are mapped back to the table records through
our generalized pointer deconstruction. For each index value(A), the pointer stores a
PageID(B) and Slot#(C). The pointer PageID(B) corresponds to the page identifier(D) in
the table page header. The pointer Slot#(C) corresponds to the row directory address(E)
in the table page. For example, the pointer for ‘Austin’ stores PageID = 8 and Slot# = 12.
To find the record, the table page with identifier = 8 is found and the 12th row directory
address is used to locate the record (68, ‘Alice’, ‘Austin’) within the page.
Index Organized Tables While MySQL was the only evaluated DBMS that created IOTs
by default, IOTs are commonly used in other DBMSes under different names (e.g., IOT in
Oracle, Included Columns in SQL Server) so we incorporated their pointer deconstruction.
The pointer for a secondary index built on an IOT is made of a PageID that references a
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page one level above the IOT B-Tree leaf page, and the primary key value. The PageID
for the IOT leaf page can then be retrieved from the pointer stored in the second level
of the B-Tree. After performing this additional IOT B-Tree access, we can associate every
secondary index value with a PageID and a primary key value, where the PageID references
an IOT leaf page and the primary key value replaces the Slot#. Figure 8.5 illustrates how
a secondary index value can be mapped back to an IOT record. We have the same index
on City and the same records from Figure 8.4. However, the records are now stored in an
IOT, and we now have a B-Tree page one level above the IOT leaf pages. The City index
values(A) now store the PageID for IOT B-Tree page(B) and the primary key values(C) as
the pointer. The IOT B-Tree page stores primary key values(F) and leaf PageIDs(G) as the
pointer. For example, the pointer for ‘Austin’ stores PageID 20 and the primary key 68.
This directs us to the IOT B-Tree page with PageID 20 and the value-pointer pair (57,
8). The IOT B-Tree pointer tells us ‘Austin’ is in the leaf page with PageID 8 and the
primary key value 68.
City Index  Page
Chicago
Detroit
Boston
Austin
Page 
Header
&
Row
Directory
Free
Space
Index
Values
20 68
8
57
1
A
B C
IOT B-Tree Page
Row
Directory
Free
Space
Index
Values
IOT Leaf Pages
Addr 1
Addr 8
1
Addr 2
Free
Space
Alice
Austin
Bob
Boston
Carl
Chicago
Dan
Detroit
Record 1
Records 3-7
Addrs 3-7
Records 2-11
Free
Space
Addr 12
Addrs 2-11
Addr 1
82-7D
E
57
68
1
8
20
57
1
9
1
2
8
…
746
…
20
20
20
F G
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8.7 Verifying Index Integrity
It is plausible for an adversary to tamper with the relevant index values in an attempt to
conceal evidence of file tampering. In this section, we address several types of index tam-
pering, and how to detect such activity.
132
8.7.1 B-Tree Integrity Verification
If the attacker changes a value, adds a record, or wipes a record from a table, he may also
perform a complimentary operation in the index. For example, ‘Dan’ was changed to ‘Jane’
in a table record could also be similarly modified in the index leaf node.
Interestingly, this type of activity creates inconsistencies in the index B-Tree that do
not arise in the table. We consider the case where an index value is changed in-place and
the case where index value was erased (and possibly reinserted into the correct position in
the B-Tree). If the index value was changed in-place, it would appear out-of-order in the
leaf of the B-Tree. If the index value was erased, it creates an uncharacteristic blank space
between values within the leaf page, which never occurs naturally.
8.7.2 The Neighboring Value Problem
An index value may sometimes be altered without violating the correct ordering of the
B-Tree. For example, in Figure 8.6 ‘Dan’ is changed to ‘Dog’ preserving a correct value
ordering of the Name index. This example shows how a table and an index can be altered
without producing an inconsistency.
We build a function-based index that stores the hash value of column(s) to thwart tam-
pering that involves neighboring range values. The values in hash-index will have a dif-
ferent ordering than the values in the secondary index so a neighboring value can occur in
one, but not both. Figure 8.6 shows an example of how a hash index can be used to detect
index tampering the involves neighboring values. In both the table and the Name index,
the value was changed to ‘Dog.’ Changing the value in the Name index preserved the cor-
rect ordering. However, changing the value in the hash-index would result in an incorrect
ordering since the values are organized differently. Function-based indexes are supported
by many major DBMSes (e.g., IBM DB2, Oracle, and PostgreSQL); a computed column
can be used for DBMSes that do not support function-based indexes (e.g., MySQL and
Microsoft SQL Server).
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Figure 8.6: Preventing the neighboring value problem.
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8.7.3 SQL Index Rebuild
Although we assume that the attacker does not have privileges to rebuild an index through
SQL, the index may nevertheless be rebuilt as part of routine maintenance. If an index is
rebuilt post tampering, the reconstruction of the index will eliminate any inconsistencies
(extraneous or erased data) between the table and the index because indexes will be built
anew using the current table state. However, when an object is rebuilt, a new object is
created and artifacts (discarded pages) from the old object are left behind in storage. Many
of the pages from the old index are likely to be overwritten, but some pages are going to
persist in storage following the rebuild [87].
Pages left behind from an index rebuild can serve as separate evidence to detect tam-
pering. The old index version (or the parts recovered) can be treated as a separate index
(It−1) from the newly rebuilt version (It). While the old index version does not contain a
complete set of values due to having been partially overwritten, it can still be used to detect
tampering. This would be applicable when auditing is not performed at regular intervals
relative to the frequency of index rebuilds.
8.7.4 Manual Index Rebuild
In order to deceive DBStorageAuditor, an attacker would have to completely rewrite
the entire index (or at least several different pages in it). While such operation is possible,
performing it successfully poses several major challenges. We emphasize that typical se-
curity solutions are designed to greatly increase the level of difficulty to perform an attack,
rather than create an absolute defense.
Section 8.4 discussed cached dirty page problem when physically modifying a page.
Moreover, dirty index pages can introduce additional complications. First, a given index
page is more likely to have a dirty version cached compared to a table page. An index
page is not only modified when the indexed column is updated, but the index pointer must
also be updated if an update causes a record to be written to a new location. Furthermore,
index pages store significantly more values than table pages, increasing their chance to be
modified. Second, as the index changes, the database may reorganize the B-Tree structure
(e.g., page split). As parts of the index are rebuilt, pages are likely to be written to new
locations in a file. We note that the physical order of a B-Tree does not reflect the logical
order of the B-Tree. Third, the attacker may have to discover the physical location of
other connected index pages (i.e., just finding the page with needed value is insufficient,
several parts of the B-Tree would need to reconstructed). Index leaf pages point to the next
logical page in the B-Tree and sometimes to the previous page as well. This means that if a
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logically adjacent page is rebuilt and written to a new location, then a modified index page
would need to reflect that change. Therefore, the attacker would need to be aware of all
internal B-Tree structure changes to guarantee a successful manual index rebuild. Finally,
if a function-based index storing a hash value exists, we assume that an SA would not have
knowledge of this function. Therefore, inconsistencies would still arise in any attempts to
manually rewrite the index.
8.8 Index Sorting
When tables and indexes are carved, the data is extracted based on the physical location
within the files. Therefore, the relationship between the ordering of the carved table records
compared to the index values is random, with a possible exception of a clustered index (it is
common for a clustered index to be manually updated, such as PostgreSQL with VACUUM
command). Assuming that the index can not be fully loaded into into RAM, expensive
random seeks must be performed to map index values to table records. In this section we
propose a method to reorder the index to make the process of matching index values and
table records scalable.
As demonstrated in Section 8.6, index pointers correspond to the physical position of
the table records. Therefore, sorting the index values by the pointers produces the same
ordering for index values and table records. Carved table records and index values are then
read sequentially, similar to a merge join process.
For an index that is too large to fit into memory, sorting the index pointers can be a
costly operation. If we assume that N table pages will be read into memory when detecting
table tampering (Section 8.9), then index values need to be sorted across every N pages,
but values do not need to be sorted within N pages. We call each set of index values that
belong in N table pages a bucket. We perform approximate sorting by re-ordering index
values across buckets but not within buckets.
For each index bucket, we record the minimum and maximum table page identifier. If an
index value is in the range of page identifiers for a bucket, the page identifier, slot number,
and index value are stored in that bucket. When table pages are read for table tampering
detection, the relevant bucket(s) are read into memory using the table page identifier and
the index bucket minimum and maximum values.
Figure 8.7 shows an example of an index that is approximately sorted on the pointer.
For each value in the index, there is a pointer that contains a PageID and a Slot#. We
first create a set of buckets where each bucket contains 1000 PageIDs. We read the carved
index data, and assign a value to the appropriate bucket using the pointer. For example, the
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first and second index values ‘Alex’ and ‘Bob’ belong in bucket #2 because their PageIDs,
2000 and 1002 are between the minimum and maximum PageID range for the bucket. We
then store the PageID, Slot#, and Value in the bucket. ‘Carl’ has a PageID 5 so that value
belongs in bucket #1. Bucket #2 demonstrates that PageIDs do not need to be sorted within
the bucket. Furthermore, we see that PageID 2000 in bucket #2 has two values. This can
occur as a result of legitimate SQL operations that create stale index values.
Carved Index
2000 1
PageID Slot#
1002 2
5 33
4400 12
3050 20
1001 1
1
1
2
1002
1001
2000
PointerValue
Alex
Bob
Carl
Dan
Sam
Kate
Pat
Joe
Jane
Bucket
#
1
2
PageID
Min/Max
1 - 1000
1001 - 2000
PageID
Slot
#
Value
3 2001 - 3000
4 3001 - 4000
5 4001 - 5000
1001
1002
2000
1
2
Joe
Pat
1
2
Kate
Bob
1
Alex
Sam
5 33 Carl
4400 12 Dan
3050 20 Jane
None
Approximately Sorted Index
Figure 8.7: An approximately sorted index example.
Our current implementation does not use the FileID even when it is stored in the
pointer. We assume that each table is stored in a single file, and that the user has directed
DBStorageAuditor to the relevant table and index files. DBMS-specific system tables
would allow us to connect FileID to the information on target table and index files.
Index Organized Tables Approximately sorting secondary indexes for index organized
tables (IOT) is a slightly different process. When an IOT is used, the secondary index
pointer is made up of a PageID that references a second level B-Tree page and the primary
key value instead of a PageID that references the table and a Slot#. To sort the secondary
index values, the second level BTree pages from the primary key is used to retrieve the
table PageIDs for each value. Furthermore, the primary key value is now used in place of
the Slot#.
The cost of approximate sorting is dependent on the amount of available memory. A
bucket must fit into memory. Fewer buckets results in quicker bucket assignment for values,
but buckets will be larger requiring more memory. In Section 8.10.2 we provide costs of
approximately sorting an index.
8.9 Detecting Table Tampering
In Section 8.4 we discussed how database files, specifically tables, are vulnerable to tam-
pering. We propose using the validated indexes (Section 8.7) to verify the integrity of table
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records in storage. Earlier in this chapter, we classified data tampering that involves chang-
ing a value or adding records as extraneous data, and we classified data tampering that
involves wiping records as erased data. In this section we present and discuss algorithms
to detect both extraneous and erased data.
8.9.1 Extraneous Data Detection
Extraneous data is a record or a value that has been added to a table through file tampering.
Since extraneous data is not added using the DBMS, it is not reflected in the indexes.
Therefore, if a record does not have any corresponding index pointer, then the entire record
is suspected of having been added through file tampering. Any table with a primary key can
be tested because an index is automatically created for a primary key constraint. Similarly,
if a table value does not match an index value with the corresponding pointer, then the
value is assumed to have been modified through file tampering. This validation test does
require that an index exist on the column(s). We use the carved data from Section 8.6
and an approximately sorted index (Section 8.8) that was not been subject to tampering
(Section 8.7).
Algorithm 6 describes how to detect extraneous data. First, we read N table pages at a
time for evaluation; we then scan the approximately sorted index buckets for the relevant
table page identifiers and read the index pages from the relevant bucket(s). For every record
in the N table pages, we find the corresponding index pointer. If an index pointer does not
exist, this record is added to a list of likely extraneous data. If an index pointer does exist
for a record, the indexed column is compared to the index value(s) for that pointer (there
may be more than one index value per pointer for legitimate reasons). If the table value is
not in the set of index values, then this value is added to a list of likely extraneous data.
This is evidence of a value that has been changed. After all table pages have been read and
all records evaluated, the resulting extraneous data list is returned to the user.
8.9.2 Erased Data Detection
Erased data is data explicitly wiped from table storage through file tampering. Deleted
records are likely to be overwritten by new records over time as the DBMS runs. However,
a deleted record will never be overwritten by something that is not another record of the
same structure. Therefore, if an index value points to an area in storage that does not
contain a proper record (including metadata), then record wiping is suspected. We are not
concerned with matching the specific index value since this is done in Algorithm 6, but
rather that a pointer must reference an area in storage that resembles a record.
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Algorithm 6 Extraneous Data Detection
1: Table← carved table data: PageIDs, Slot #s, and Records.
2: N ← the number of table pages to be read.
3: SortedIndex← the approximately sorted index (Section 8.8).
4: Flag ← an empty list to store extraneous data.
5: for each NPages ∈ Table do
6: MinPID ← the minimum page ID from NPages.
7: MaxPID ← the maximum page ID from NPages.
8: Indexes← an empty list to store index pages.
9: for each Bucket ∈ SortedIndex do
10: if (MinPID ∈ Bucket) ∨ (MaxPID ∈ Bucket) ∨ (MinPID < Bucket ∧
MaxPID > Bucket) then
11: Indexes.append(Bucket)
12: for each Rec ∈ NPages do
13: RecPtr ← Rec.PageID.Slot#
14: if RecPtr ∈ Indexes.PageID.Slot# then
15: if Rec.V al /∈ Indexes.PageID.Slot#.V als then
16: Flag.append([′ModV al′, RecP tr, Rec, V al])
17: else
18: Flag.append([′HiddenRecord′, RecP tr, Rec])
19: return Flag
Algorithm 7 describes how to detect erased data. First, we read each bucket from the
approximately sorted index. When a bucket is read, the table pages with the relevant page
identifiers are also read. We iterate through each index value in the bucket. If the pointer
for an index value does not match any record in the table pages, then the index value is
appended to a list of erased data. After all index buckets have been evaluated, the list of
erased data is returned to the user.
Adjacent Deleted Records It is possible that multiple deleted records can exist adjacent
to one another in a page. When this happens it is also possible the a single record could
overwrite all of one record and part of another. For example, (1, ‘Ed’) and (2, ‘Tom’) are
deleted records that are next to each other in storage. The inserted record (3, ‘Karen’) could
overwrite all of (1, ‘Ed’) and part of (2, ‘Tom’). This presents a problem because any old
index value for (2, ‘Tom’) would now point to the middle of the inserted record, rather
than to a full record. In this scenario, Algorithm 7 would return a false-positive for the
index value from (2, ‘Tom’). These false-positives can be eliminated by comparing these
results to audit log entries. For example, if a delete command in the log could explain (2,
‘Tom’), then this could be declared as not malicious. This functionality is not currently
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Algorithm 7 Erased Data Detection
1: Table← carved table data: PageIDs, Slot #s, and Records.
2: SortedIndex← the approximately sorted index (Section 8.8).
3: Flag ← an empty list to store erased data.
4: for each Bucket ∈ SortedIndex do
5: NPages← pages from Table where PageID ∈ Bucket
6: for each IndexV alue ∈ Bucket do
7: Ptr ← IndexV alue.PageID.Slot#
8: if Ptr /∈ NPages then
9: V alue← the index value
10: Flag.append([′ErasedRecord′, P tr, V alue])
11: return Flag
supported by DBStorageAuditor, and it would be explored in future work to achieve
a more complete auditing system.
8.10 Experiments
In this section, we present a set of experiments that evaluate the performance, accuracy,
and limitations of DBStorageAuditor. Table 8.2 summarizes the experiments in this
section.
#1 Forensic analysis (Sec 8.6) cost evaluation. DB files were carved at a rate of 1.2
MB/s. A checksum comparison can improve carving costs.
#2 Approximate sorting (Sec 8.8) cost evaluation. Fewer buckets improves runtime,
but requires more memory.
#3 Algms 6 and 2 (Sec 8.9) cost evaluation. Both algorithms increase linearly with
table size.
#4 DBStorageAuditor detection evaluation. Algm 6 detects an added record,
Algm 6 detects a modified value only for an indexed column, and Algm 2 recon-
structs erased data that was indexed.
#5 DBStorageAuditor detection limitations after an index rebuild (Sec 8.7).
DBStorageAuditor can use the old version of an index depending on the
DBMS.
Table 8.2: Summary of experiments.
MySQL 5.7, PostgreSQL 9.6, and Oracle 11g R2 DBMSes were used in these exper-
iments. We believe these three RDBMSes are a good representative selection from the
commonly used RDBMSes. Not only are they widely used commercial and open-source
DBMSes, but they also represent the spectrum of different storage decisions across about
ten DBMSes we have studied. For example, PostgreSQL does not support IOTs, Oracle
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offers an option to create IOTs, and MySQL automatically uses IOTs. The default page
sizes for each DBMS were used: 8K for Oracle and PostgreSQL and 16K for MySQL.
Data from the Star Schema Benchmark (SSBM) [59] was used to populate our DBMS in-
stances. Table 8.3 can be used to reference table sizes used throughout this section. DBMS
instances ran on servers with an Intel X3470 2.93 GHz processor and 8GB of RAM running
Windows Server 2008 R2 Enterprise SP1 or CentOS 6.5.
Table Scale DB File Size(MB) Values(M)
Lineorder 1 600 6
Lineorder 4 2400 24
Lineorder 14 8300 84
Supplier 1 <1 2K
Table 8.3: SSBM table sizes used through the experiments.
The different DBMS storage-altering operations that we are seeking to detect are dis-
cussed in Section 8.9. When modifying files, we re-calculated and updated the page check-
sum value for the PostgreSQL pages; in MySQL and Oracle we disabled the page checksum
validation. Before modifying files, we first shutdown the DBMS instance.
8.10.1 Forensic Processing
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the computational cost associated with
the forensic processing component of DBStorageAuditor discussed in Section 8.6.
In Part-A, we provide DBCarver runtimes against database files of various sizes from
MySQL, Oracle, and PostgreSQL DBMSes. In Part-B, we repeat the same evaluation,
further including a checksum re-computation.
Part-A We created a series of database files for each DBMS to pass to DBCarver. We
created three LINEORDER tables: Scale 1, 4, and 14. Each table was stored in a separate
file. The PostgreSQL files were carved at an average rate of 1.0 MB/s, the MySQL files
were carved at a rate of 1.2 MB/s, and the Oracle files were carved at a rate of 1.5 MB/s.
Part-B We used the PostgreSQL LINEORDER Scale 4 table from Part-A to evaluate
the checksum comparison we added to DBCarver. We modified pages that induced a
checksum change for 1%, 5%, 10%, and 100% of the pages in the database file. The
carving rate for each percent modification was 100%→ 1MB/s, 10%→ 9 MB/s, 5%→ 18
MB/s, and 1%→ 58 MB/s. The cost of forensic pre-processing is thus proportional to the
number of modified pages rather than the total size of the DBMS storage.
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8.10.2 Index Sorting
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the costs associated with approximately
sorting the index values on the pointers. The output produced by the forensic analysis
is similar for all DBMSes so this component of DBStorageAuditor is not tested for
DBMS-specific features. In Part-A, we vary the size of bucket; in Part-B, we vary the size
of the indexes.
Part-A To evaluate approximate sorting with respect to bucket size, we used the carved
output from PostgreSQL database files containing a LINEORDER Scale 4 table, a sec-
ondary index on LO Revenue, and a secondary index on LO Orderdate. Table 8.4
summarizes the performance results. As the number buckets decreases the time to sort the
data decreases. However, a bucket must fit into memory, so increasing of bucket sizes is
limited by available RAM.
Bucket Size (Pages) Bucket Count Orderdate (sec) Revenue (sec)
5,000 63 1366 1380
10,000 32 1121 1131
50,000 7 932 945
100,000 4 909 926
200,000 2 903 918
Table 8.4: Index sorting costs with varying bucket sizes.
Part-B To evaluate approximate sorting with respect to the size of an index, we used the
carved output from PostgreSQL database files containing LINEORDER Scale 1, 4, and 14
tables and a secondary index on LO Revenue for each table. Table 8.5 summarizes the
results. If the bucket size is increased proportionally for the table size, the approximate
sorting cost increases linearly.
Bucket Size Index sorting time (sec)
(Pages) Scale 1 Scale 4 Scale 14
10,000 239 1131 6193
50,000 231 945 3797
100,000 n/a* 926 3486
200,000 n/a* 918 3357
*Bucket size is larger than the table.
Table 8.5: Approximate sorting costs for varying table sizes.
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8.10.3 Tampering Detection Costs
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the costs associated with of Algorithms 6
and 2. For this experiment we used the LINEORDER Scale 4 table. We used one index on
the LO Revenue and multiple indexes on the LO Revenue and LO Orderdate. We
approximately sorted the index using buckets with 50K pages.
Part-A: Algorithm 6 To evaluate the costs associated with Algorithm 6, we used the
output from two different secondary indexes (LO Revenue and LO Orderdate) on
LINEORDER Scale 4 and one secondary index (LO Revenue) on LINEORDER Scale
14. Table 8.6 summarizes the runtime results. The runtime for Algorithm 6 was the same
for LO Revenue and LO Orderdate on LINEORDER Scale 4, and the cost increased
linearly for LO Revenue on LINEORDER Scale 14.
Table Index Part-A (sec) Part-B (sec)
Scale 4 LO Revenue 966 503
Scale 4 LO Orderdate 961 476
Scale 14 LO Revenue 3482 1773
Table 8.6: Algorithm 6 and 2 runtimes.
Part-B: Algorithm 2 We used the same tables in indexes from Part-A of this experi-
ment to evaluate the costs associated with Algorithm 2. Table 8.6 summarizes the run-
time results. Similar to Algorithm 6, the cost for Algorithm 2 was nearly the same for
LO Revenue and LO Orderdate on LINEORDER Scale 4, and the cost increased lin-
early for LO Revenue on LINEORDER Scale 14.
8.10.4 Detection Capabilities
The objective of this experiment is to demonstrate the file tampering activity that
DBStorageAuditor is capable of detecting. For each part in this experiment, we sim-
ulate one defined type of malicious activity and explain how it was detected. We manually
add records to the database file (Part-A), change values in the database file (Part-B), and
erase records from the database file (Part-C). We present results only for PostgreSQL be-
cause we our results for Oracle and MySQL were very similar.
142
Setup We created a LINEORDER Scale 4 table for a PostgreSQL DBMS. An index ex-
isted on the primary key (LO Orderkey, LO Linenumber) and we created a sec-
ondary index for
LO Revenue and LO Orderdate.
We also created a function-based index on LO Revenue that used the 32-bit version
of the MurmurHash2 hash function.
Part-A We manually added 5 records (shown in Figure 8.8) to the file containing the
LINEORDER table. We added a record to five different pages (with PageIDs 11, 12, 13, 14,
and 15). Existing primary key values were included in each of the five records. For each
of these records, all of the data was the same as the existing records with the same primary
key except we used LO Suppkey -5 and LO Revenue -100000.
Primary Key LO_Revenue = -100000LO_Suppkey = -5
1
2
3
4
5
101|1|108733|7417     |  -5 |19960319|‘3-MEDIUM’|0|49|
7352695|20527439|10|  -100000 |90033|0|19960529|‘AIR’
4001|1|38143|210370  |  -5 |19931228|‘1-URGENT’|0|26|
3328936|3362225|0     |  -100000 |76821|1|19940113|‘RAIL’
12001|1|2303|391486    |  -5 |19970718|‘4-NOT SPECI’|0|8|
1261976|17693973|1   |  -100000 |94648|1|19971011|‘SHIP’
100001|1|102599|383999| -5 |19941106|‘3-MEDIUM’|0|14|
2916172|2995491|4     |  -100000 |124978|7|19950117|‘SHIP’
200001|1|85157|130108  |  -5 |19960903|‘1-URGENT’|0|21|
2390010|2413431|1     |  -100000 |68286|2|19961005|‘REG AIR’
Figure 8.8: Records added to the LINEORDER file.
The addition of these five records produced several interesting outcomes. First, these
records bypassed the primary key constraint since they contained primary key values that
previously existed in the table. The DBMS only checks constraints when executing API-
based load commands, and it does not retroactively check the table for constraint violations.
Adding the record to the file bypasses all official channels and is thus never checked for
constraint violations. Second, these records also bypassed referential integrity since the
LINEORDER table references the SUPPLIER table, and LO Suppkey -5 did not exist in
the SUPPLIER. Similar to the primary key violation, the constraint violation was never
caught by the DBMS. Finally, table access for the same query could produce different re-
sults because the indexes were not updated after we added these five records. For example,
the two versions of the following query returns different results:
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• Query 1→ 34600180980
SELECT SUM(LO_Revenue) FROM Lineorder
WHERE LO_Orderdate = 19960319;
• Query 2→ 34600180980 - 100000
set enable_seqscan=true;
SELECT SUM(LO_Revenue) FROM Lineorder
WHERE LO_Orderdate = 19960319;
Query 1 uses the LO Orderdate index to access the table while Query 2 uses a full
table scan. Record #1 from Figure 8.8 was included in Query 2, but it was not included in
Query 1.
Algorithm 6 successfully detected the fact that five new records do not have correspond-
ing pointers in the primary key index, the two secondary indexes, and in the function-based
index. Problem was flagged by a False value for the line 14 If condition resulting in
the malicious records being added to the list of invalid data at line 18. Each existing index
serves as an additional validation to detect table tampering – and the function-based makes
sure that small incremental changes are not possible.
Part-B Next, we changed LO Revenue for all 41 records where the LO Custkey 4321
and LO Orderdate between 19930101 and 19931231. To simulate a neighboring value
problem (a small change that does not violate index ordering), we changed the record
with LO Custkey 4321 and LO Revenue 3271986 to 3271987 in both the table and
the LO Revenue index. For all other records we subtracted 100000 from LO Revenue
in the table.
Algorithm 6 reported that 40 records had an inconsistent value based on the
LO Revenue index and 41 records had an inconsistent value based on the function-based
index on LO Revenue. The difference of the one additional record was due to the neigh-
boring value attack which regular index may fail to detect. These values were detected
by a False value for the line 15 If condition resulting in the malicious values being
added to the list of invalid data at line 16. We can conclude that the primary key and
LO Orderdate columns were not tampered with for these and all records since they
were not included in the invalid data. However, we can not make any conclusion if any
other of the non-indexed columns for these or any records were tampered.
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Part-C Next, we erased all 3085 records with the LO Suppkey 123 from the file. For
data erasure, we explicitly overwrote the records and their metadata with the NULL ASCII
character.
Algorithm 2 returned the primary key index, the the function-based index, and two sec-
ondary indexes values. Each had 3085 values that did not point to a valid record structure.
These were detected by a True value for the line 8 condition in Algorithm 2, resulting in
malicious data being added to the list of invalid data at line 10. By combining the values
for each pointer we reconstructed partial records containing the index columns to explain
the missing data. However, the data for the non-indexed columns was unable to be recon-
structed since it was not indexed.
8.10.5 Long-Term Detection
The objective of this experiment is to evaluate the artifacts produced by an index rebuild
that can used by DBStorageAuditor. We evaluate a different DBMS for each part of
this experiment: Oracle in Part-A, MySQL in Part-B, and PostgreSQL in Part-C.
We performed the following steps for each DBMS. After each step, we copied the
database file for analysis. Table 8.7 summarizes the results.
• T0: Started with the Supplier Scale1 (2K records) table and a secondary index on
S Name.
• T1: Erased/wiped all 829 records where S Region equaled ‘ASIA’ or ‘EUROPE’.
• T2: Rebuilt the index. Each DBMS used a different index rebuild command:
– Oracle: ALTER INDEX Supp_Name REBUILD ONLINE
– MySQL: DROP and CREATE commands
– PSQL: REINDEX TABLE Supplier
DBMS T0(pgs) T1 T2
Oracle 1 root, 9 leaf no change All index pages from the old in-
dex remained in DB storage.
MySQL 1 root, 5 leaf no change 2 leaf pages from the old index
remained in DB storage.
PSQL 1 root , 10 leaf no change None of the old index remained
in DB storage.
Table 8.7: Index rebuild summary.
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Part-A: Oracle The index contained 1 root page and 9 leaf pages after creation at T0.
No changes were made to the index after the table records were erased at T1. After the
index rebuild at T2, the new index contained 1 root page and 5 leaf pages. All of the
pages from the original version at T0 remained in the database file. The DBMS assigned
a new ObjectID to the new version of the index so index pages between versions were
easily distinguished. Since the entire version of index was found, it could be used by
DBStorageAuditor. The old version of the index still contained pointers to the erased
records, whereas the new version only contained pointers to active records in the table.
Part-B: MySQL The index contained 1 root page and 5 leaf pages after creation at T0.
No changes were made to the index after the table records were erased at T1. After the
index rebuild at T2, the new index contained 1 root page and 3 leaf pages. 2 out of the 5
leaf pages from the original index remained in database storage. This demonstrates that
the DBMS immediately reclaimed the pages from the dropped index. Since the new index
version used less storage space, 2 pages from the old version remained in the file. In this
scenario, a B-Tree could not be fully validated with only 2 leaf pages making them less
useful as evidence for DBStorageAuditor. It is likely that copies of the index could
be carved from a disk image due to activity such as writes that do not occur in place and
paging files. DBStorageAuditor does not currently reconstruct entire B-Tree indexes
from disk images. Future work will seek to reconstruct objects from disk images, which
requires multiple versions of pages to be considered.
Part-C: PostgreSQL The index contained 1 root page and 10 leaf pages after creation at
T0. No changes were made to the index after the table records were erased at T1. After the
index rebuild at T2, the new index contained 1 root page and 6 leaf pages. The new version
of the index was assigned a new ObjectID and a separate file. All pages belonging to the
old version of the index were disassociated with its file, and this storage was reclaimed
by the file system. In this scenario, DBStorageAuditor can no longer detect that the
records were erased. As discussed in Part-B, it is likely that the index could be carved from
a disk image. This will be explored in future work since a logical timeline would need to
be recreated to account for multiple page versions.
8.11 Conclusion
Database file tampering can be used to perform malicious operations while bypassing
database security mechanisms (logging and access control) and constraints. We presented
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and evaluated DBStorageAuditor component that detects database file tampering. Our
approach relies on a forensic inspection of database storage and identifies inconsistencies
between tables and indexes.
Future work plans to expand upon this chapter and work from [85] to create a com-
plete database auditing framework. This future work would include creating a timeline of
events and user attribution of storage artifacts. Our auditing framework relies on inherent
characteristics of database storage that users, including privileged users, are incapable of
controlling.
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Chapter 9
An Independent Analysis of Data
Organization
9.1 Introduction
Indexing is a primary technique in Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS)
to logically order data. Therefore, it is a key factor for scalable query processing. When
the underlying data is clustered in index order, query processing scales up. However, in
the absence of clustering a regular secondary index merely improves search performance
while potentially incurring random I/O for each page access. In the worst case for an
indexed query predicate on an unclustered index, a cost-based optimizer may resort to full
sequential table scan for query selectivity as low as 0.01 (1%).
It is well recognized that moving object or sensor data warehouses that continually in-
gest data, which requires clustered and unclustered indexes to support analytical workloads,
face query response time degradation due to indices becoming severely unclustered, i.e., in-
curring random I/O on each disk access. It is not uncommon for a database warehouse to
undertake a downtime to recluster the entire data and improve performance.
However, such slowdowns due to random disk I/O can be reduced if the database shares
some information of the physical location of attributes on a disk. We illustrate this reduction
through an example in Figure 9.1. Consider Table T in Figure 9.1 with attributes {ID,
Name}. The table is physically clustered on attribute {ID} into seven pages, i.e., the pages
are in sequential order on the disk. The table also records the physical location of each
row which is marked with an internal {RowID} column. Clustering this column on {ID}
will sort the attribute {ID} and physically cluster the sorted result. Note that in order to
minimize maintenance costs, the clustering on {ID} in Figure 9.1 example is not strict but
rather approximate. Consider a query that accesses values based on ID BETWEEN #1
and #6. The secondary index will look up the matching keys, reading a number of index
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 Row1: #1, Eric, … 
 Row2: #3, Jane, … 
 Row3: #2, Mark, … 
 Row4: #4, Ana, … 
 Row5: #6, John, … 
 Row6: #10, Jon, … 
 Row7: #7, Pat, … 
 Row8: #9, Liam, … 
 Row9: #8, Jack, … 
 Row10: #11, Rick, … 
 Row11: #14, May, … 
 Row12: #12, Pete, … 
 Row13: #17, Lear, … 
 Row14: #16, Jay, … 
 Row15: #15, Alex, … 
 Row19: #5, Tanu, … 
 Row20: #13, Hai, … 
 
  #1: Row1 
  #2: Row3 
  #3: Row2  
  #4: Row19 
  #5: Row4 
Secondary Index     
(native index is 
dense and 
expensive to 
maintain) 
 Row16: #22, Iyad, … 
 Row17: #19, Marc, … 
 Row18: #18, Sam, … 
  #6: Row5 
  #7: Row7 
  #8: Row9  
  #9: Row8 
 #10: Row6 
 #11: Row10 
 #12: Row12 
 #13: Row20  
 #14: Row11 
 #15: Row15 
 #16: Row14 
 #17: Row13 
 #18: Row18  
 #19: Row17 
 #22: Row16 
 
  Bucket1: Row1 
  Vals: [1 -- 10] 
  Bucket2: Row7 
  Vals: [7 -- 14] 
  Bucket3: Row13 
  Vals: [15 -- 22] 
  BktOvrflow: Row19 
  Vals: [5 -- 13] 
 
PLI Index 
(approximate, 
sparse & cheap 
to maintain) 
Index Organized Table         
(native index is dense, clustered 
and very expensive to maintain) 
 
Oracle IOT is 4X-6X times bigger 
compared to the original table 
  #1: Row1: #1, Eric, … 
  #2: Row2: #2, Mark, … 
Leaf 
Nodes 
 #9: Row9: #9, Liam, … 
#10: Row10: #10, Jon, … 
 #19: Row19: #19, Marc, … 
 #22: Row22: #22, Iyad, … 
 
The data is stored in 
BTree leaves  
(not in a table as above) 
Attribute-
based PLI 
(id) 
4 index 
records for 
20 rows 
 
  Bucket1: Row1 
  Vals: [0 -- 3] 
  Bucket2: Row7 
  Vals: [2 -- 5] 
  Bucket3: Row13 
  Vals: [4 -- 7] 
 Ovrflow: Row19 
  Vals: [1 -- 4] 
 
Expression-based 
PLI 
(
𝒊𝒅 −𝟏
𝟑
) 
Custom 
expression,  same 
4-bucket mapping 
Figure 9.1: Storage layout of PLI and native database indexes (secondary and index-
organized).
pages (intermediate levels) and two pages from leaf level of the index (incurring several
seeks before accessing the table itself). First three pointers (Row1, Row3, Row2) will
access the first page, which will be cached after the Row1 lookup. Fourth match (Row19)
will require a seek and a read of a seventh page at the end. Finally, fifth and sixth match will
correspond to pointers (Row4, Row5) causing yet another seek and reading of the second
page in the table. A more efficient access path would recognize that five out of six matched
values are in fact co-clustered in first two pages, with one outlier (#4) that resides in the
overflow page and avoid seeking back and forth.
The only way to take advantage of this seek reduction is by determining the level of
physical co-clustering within attribute {ID}, an information which is maximally available
through the RowID column of the table. Thus for instance, if the database was indexed on
RowID, with each range of RowID values consisting of six table rows, then such an index
will quickly determine the physical co-clustering and lead to two seeks instead of three
seeks. In general, the difference can be much larger. The sparse index on the right of table
T illustrates that fewer seeks are possible with physical clustering.
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To create an index based on physical location ordering of data rows, one must pre-
cisely determine the physical location, i.e., the values of the RowID column. While this
internal column maps the queryable tuple to the physical location on the disk, commercial
databases, due to physical-logical independence do not provide this information transpar-
ently. In fact, while the physical location of a row can be determined through a SQL query
(e.g., SELECT ROWID in Oracle) , given two physical locations, there is no SQL query
that determines if the two physical locations are strictly ordered on disk. Ordering a table
on the internal RowID attribute, and inserting the result into a new table will also not guar-
antee that the resulting table is strictly ordered. To obtain the precise physical locations of
the table rows in this chapter we use a forensic tool that can read most commercial database
storage files and output rows as they are physically ordered on disk for each table.
We describe a bucket based mechanism that exploits the approximate sorting inherent to
Table T in Figure 9.1. Instead of traditional index that maps one value to one storage loca-
tion (e.g., {ID}=3 to Row2 pointer) PLI utilizes range-of-values to range-of-addresses
mapping. In our example, there is no entry for {ID}=3 specifically; instead, there is
Bucket1 that represents a value range [1–10] (min and max for {ID}) which is mapped to
a storage location range (in our example, Bucket1 corresponds to a physical pointer range
of [Row1–Row6]). What Bucket1 tells us is that physical address range [Row1–Row6],
which corresponds to first two pages, contains only values between 1 and 10. The index
enables us to include (or exclude) this particular bucket without knowing the exact set of
values or their specific ordering within the bucket.
Bucket mapped index has significant advantages over a typical secondary index. First, it
provides the advantages inherent to a sparse index. That is, it requires one record per bucket
(instead of one record per row) and is easier to maintain and use for lookup. Furthermore,
bucket ranges defined in terms of RowID can be externally used in any database that ex-
poses RowID values. This approach can be effectively generalized to multiple databases
and attached to a live DBMS. Second, the value range associated with each bucket makes
it easy to build expression-based variations of the same structure. For example, in Fig-
ure 9.1 we have a second PLI structure constructed on ID−1
3
rather than ID. The only
change that such structure requires is re-mapping the value ranges (e.g., Bucket1 [1–10]
becomes Bucket1 [0–3]) and the new PLI can be used on matching expression. This is far
easier for order-preserving functions and we plan to explore other mappings and effects of
inter-column correlation.
Our experiments show that a live database can be augmented with PLI using existing
RowID and achieving query performance competitive to that of a native clustered index (or
even exceed native performance because clustered indexes are not implemented to act as
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a true sparse index). Furthermore, PLI is also associated with surprisingly low overhead
and higher tolerance to storage fragmentation (due to inserts) because of its sparse nature
and approximate (rather than strict) ordering.
9.2 Related Work
Some DBMSes (e.g., Oracle and MySQL) implement an Index Organized Table (IOT) as
a replacement for clustered table. Figure 9.1 includes an example of IOT compared to a
clustered index or PLI. While a traditional clustered index is still an additional structure
that happens to be aligned with the sorting order of the table (table and index are two dis-
tinct structures), IOT is a merged structure with rows of the table spliced into the leaf nodes
of the index itself. IOTs do achieve clustering (textbook definition) in that the table data
is now kept sorted as new rows are inserted. However, this solution comes at a price. The
leaves of the BTree data structure are logically sorted forming a linked list (each leaf node
points to the next sibling). However, such linked list is not guaranteed to maintain a phys-
ical ordering as a clustered table usually does. Furthermore, even if a physical ordering of
index leaves exists initially, BTree maintenance algorithm cannot maintain such continuity
as the tree splits and merges (nor is this the goal of BTree structure).
Kimura et al. proposed dividing a table into buckets as a scan unit with correlation maps
(CMs) index [42]. Using buckets to scan a table allows for a compressed index structure,
but can result in false positives. A compressed index structure can be cached, reducing I/O
operations for index maintenance just like PLI. Similar to CMs, our method records the
ranges of values stored for each bucket. Unlike CMs, our method only requires access to
internal row identifier – while CMs require a built-in clustered index to operate. As we
show in our experiments, built-in clustered index has some practical (database-specific)
limitations.
Generalized partial indexing builds unclustered indexes around records defined by the
user, leaving some records not indexed [78]. A physical location index is similar in that
the user defines which sections, i.e. buckets, of the table to reorder possibly leaving some
buckets unordered. However, PLI provide the benefit of indexing to most records, and ap-
proximately sorts data across buckets. In both methods, index maintenance cost is reduced
by only recording access or reorganizing data that benefits queries.
Database cracking expands on generalized partial indexing by reorganizing a cracker
index in pieces accessed by queries [39]. Our work allows the user to reorganize data across
units of buckets, where the size of the bucket is determined by the user instead of a query.
Similar to database cracking, data is only organized across, not within, a piece or bucket.
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Figure 9.2: Architecture of PLI.
The major difference between the two is that database cracking requires significant rewrite
of the DBMS engine, while we add PLI to a live database.
Cheng et al. implements predicate introduction to improve query performance [10].
Predicate introduction can be used to improve a query by accessing a column with an index,
or by reducing the tuples scanned for a join. Instead of rewriting queries based on structures
created by the user, our work rewrites queries with constraints on the database internal row
identifier in the WHERE clause of the query. Since the row identifier is typically used to
access rows when a full table scan is not used, there is no benefit to using user created
structures.
9.3 How to Build a Custom Clustered Index
To create a database-independent clustered in a DBMS, we augment the DBMS with a
module that consists of a sparse index structure, a maintenance component and an auto-
mated SQL query re-writer. Section 9.4 presents results using a PostgreSQL and Oracle
DBMSes.
9.3.1 Architecture
The architecture of PLI operation is shown in Figure 9.2. We rely on the native database
table(A) with no modifications or assumptions about DBMS engine features (e.g., DBMS
may not even support clustering). Initially, we use DBCarver to inspect table layout as
it currently exists. As shown in [91], looking for specific pages in a table is orders of
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magnitude faster compared to full reconstruction of disk image. If the table is sufficiently
(approximately) organized in the desired fashion and can be represented as a sequence of
bucket ranges (e.g., first 10 pages contain function values [0 – 10], next 10 pages contain
function values [9 – 12], etc.), then PLI can be built immediately; otherwise, we need to
reorganize the table (by creating a replacement table with custom ORDER BY clause). Note
that any sorting function supported by DBMS can be chosen (e.g., income-expenses or√
income). The PLI structure is then constructed(D) as a substitute for the native DBMS
index – Figure 9.1 outlines different index choices. PLI is orders of magnitude cheaper
to maintain when compared to a regular index for two reasons: 1) PLI is sparse and thus
very small, and 2) PLI does not need to track DELETE operations (we explain why in this
section). Finally, in order to query with PLI, we use a simple query rewrite process(G) that
occurs outside of the database. An incoming query is augmented to include a predicate on
database-specific implementation of the RowID to instruct the DBMS engine which pages
to read. The rest of this section discusses creation and use of PLI in more detail.
9.3.2 Initial Setup
The first step in using PLI is to inspect the table and organize it (if necessary) according
to the desired access pattern. Note that reorganization refers the table data itself not to
creation of an additional index. Secondary index does not permit sequential access and
introduces significant overhead in addition to the original table. Databases clustering func-
tionality is severely restricted in practice (e.g., in many DBMSes clustering index key must
be unique). Despite the fact that sparse access is the distinguishing feature of clustering
indexes, they are never truly sparse (e.g., using only 1 index entry per 80 rows on a page)
when used in practice.
If the table is not already sorted as we prefer, we impose the ordering by recreating that
table structure. In either case we discard the existing secondary index (as PLI will replace
it). Database user can choose arbitrary ordering that need not be unique or strict; any
function or rule supported by ORDER BY clause would be acceptable. To order table T on
function of columns (A-C), we create a new structure as CREATE TABLE T PLI AS
SELECT * FROM T ORDER BY (A-C). This new table structure replaces the original
table and requires very little maintenance from the host DBMS (since new rows can be
appended at the end of the table).
Once the sorted table is created, we use DBCarver to validate table’s storage sort-
ing at the physical level. The table is likely to be sorted (or at least mostly-sorted) as the
ORDER BY clause specified as non-clustered tables are generally stored in order of inser-
tion. However, although such sorting is not guaranteed – in practice, new table may be
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stored differently on disk (most notably in Oracle). Using the underlying sorting, we next
generate a bucket mapping structure, recording RowID boundaries for each bucket.
9.3.3 PLI Structure and Maintenance
The structure of PLI is similar to that of a traditional sparse primary index. A regular sparse
index will direct access to the correct page or sequence of pages instead of referencing
particular rows. For example, in Figure 9.1, PLI consists of 3 buckets of approximately
sorted data and an overflow bucket for a total of 20 rows in the table. Instead of storing
20 index entries, PLI only contains 4; the first bucket covers first two pages with six
rows – PLI structure knows that all indexed values in that range are between #1 and #10
(without knowing the exact order) and can direct the query to scan this range if the predicate
matches. The following two pages belong to bucket two which includes range between #7
to #14; note that approximate nature of sorting can result in overlap between buckets, e.g.,
PLI does not know whether #8 is in the first or second bucket and will direct the query
to scan both buckets for this value. Thus, PLI can conceptually tolerate any amount of
out-of-orderness, but performance will deteriorate accordingly. In addition to the indexed
buckets, we also include the overflow bucket (values [5–13]) which contains recent inserts.
We next discuss maintenance costs. Interestingly, PLI’s approach requires no mainte-
nance for deletes. Sparse bucket-based indexing knowingly permits false-positive matches
that will be filtered out by the query after I/O was performed. Therefore, the index does not
change when rows are deleted (e.g., in Figure 9.1, deletion of #6 will not change the first
bucket in any way). Update queries can be viewed as DELETE + INSERT, permitting us
to treat updates as insert as well.
A new insert would typically be appended at the end of table storage, unless there is
unallocated space on one of the existing pages and the database is willing to make in-place
overwrite (Oracle has a setting to control page utilization, while PostgreSQL avoids in-
place overwrite inserts). If the insert is appended, the overflow bucket needs to be updated
only if the range of values in the bucket changes. For example, in Figure 9.1 overflow
bucket is [5–13] and thus does not need to be changed when #10 is inserted into overflow.
There are several ways to determine the location of the newly inserted row to update
PLI (RowID is the internal database identifier that reflects location of the row). Our current
prototype queries the DBMS for it (SELECT CTID in PostgreSQL or SELECT ROWID
in Oracle). However, for bulk inserts it we can also use DBCarver to inspect the storage
and determine the RowID ourselves. The new insert may overwrite a previously deleted
row at any position (as we are avoiding maintenance overheads of clustering), which could
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potentially widen range of values in that bucket creating more false-positives. The degra-
dation is gradual, but eventually the table will need to be reorganized. The comparison
of different reorganization algorithms is beyond the scope of this chapter, but storage re-
organization can be done by targeting specific rows (executing commands that will cause
out-of-order rows to be re-appended) or by resorting the whole table.
The storage size and the cost to maintain the PLI structure is proportional to the number
of buckets that it uses. We have experimented with different granularities and bucket sizes
– and, in practice, having a bucket of fewer than 12 disk pages does not improve query
performance. Assuming about 80 rows per page, PLI structure only needs one bucket
per one thousand (1000) rows. A structure of this size can be kept in RAM and used or
maintained at a negligible overhead cost.
9.3.4 Query rewrite
In order to use PLI index, incoming SQL queries are rewritten to take full advantage of
the current layout of the table. Additional PLI-based predicates are added to the query to
restrict the disk scan range; bucket-based indexing is approximate by nature and provides
a superset range within which data of interested resides. For example, consider Figure 9.1
– a query predicate:
id BETWEEN \#1 AND \#6
is rewritten into:
id BETWEEN \#1 AND \#6
AND CTID BETWEEN Row1 AND Row6
AND CTID BETWEEN Row19 AND Row20.
In Oracle ROWID will be used instead of CTID in PostgreSQL. The first added condition
matches the range of buckets (in that case the first bucket from PLI) and the second condi-
tion corresponds to the overflow bucket. This access range results in a more efficient pattern
of disk reading by minimizing seeks and by removing the overhead of secondary index use.
While this PLI condition does include false-positives (specifically, id #10 at Row6 and #13
at Row20), the original query predicate (id BETWEEN #1 AND #6) will elminate false
positives.
9.4 Experiments
Due to limitations of available user access to the database-internal RowID attribute, our
experiments were limited to two databases, PostgreSQL and Oracle. We used data from the
Unified New York City Taxi Data Set [76]. The experiments reported here were performed
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on servers with an Intel X3470 2.93 GHz processor and 8GB of RAM running Windows
Server 2008 R2 Enterprise SP1 or CentOS 6.5.
9.4.1 Experiment 1: Regular Clustering
The objective of this experiment is to compare the performance of a table with a native
clustered index and a table with a PLI. In Part-A, we collected query runtimes using a
predicate on the sorted attribute. In Part-B, we compare the time to batch insert data into
each table. In Part-C, we repeat the queries from Part-A.
Part A We began with 16M rows (2.5GB) from the Green Trips table sorted by the
Trip Distance column. For each DBMS, we created one table that implemented the
native clustering technique and another table that implemented PLI. Since an Oracle IOT
can only be organized by the primary key, we prepended the Trip Distance column
to the original primary key. We then ran three queries, which performed sequential range
scans, with selectivities of 0.10, 0.20, and 0.30.
Table 9.1 summarizes the runtimes, which are normalized with respect to a full table
scan (i.e., 100% is the cost of scanning the table without using the index). Since our goal is
to evaluate a generalized database approach, the absolute time of a table scan is irrelevant;
we are concerned with the runtime improvement resulting from indexing. In PostgreSQL,
both approaches exhibited comparable performance, a few percent slower than the optimal
runtime (e.g., for 0.20 selectivity the optimal runtime would be 20% of the full table scan).
PLI remained competitive with native PostgreSQL clustering – the slight edge in PLI
performance is due to not having the overhead of accessing the secondary index structure.
PostgreSQL has to read the index and the table, while PLI access only reads the table
(PLI structure itself is negligible in size). In Oracle, PLI significantly outperformed the
IOT for the range scans. The queries that used a PLI were about three times faster than
those that used an IOT. Oracle performance is impacted by lower average page utilization
(and unused space) in the nodes of the IOT B-Tree.
Query Selectivity
DBMS Index Type 0.10 0.20 0.30
PostgreSQL Clustered 15% 26% 38%PLI 13% 25% 36%
Oracle Clustered 31% 57% 86%PLI 12% 21% 32%
Table 9.1: Query runtimes as percent of a full table scan (clustered on attribute vs PLI).
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Part B Next, we bulk loaded 1.6m additional rows (250MB or 10% of the table) into each
Green Trips from Part-A. In PostgreSQL, the records were loaded in 263 seconds for
the table that implemented native clustering and 62 seconds for the table that implemented
a PLI. Clustering is a one-time operation in PostgreSQL and ordering is not maintained
as inserts are performed. Therefore, the observed overhead was primarily associated with
the clustered index itself. A PLI does not have a significant maintenance cost due to its
sparse and approximate nature. In Oracle, the records were loaded in 713 seconds for the
IOT, and 390 seconds for the table that implemented a PLI. Since IOT used a B-Tree to
order records, the observed high overhead was caused by maintenance of the B-Tree as new
records were inserted.
Query Selectivity
DBMS Index Type 0.10 0.20 0.30
PostgreSQL Clustered 90% 115% 139%PLI 23% 31% 44%
Oracle Clustered 123% 238% 347%PLI 20% 31% 40%
Table 9.2: Query runtimes as percent of a full table scan (clustered on attribute vs PLI
after bulk insert).
Part C To evaluate the maintenance approach for each index, we re-ran the queries from
Part-A. Table 9.2 summarizes the resulting runtimes. For both DBMSes, the queries that
used a PLI incurred a penalty of 10% or less compared to Part-A, which is consistent with
Part-B inserting 10% worth of new rows. All newly inserted records were appended to
the end of the table and were therefore incorporated into the overflow bucket (requiring
minimal maintenance in the process and causing limited query performance deterioration).
In PostgreSQL, the queries using the native clustered index slowed down by a factor of
about 4 due to the interleaving seeks inefficiency discussed in Section 1. In Oracle, the
queries using native clustering also slowed down by a factor of about 4, albeit for a different
reason. While the IOT maintains logically sorted records within the leaf node pages, these
leaf node pages are not necessarily ordered on disk during B-Tree re-organization resulting
in an increased number of seeks for the queries.
9.4.2 Experiment 2: Expression Clustering
The objective of this experiment is to expand upon Experiment 1, and evaluate an expres-
sion based (rather than attribute-based) index to demonstrate the extendability and flexibil-
ity of the PLI approach. In Part-A, we collected query runtimes using a predicate on the
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sorted attribute. In Part-B, we compare the time to batch insert data into each table. In
Part-C, we re-run the same queries from Part-A.
Part A We began with 16M rows (2.5GB) from the Green Trips table, and we sorted
the table on T ip Amount
Trip Distance
function (i.e., tip-per-mile for each trip as our order-preserving
function). For each DBMS, we created one table that implemented the native clustering
technique and another table that implemented PLI. As Oracle does not support function-
based indexes, we created a computed column, and prepended this computed column to
the primary key so an IOT could be built. We then ran three queries, which performed
sequential range scans with selectivities of 0.10, 0.20, and 0.30.
Table 9.3 summarizes the runtimes, which are again normalized with respect to full
table scan. These baseline performance results are very similar the result from Experiment
1: Part-A demonstrating that query access for the function based index does not impose a
significant penalty for any of the approaches. The runtimes for the Oracle IOT were slightly
higher, which we believe were caused by additional storage space used by the computed
column.
Query Selectivity
DBMS Index Type 0.10 0.20 0.30
PostgreSQL Clustered 13% 25% 37%PLI 15% 25% 37%
Oracle Clustered 30% 62% 100%PLI 11% 21% 32%
Table 9.3: Query runtimes as percent of a full table scan (clustered on expression-based
index vs PLI).
Part B Next, we bulk loaded 1.6m additional rows (250MB or 10% of the table) into
each Green Trips from Part-A. For the Oracle IOT containing the computed column,
we previously generated the value, and we stored it in the raw data file. In PostgreSQL,
the records were loaded in 917 seconds for the table that implemented native clustering,
and 70 seconds for the table that implemented a PLI. This demonstrates that a traditional
expression-based index is far more expensive to maintain than a regular index, producing
much higher overheads. PLI requires very minimal maintenance – same as in Experiment
1, without an expression-based clustering. The insert cost into the table itself is using
append and is thus comparable for both. In Oracle, the records were loaded in 1527 seconds
for the IOT, and 408 seconds for the table that implemented a PLI. This drastic overhead
increase in the time to load the data (compared to Experiment 1: Part-B) can be explained
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by data distributed. The data in Experiment 1 was more uniform requiring less B-Tree
rebuilding, while computed ordering was much more scattered resulting in more B-Tree
restructuring.
Part C To evaluate the maintenance penalties for each index, we re-ran the queries from
Part-A as summarized in Table 9.4. Just as in Experiment 1, the queries that used PLI
increased in cost by about 10% of a full table scan – as expected because inserted records
were appended to the overflow bucket causing queries to scan additional 10% of overflow
data. In PostgreSQL, the runtimes for the native expression-based clustered index increased
by about a factor of 3 due to interleaving seeks as in Experiment 1. Interestingly, the
penalty caused by computed index and storage fragmentation was not nearly as significant
as regular built-in clustered index. We expect that PostgreSQL makes some additional
effort to mitigate the overhead of interleaving seeks when utilizing an expression-based
clustered index. In Oracle, the queries using the IOT increased by a factor of about 7,
which is significantly more than Experiment 1: Part-C. This difference can be attributed to
a greater amount of fragmentation caused by the B-Tree restructuring in Part-B.
Query Selectivity
DBMS Index Type 0.10 0.20 0.30
PostgreSQL Clustered 52% 79% 93%PLI 22% 31% 44%
Oracle Clustered 259% 461% 706%PLI 19% 30% 40%
Table 9.4: Query runtimes as percent of a full table scan (clustered on expression-based vs
PLI after bulk insert).
9.5 Conclusion
We have presented PLI – a generalized clustered indexing approach that can be added to
a live relational database using rowid column. This indexing approach uses a bucket-
based sparse indexing structure, which results in a very lightweight and easy-to-maintain
index. The sparse pointers into the table can easily tolerate approximate clustering (i.e.,
reordering within the bucket is irrelevant) and trivially allows PLI variations to use an
expression-based index to match query predicate. DBMSes could expose rowid column
further to make custom clustered index creation simple for the user – or this approach can
be used to create a generation of better clustered indexes inside the database engine, as
existing engines do not implement true (i.e., textbook-like) sparse clustering indexes.
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Chapter 10
Future Work
10.1 Testing framework
10.1.1 Introduction
Prior to a digital examination, investigators select the proper forensic tool(s) based on the
tool’s capabilities. For evidence to be usable (e.g., admissible in court), forensic tools must
be tested using well-accepted benchmarks and repeatable environments. Additionally, test-
ing is of the utmost importance for newly developed forensic tools, which have unproven
functionality.
Database forensics is an emerging sub-field of digital forensics. As DBMSes are in-
creasingly used in all facets of everyday life (e.g., cell phones, web browsers, web stores,
banking), there is a growing demand for database forensic tools. However, due to the rel-
atively young age of the field, datasets, workloads, and test environments are yet to be
developed. Stable, controlled, and repeatable experiments are an undeniable requirement
for scientific validation. Having a set of representative corpora enhances the scientific eval-
uation of forensic methods; they can be used as a baseline to evaluate the success of new
database forensic tools and methods using objective metrics.
Testing environments should support benchmarks consisting of both a dataset and a
corresponding workload to measure tool metrics. A good benchmark allows users to model
real-world requirements. For example, law enforcement wants to know the data that can be
collected from a cell phone where a suspected criminal receives, sends, and deletes SMS
messages. Therefore, there is an obvious need for a comprehensive corpus that supports
both a variety of DBMSes and a comprehensive range of benchmarks that model real-world
scenarios.
As future work we propose to address this problem and contribute to repeatability and
comprehensive database forensic tool testing. We propose two main contributions: 1) An
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automated framework to setup, run, and collect storage for repeatable and controlled cor-
pora creation to be used for database forensic tool evaluation. 2) We will use our framework
to generate a public, multi-modal corpus. Our generated corpus will then be applied to a
set of forensic software to evaluate the metrics of these tools and demonstrate the impact
of our testing framework.
10.1.2 Related Work
We account for the work by Yannikos et al. [94] and Diffallah et al. [16] when defining our
framework requirements and design. Yannikos et al. presented a framework to generate
synthetic disk images for testing file carvers [94]. Similarly, we automatically capture stor-
age based on user specified models. Differently, we capture disk images, RAM snapshots,
network packets, and individual files (in addition to disk images), we incorporate accepted
benchmarks (rather than generate user-specified models) within our system, and we collect
statistics and metadata for testing database carvers. Diffallah et al. presented a testbed to
benchmark relational DBMSes [16]. Similarly, our framework uses a workload manager to
run a specified benchmark and collects statistics and metadata about the DBMS and server
being tested. Differently, the statistics and metadata we collect are intended for forensic
testing (rather than transaction processing), and we collect storage to maintain a forensic
corpus.
Several real-world corpora exist for digital forensics [24, 23], but full knowledge of
what forensic artifacts exist on them makes tool evaluation (especially in the emerging
field of database forensics) difficult. Recently, Nemetz et al. presented a synthetic cor-
pus to test SQLite DBMS forensic tools [53]. This corpus is the only publicly available
database forensics corpus; our proposal makes some significant extensions and improve-
ments to Nemetz’s work. First, they only collected the SQLite data files, whereas, we
collect all storage (e.g., disk images, RAM snapshots) that contain other forensic data and
metadata. Second, their corpus contains only the very basic database operations, whereas
our framework supports any type of user-specified benchmark that model desired scenarios.
Third, their work was done for only SQLite DBMS, whereas, our framework is designed
to support all relational DBMSes.
10.1.3 Framework Description
Our proposed framework contains a synthetic workload manager to incorporate realistic
datasets allowing users to model real-world scenarios, a set of global actions to create
multi-modal corpora and control the rate of storage collection from a VM, and a defined
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Figure 10.1: Architecture of automated corpus generation framework.
set of statistics and metadata that is automatically collected and included with a corpus for
accurate and comprehensive tool testing. Figure 10.1 displays the framework overview. In
a configuration file, the user specifies the benchmark for the workload manager (A) to use
and the set of global action (B) to perform. While forensic data is generated, (C) statistics
and metadata are collected to be included for later forensic tool evaluation.
The workload manager (A) is responsible for reading the user-provided benchmark
(specified in the config file) and the benchmark parameters (e.g., transaction throughput,
dataset size). Given these inputs, the workload manager generates a synthetic workload
based on these parameters. The work in this proposal assumes a single client; future work
will expand support to simulating a workload from multiple clients.
The global actions (B) are functions accessible anytime while the workload manager
is in operation. These commands will include the ability to capture a disk image, RAM
snapshot, files, and network files (i.e., a multi-modal set of forensic evidence). The ability
to capture a set of heterogeneous forensic data allows for a wide variety of tools to be tested
using our framework.
As the workload manager executes transactions and global actions are performed, the
statistics and metadata collector (C) captures information to summarize and represent this
activity. We will define the metadata and statistics that must be collected. Examples of
relevant information include the number of records affected by a transaction, the amount of
file system and database file slack space during a disk image export, and the buffer cache
utilization during a RAM snapshot export.
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We presented a prototype of this framework in [45] as SysGen. SysGen currently exe-
cutes custom workloads and generates a corpus, which includes the DBMS files, full disk
image, RAM snapshot, and network packets, for most relational DBMSes
10.1.4 Public Corpus Generation and Framework Demonstration
We plan to use our framework to create public corpora to be hosted by the DePaul Data
System Laboratory. These corpora will include several established benchmarks in database
systems research (e.g., SEATS [18], TPC-C [19], LinkBench [20]) and at least two ad-
ditional benchmarks created by us. Each benchmark will be run against multiple DBM-
Ses (e.g., Oracle, PostgreSQL, SQLite, MySQL). Most database systems benchmarks do
a good job of simulating OLTP (e.g., webstores) and OLAP (e.g., data warehouses) en-
vironments, but do not simulate the real-world environments experienced by most of our
collaborators in law enforcement (e.g., the Chicago Regional Computer Forensics Lab,
MITRE, Royal Canadian Mounted Police). We will create new benchmarks to simulate
these environments. Specifically, our new benchmarks will model personal data uses, such
as cell phones and web browsers.
10.2 Systematic Reverse Engineering
10.2.1 Introduction
Digital forensic tools enable investigators to reconstruct data (e.g., deleted files) and event
timelines (e.g., sequence of actions in remote hack) following a security breach. A foren-
sic analyst can use the reconstructed artifacts to detect subtle advanced persistent threats
that skirt preventative security measures (e.g., access control or encryption), particularly in
cases of insider attack. Accurate event timelines inform investigators on how to implement
future preventative measures and what data was compromised.
The current state-of-the-art approach to digital forensic analysis is to reverse engineer
specific systems, often for a specific purpose. Developing a dedicated forensic solution for
each system (e.g., for each database, for each file system) is obviously problematic, but
the reality is much worse. As new, unforeseen analysis approaches emerge or new ver-
sions of the same system are released (changing the internal storage structure), forensic
investigators develop and publish multiple approaches for the same system. For example,
SQLite database is of particular significance to forensics because it is used by mobile de-
vices (e.g., SMS messages) and Internet browsers (e.g., preferences or bookmarks). Over
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the last decade, researchers published three papers focusing only on algorithms for re-
covering deleted records from a SQLite database (starting from Pereira [66] in 2009). That
does not include a generalized approach to reconstructing relational databases that included
SQLite among others [86] and at least half a dozen SQLite recovery tools with varying ca-
pability (explored in [53]) and of unknown scientific provenance (not explored by anyone
to our knowledge).
Reverse engineering a system (particularly without access to the source code) is an
arduous task. However, it is usually not a new or a novel technique and creates a bot-
tleneck for tool development. This means current digital forensic tools are in a constant
state of ‘catch-up’ with new technologies. Despite all of the reverse engineering in digital
forensics, little effort has been devoted to developing automated or systematic reverse en-
gineering approaches. Complete (or even partial) automatic reverse engineering advances
digital forensics through quicker tool development, composability, abstraction for analysis
tools, and alternate analysis methods using heterogeneous data sources. Furthermore, au-
tomation anticipates new systems or system changes rather than waiting for new releases
and constantly playing ‘catch-up’ – a great business model to keep forensic tool developers
employed, but it is not always ideal for end users.
Future work makes a case for what we believe to be one of the most promising ways to
design systematic approaches (and innovation) in digital forensics: tool parameterization.
The goal of this work is to bring to light that parameterization is possible for forensic tools
and that it should be explored more by serious digital forensic researchers. To describe
this process, we broke it down into four steps: 1) define parameters that describe metadata
and data layout, 2) create synthetic data to identify parameter values, 3) collect parameter
values as the synthetic data forces changes to data structures, and 4) define how to use these
parameters in carving tools.
10.2.2 Overview
DBCarver (and page carving) is our strongest example of systematic reverse engineering
with parameterization. DBCarver describes all DBMS metadata and data with a set of
parameters, rather than a tool for each DBMS. It was also designed to anticipate storage
architecture changes in existing DBMSes or new DBMSes.
We also described a systematic framework to reverse engineer database memory in
[84]. Rather than reconstructing data at the page-level as with DBCarver, this work de-
scribes how to reverse engineer four major DBMS memory areas regardless of the system
configurations: I/O cache, sort area, query cache, and transaction buffer.
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We propose that our work with DBCarver and in [84] can be translated to all systems
(e.g., file systems or NoSQL DBMSes) and data structures (e.g., process control blocks
or OS page tables). While some of these systems and data structures are used to manage
unstructured data, the metadata used to describe the data will be structured and therefore
has potential to translate to our systematic approaches in reverse engineering.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
This dissertation presented our novel database forensic method of page carving and an im-
plementation as DBCarver. We then presented a standard storage format for database
forensics called DB3F, and an API called ODSA to access data stored in DB3F. Next,
we presented three applications that require low-level storage information that cannot be
obtained through DBMS APIs and must use database forensics to obtain this data. The
first application, DBDetective, seeks to detect malicious database activity that bypasses
audit logs. The second application, DBStorageAuditor, seeks to detect illegitimate
modifications to DBMS files made at the OS level. The third application, PLI, builds an in-
dex that supports approximate clustering. Finally, we presented future work that addresses
more thorough testing of DBCarver, the applications that use its output, and database
forensics in general. Future work also discusses expanding our novel methods in database
forensics to all of digital forensics.
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